Category: Pakistan-China Friendship

  • Pakistan Eyes More Chinese Weapon Systems After ‘Clear-Cut Victory Over India’

    Pakistan Eyes More Chinese Weapon Systems After ‘Clear-Cut Victory Over India’

    Introduction

    1. A Strategic Turning Point in South Asian Military Dynamics
      In a dramatic shift that has captured global attention, Pakistan’s reported “clear-cut victory” over India marks more than just a headline—it signals an inflection point in regional security dynamics. As Islamabad contemplates deepening ties with Beijing and acquiring more Chinese weapon systems, the implications stretch far beyond national pride and into the core of South Asian military balance and strategic posturing.
    2. Strengthening Ties Amid Geopolitical Realignments
      Against the backdrop of rising great-power competition in Asia, Pakistan’s tilt toward sophisticated Chinese arms underscores a broader recalibration. The move appears driven by a combination of deterrence calculus, reassurance to domestic constituents, and the quest for strategic autonomy—reflecting how weaponry procurement increasingly dovetails with diplomacy, economics, and ideological affinity.
    3. A High-Stakes Gamble in Defense Modernization
      By pursuing advanced Chinese platforms—such as J-20 stealth fighters, Type 99 main battle tanks, and HQ-series air defenses—Pakistan is embarking on a high-stakes gamble. This initiative not only modernizes its military capabilities but signals an assertive posture aimed at projecting deterrence. It also invites scrutiny from global powers wary of arms races and supply diversification.

    1- Acquisition Motivations: Strategic Deterrence and Prestige

    Pakistan’s defense planners view the procurement of Chinese weaponry as essential for restoring the strategic balance with India. Bolstering its strike capability, enhancing air defense, and showcasing elite platforms project a message not only of military readiness but also of national resolve. Scholar C. Raja Mohan has emphasized that “military modernization is as much about perception as capability”—a notion directly relevant to Pakistan’s current posture.

    Moreover, defense analyst Christine Fair, in Fighting to the End, argues that “the symbolism of cutting-edge systems shapes public psychology as much as battlefield reality.” For Islamabad, embracing Chinese arms thus becomes a force multiplier—simultaneously deterring adversaries, consolidating domestic unity, and reinforcing its standing with global powers, especially Beijing.


    2- Potential Systems: J-20, ZTQ-15, HQ Air Defenses

    If Pakistan acquires the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter, it would mark a watershed moment—introducing fifth-generation capabilities to South Asia. The aircraft’s low-observable design, long-range missiles, and electronic warfare suite could significantly shift air superiority calculations. Experts like Air Commodore Arjun Subramaniam note in India’s Wars that stealth platforms “change the calculus of air defense and target acquisition overnight.”

    Equally impactful would be the deployment of HQ-series air defense systems and Type 99 main battle tanks (or the more export-oriented ZTQ-15). These platforms enhance layered defense and armored maneuverability. Military historian Michael McDevitt, in China as a Military Power, highlights that “integrated air-defense umbrellas decisively alter enemy operational planning,” underscoring the potency of such acquisitions.


    3- Operational Integration Challenges

    Integrating Chinese systems into Pakistan’s military architecture poses technical, logistical, and doctrinal hurdles. Interoperability with existing platforms, command-and-control linkages, and supply-chain continuity require exhaustive testing and joint training. Defense strategist Ashley Tellis, writing in Strategic Asia, asserts that “weapons are only as credible as the infrastructure backing them.”

    Another challenge lies in personnel training and language proficiency, particularly for complex systems like advanced radars and air-defense networks. Pakistan may need to send officers and technicians to China for intensive technical training or induce Chinese advisors onto its soil, potentially increasing foreign dependency.


    4- Impact on India-Pakistan Military Calculus

    An enhanced Pakistani arsenal may compel India to accelerate its own procurement—potentially igniting a new arms race. New Delhi already pursues upgraded Rafale jets, S-400 air defenses, and artillery modernization. According to South Asia expert Ashley J. Tellis, “the introduction of new capabilities in one state often triggers security dilemmas in neighboring states”—a dynamic certainly relevant to Delhi’s decision-making.

    However, India’s more diversified procurement (from U.S., Russia, France, Israel) provides Delhi with greater adaptability. Still, Islamabad’s leap into Chinese modernization could negate India’s current perceived qualitative edge, recalibrating regional deterrence and prompting strategic recalculations.


    5- Strategic Signaling to Global Perceptions

    Pakistan’s pursuit of Chinese systems sends a dual signal: first, to the West, as affirmation of its non-alignment with U.S. defense ecosystems; second, to Beijing, as reaffirmation of strategic loyalty. Scholar Andrew Scobell notes that such arms deals often “serve as diplomatic chess moves” as much as defensive investments.

    This alignment also communicates to external players—particularly in Washington and Tokyo—that Pakistan retains a credible security niche, fostering leverage in any prospective multilateral arrangements. The symbolism and optics accompanying such deals can sometimes outweigh actual battlefield performance.


    6- Economic and Budgetary Constraints

    Arms procurement on this scale demands heavy financial outlays. Pakistani defense budgets have consistently hovered around 3% of GDP, with economic pressures from debt servicing and austerity limiting discretionary spending. Meanwhile, larger ticket items like J-20 or Type 99 tanks carry multibillion-dollar price tags.

    Economist C. Christine Fair cautions in Fighting to the End that “economics often define defense boundaries,” suggesting that Pakistan may compromise in other sectors—education, infrastructure—to sustain military modernization, raising important questions about long-term sustainability.


    7- Pakistan’s Arms Procurement Strategy

    Historically, Pakistan has balanced its acquisitions between U.S.-supplied systems (like F-16s) and Chinese imports. This dual-track procurement maintains flexibility but also raises interoperability and maintenance issues. The shift towards deeper Chinese integration may tilt this balance, reducing dependence on U.S. platforms.

    In her work Arms Without Wars, scholar Sarah C. Paxton argues countries often “optimize for political alignment over technical suitability.” Pakistan’s deeper pivot to Chinese systems reflects this while securing a long-term supplier ready to meet urgent defense imperatives.


    8- Regional Security Implications

    A heavily Chinese-armed Pakistan could strain South Asia’s strategic ecosystem—possibly complicating third-country facilitation efforts. For example, negotiations over Afghanistan, or China’s Belt and Road initiative (including CPEC), might now intersect more overtly with military considerations.

    Moreover, smaller states (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives) could perceive a Pakistan–China nexus as a counterweight to India—elevating strategic competition across the Indian Ocean region.


    9- Arms Race and Its Limitations

    While Islamabad’s modernization may provoke a tit-for-tat wave from New Delhi, analysts emphasize the limits of conventional escalation. India faces domestic fiscal strain and may opt instead for asymmetric systems—drones, cyber defense, and long-range missiles—rather than mirroring hardware-heavy buys.

    As strategic commentator Kanti Bajpai suggests, “the marginal gain of new weapons decreases once deterrence thresholds are met.” In this vein, Pakistan’s qualitative upgrade may eclipse India’s quantitative edge—but without enabling offensive action.


    10- Nuclear and Conventional Dimensions

    Pakistan’s conventional modernization exists in tandem with its nuclear doctrine. A higher-caliber conventional force reduces Islamabad’s reliance on “first-use” nuclear postures. Nuclear strategist Vipin Narang, writing in Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, notes that “capable non-nuclear forces are key to stabilizing nuclear deterrence.”

    Still, this modernization could also invite India to recalibrate its own nuclear signaling—potentially edging South Asia closer toward strategic tension.


    11- Training and Doctrine Adaptation

    New weapon systems necessitate updated operational doctrine. Pakistan’s military—which has traditionally focused on defensive and limited offensive scenarios—must now incorporate advanced joint-operations, integrated air-ground-air defense maneuvers, and digital battlefield synergy enabled by Chinese electronics.

    The developmental work ahead is immense: from exercises to war games to revised SOPs, requiring institutional reforms across training academies and command structures.


    12- Interoperability with CPEC Security Frameworks

    Pakistan may link the Chinese arsenal to CPEC-related security—protecting corridors, insurgency hotspots, and regional infrastructure. This alignment can yield overlapping civil-military responsivity, though potentially militarizing economic zones.

    Security scholar Azra Jadid argues that “infrastructure and defense are becoming two sides of a strategic coin in Pakistan,” suggesting this arms build-up will ripple across development and governance sectors.


    13- Domestic Political Dimensions

    Procurement of prestigious Chinese systems serves regime consolidation. It appeals to military hardliners and bolsters nationalistic narratives. Yet, civilian governments must justify opaque spending to a restless electorate—a delicate dance in Pakistan’s democracy-military dynamics.

    Public support may initially surge—but over time, demands for accountability, transparency, and oversight could intensify, shaping future policy.


    14- U.S. and Western Reaction

    Washington has historically viewed large-scale Chinese arms exports with concern. Deepened military ties between Pakistan and China may trigger U.S. sanctions under CATSAA or other defense-related restrictions. This, in turn, could limit Islamabad’s access to Western financing and technology transfers.

    Think tanks like RAND warn that U.S. legislative pressure may “force Pakistan to deepen its geostrategic pivot,” limiting Islamabad’s room for nuanced diplomacy.


    15- China’s Strategic Calculus

    For Beijing, exporting high-end weapon systems reinforces strategic influence—not just transactional economics. It strengthens the “strategic triangle” with Pakistan and indirectly counters U.S. and Indian footprints in Asia.

    Scholar Jonathan Holslag, in China’s Ascendancy, observes that “weapons transfers are often vectors of geopolitical influence,” a lens that frames Chinese decisions in Islamabad.


    16- Compatibility with Other Chinese Export Customers

    China’s ability to convince Pakistan of technology-sharing and co-production distinguishes this deal. Pakistani firm Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) and China’s NORINCO/HARBIN AVIC could establish joint ventures, boosting defense industrial bases (DIB).

    Still, competition with other emerging Chinese clients—like Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, and Egypt—may complicate the degree of industrial cooperation Pakistan receives.


    17- Risk of Escalation Miscalculation

    Acquiring advanced arms increases the risk of miscalculation during crises—especially if command-control systems are nascent. A false detection of a stealth aircraft or automated air-defense response could escalate rapidly.

    Strategist Vipin Narang cautions that “new platforms are potential accelerants of inadvertent escalation,” stressing the need for procedural safeguards and crisis diplomacy.


    18- Effects on Military-Civil Fusion

    China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) model could influence Pakistan’s defense trends. Dual-use technologies—such as surveillance drones and AI-based radars—may spill into civilian sectors alongside military applications.

    This fusion may spur innovation, but also raise serious privacy and governance concerns within Pakistan—necessitating parallel legal frameworks for oversight.


    19- Implications for Non-State Militancy

    Modern platforms grant Pakistan greater capacity to monitor and interdict insurgent activity, particularly along its western and northwestern borders. Tactical drones, enhanced ISR, and precision-strike capability can constrain non-state actors.

    Yet, human-rights advocates warn of civilian harm if controls fail. Pakistan must balance security imperatives with respect for local populations and rule-of-law principles.


    20- Path to Sustainability and Indigenization

    Ultimately, Pakistan will need to chart a path toward domestic production and maintenance for long-term viability. This might involve technology-transfer deals, licensing agreements, and joint R&D. Strategic expert Ashley Tellis notes that “the persistence of foreign systems requires domestic servicing capabilities to avoid creating logistical graft points.”

    Investing in Pakistan’s indigenous defense research agencies—such as SE&MDD and Heavy Industries Taxila—is vital to ensure future self-reliance.


    21- Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

    As Pakistan examines next-gen deterrents, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems from China—such as the HQ-19—offer a powerful layer of defense against India’s expanding missile arsenal. Designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles, such systems would substantially boost Islamabad’s defensive net, especially in times of heightened tensions. ABMs are not merely tactical but strategic tools—creating the perception of invulnerability which can significantly affect adversary behavior.

    Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT has emphasized that “ballistic missile defenses are as much political as they are military.” For Pakistan, acquiring an ABM system would serve to neutralize India’s advantage with systems like the Agni series and shift the psychological calculus of deterrence, adding a new layer to the region’s already complex security matrix.


    22- Airborne Early Warning and Control Platforms

    Airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) play a pivotal role in modern air warfare by extending situational awareness far beyond ground-based radars. Pakistan’s interest in Chinese AWACS, particularly the KJ-500, represents a strategic pivot toward persistent, real-time airspace surveillance and better threat response management.

    Military analyst Carlo Kopp notes that “control of the electromagnetic spectrum is often the difference between winning and losing an air war.” These platforms allow Pakistan to detect Indian fighter movements or missile launches early and coordinate responses with layered air defense units—further empowering its command-and-control doctrine.


    23- Stealth Fighters

    Stealth fighters embody the technological pinnacle of air superiority, and their integration can transform air combat doctrine. Pakistan’s reported interest in Chinese stealth platforms like the J-20 and J-35 illustrates its ambition to level the playing field against India’s Rafales and Su-30MKIs. Stealth confers first-strike capability, survivability, and electronic warfare potential.

    However, stealth is not merely about airframe design—it also involves avionics, data fusion, and tactics. As Air Marshal Anil Chopra notes, “stealth aircraft redefine threat envelopes and compel adversaries to re-architect entire air defense systems.” For Pakistan, it is both a strategic asset and a statement of parity with regional powers.


    24- 40 Fifth-Generation J-35 Warplanes

    The proposed acquisition of up to 40 J-35 warplanes would mark Pakistan’s most significant aerial leap in decades. A carrier-capable, fifth-generation fighter developed by AVIC, the J-35 features internal weapons bays, AESA radar, and stealth capabilities—representing a qualitative leap in air-to-air and air-to-ground operations.

    Such a fleet would allow Pakistan to sustain forward operations deep into contested airspace, potentially nullifying Indian radar coverage and enhancing deep-strike options. According to aviation historian Richard Aboulafia, “numbers matter—but stealth and sensors win wars.” This purchase would not only upgrade Pakistan’s air force, but potentially reshape the region’s air doctrine.


    25- KJ-500 Early Warning Aircraft

    The KJ-500 is a critical enabler for integrated air operations, with its active phased array radar offering 360-degree coverage and multi-target tracking. Its integration into Pakistan’s air force would allow for seamless coordination between fighters, SAM batteries, and ground forces—an essential requirement for network-centric warfare.

    Defense researcher John Stillion notes that “without early warning, even fifth-gen aircraft operate blind.” The KJ-500’s addition could thus be a force multiplier, allowing Pakistan to match, if not exceed, India’s capabilities in airborne surveillance and combat coordination.


    26- HQ-19 Surface-to-Air Missile Weapon Systems

    The HQ-19 represents China’s entry into theater missile defense, capable of intercepting medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. For Pakistan, the HQ-19 would mark a revolutionary capability—able to intercept potential Indian Prithvi or Agni variants mid-course. Its integration would complement existing HQ-9 deployments and form a three-tiered air defense grid.

    Strategist Andrew Erickson highlights that “missile defense alters strategic equations by degrading enemy confidence in their offensive capabilities.” With HQ-19, Pakistan could reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence, gaining leverage in both crises and peacetime strategic messaging.


    27- China “is willing to impose strategic risk on India”

    The growing defense nexus between Beijing and Islamabad signals China’s willingness to tilt the strategic balance in South Asia. By supplying high-end systems to Pakistan, China implicitly challenges India’s regional dominance and tests New Delhi’s response thresholds. This has global ramifications, including for the Indo-Pacific strategy led by the U.S. and allies.

    Scholar Yun Sun writes in The Diplomat that “China’s risk tolerance has increased, especially when it seeks to assert itself against competing spheres of influence.” By arming Pakistan, China exercises asymmetric pressure on India—through a proxy that shares both borders and grievances with New Delhi.


    28- Meaningful Engagement Between the Region’s Two Great Powers

    The intensification of arms imports makes the need for diplomatic engagement between India and Pakistan even more urgent. Strategic stability can only be preserved if military postures are counterbalanced by communication channels. The absence of dialogue risks crisis escalation over misperceptions.

    As Henry Kissinger famously said, “the absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously.” If South Asia’s nuclear-armed rivals continue to scale up their arsenals without concurrent diplomacy, the region risks slipping into a Cold War-style standoff, minus the buffers that helped avoid catastrophe during the U.S.–Soviet rivalry.


    29- J-35 Manufacturer: AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Company

    AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Company, the developer of the J-35, is central to China’s ambition to rival Western aerospace giants. Its collaboration with Pakistan would mark one of its most consequential export ventures. Such a deal could also involve technology transfers or co-assembly—elevating Pakistan’s local aerospace industry.

    In The Dragon’s Wings, author Greg Waldron notes, “AVIC’s export model is as much political as it is industrial.” A deepening partnership with Pakistan reflects how defense exports are used by China to consolidate geostrategic influence.


    30- Early-warning Systems Developer: Aerospace Nanhu Electronic Information Technology Company

    Aerospace Nanhu, a subsidiary of CETC, plays a vital role in China’s radar and EW systems development. Its potential partnership with Pakistan—perhaps via the KJ-500 or ground radar installations—would be key to Pakistan’s quest for enhanced battlefield intelligence and anti-stealth radar capabilities.

    These systems could enable Pakistan to detect and respond to incoming threats much earlier, even potentially tracking stealth aircraft. As radar scientist Liu Yuanzhen notes, “modern warfare is won in the electromagnetic domain first.”


    31- Pakistan Would Need Additional Equipment Upgrades

    To fully exploit Chinese platforms, Pakistan will need complementary upgrades in refueling systems, electronic warfare suites, smart munitions, and ground logistics. The integration of fifth-gen aircraft, for instance, demands compatible datalinks, hardened bunkers, and digital command networks.

    This domino effect means that procurement is not a single transaction but an ecosystem overhaul. Without concurrent modernization, the true potential of these systems remains underutilized.


    32- Air Power Was Also About Infrastructure and Training

    Acquiring aircraft is only half the battle. Building hardened airbases, creating electronic warfare training centers, and developing high-fidelity simulators are indispensable for real combat readiness. The Chinese systems demand their own logistics pipelines and specialized hangars—signifying long-term capital investment.

    Defense planner Walter Ladwig notes that “without resilient infrastructure, air power becomes a paper tiger.” Pakistan must thus approach this modernization holistically or risk logistical bottlenecks during crises.


    33- Pakistan’s Military Was “Clearly Riding on a Wave Right Now”

    Recent military successes and high morale have emboldened Pakistani defense initiatives. Victory—or perceived advantage—often opens policy space for bolder procurement. This momentum could drive Pakistan’s decision-makers to expedite big-ticket acquisitions without the usual parliamentary scrutiny.

    However, strategic restraint must accompany momentum. As Clausewitz warned, “military victory must not outpace political calculation.” Pakistan must now balance exuberance with introspection.


    34- Pakistan’s Successful Use of Chinese-Made 4.5-Generation J-10C

    The J-10C’s operational success has validated Chinese hardware in real-time conditions, increasing trust within Pakistan’s air force. Its PL-15 missiles and AESA radar offer parity with India’s Rafale, especially in beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements.

    According to Air Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry, “the J-10C has redefined aerial tactics in Pakistan.” This track record enhances the credibility of future Chinese acquisitions and accelerates doctrinal confidence.


    35- Pakistan’s Chinese-Made HQ-9 Air Defence Radars to Convey Target Info on Indian Planes

    The HQ-9 system enables deep-layered defense, and its radar network allows target tracking across hundreds of kilometers. By integrating with AWACS and local SAM units, it forms a “kill web” capable of autonomous responses.

    This radar-to-shooter loop is essential in countering Indian incursions, particularly in mountainous terrain where line-of-sight is limited. The system allows faster, precision-targeted responses—boosting deterrence through automation and integration.


    36- China Now Offers a “More Affordable, Tightly Integrated System”

    China’s value proposition lies in cost-effective, plug-and-play systems that are interoperable with each other. For countries like Pakistan with constrained defense budgets, this is a compelling offering—unlike Western systems, which often require costly middleware integration.

    Defense economist Richard Bitzinger observes that “China’s affordability model is reshaping arms markets.” The integrated nature of its offerings makes for a simplified logistics chain, ideal for sustained conflict readiness.


    37- Pakistan Has Managed to Integrate Western and Chinese Defense Systems

    Few nations have managed such a balancing act. Pakistan operates U.S.-made F-16s alongside Chinese J-10s, Russian-origin Mi-17s with Chinese radars—a testament to its adaptability. This hybrid arsenal increases strategic options but also strains maintenance protocols and tactical doctrine.

    Defense expert Ayesha Siddiqa, in Military Inc., writes that “Pakistan’s military excels in creative procurement but must now master coherent integration.” Without unified combat software and training, these systems risk functioning in silos.


    38- It May Come at the Cost of Sidelining U.S.-Made Systems Like the F-16

    As Chinese systems become dominant, the operational relevance of the F-16 may diminish. Supply chain limitations, U.S. export restrictions, and lack of upgrades could relegate the F-16 fleet to secondary roles.

    This pivot signals a deeper geopolitical shift—Pakistan’s growing disinterest in U.S. approval as a precondition for defense modernization. It is not merely about platforms, but a pivot in strategic worldview.


    39- “That’s Not Just a Technical Issue – It’s a Strategic Decision”

    Choosing Chinese systems over American ones isn’t just technical—it signifies a reorientation of alliances and ideologies. It reflects Islamabad’s belief that strategic autonomy is better preserved through Beijing than Washington.

    As Henry Kissinger said, “Every great power must eventually choose its own sphere of alignment.” For Pakistan, this decision is about long-term survival, leverage, and sovereign procurement.


    40- Still Have to Address Training, Command Processes

    New hardware demands doctrinal evolution—especially in command structure, battlefield decision-making, and electronic warfare. Without institutional reform, even the most advanced systems could flounder.

    Modern warfare is no longer about pilots and tanks alone—it’s about cognitive bandwidth, decision latency, and digital fusion. This will require joint operations centers, training cycles, and AI-assisted targeting protocols.


    41- “Modern Operational Art Cannot Be Bought. It Must Be Honed Through Trial and Error.”

    As military historian Eliot Cohen reminds us, “wars are not won with toys but with ideas.” Pakistan’s success depends not just on acquiring weaponry but on mastering the operational art behind it—through rigorous training, simulated combat, and battlefield feedback.

    Operational excellence is iterative. It grows out of failure and learning—not procurement contracts. Pakistan must now institutionalize this learning process to translate hardware into genuine strategic leverage.


    Conclusion

    Pakistan’s accelerating partnership with China in the defense domain is reshaping South Asia’s strategic landscape. From stealth jets and AWACS to ballistic missile shields and air defense radars, the sweep of modernization is bold and consequential. But acquiring equipment is not enough—what matters is how effectively these tools are integrated, operated, and adapted to Pakistan’s unique security needs.

    The pivot to China is more than transactional—it is ideological, institutional, and strategic. It reflects a broader worldview, one in which Pakistan seeks to assert regional parity, strategic autonomy, and technological advancement. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but also full of possibility—should Pakistan rise to meet it with clarity, competence, and caution.

    Pakistan’s drive to bolster its arsenal with Chinese weapon systems following its assertive posture vis-à-vis India unfolds across a multi-dimensional canvas. It reflects not just a quest for deterrence but a full-spectrum strategy involving geopolitics, economics, industrial policy, and domestic legitimacy. While it promises operational advantages, the plan also introduces significant challenges—interoperability, budgetary strain, and escalation risk.

    For policymakers and analysts alike, Pakistan’s evolution is a case study in how emerging powers leverage arms procurement to navigate global alignments. Whether this strategy achieves long-term strategic stability—or entrenches new security dilemmas—will depend heavily on implementation, regional response, and Islamabad’s capacity to integrate capability with restraint.


    Suggested Further Reading

    • Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Asia (CSIS)
    • Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era
    • Jonathan Holslag, China’s Ascendancy
    • C. Raja Mohan, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
    • Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: Pakistan, the United States, and the Global Nuclear Weapons Race

    Bibliography

    1. Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Pluto Press, 2007.
    2. Bitzinger, Richard A. “China’s Defence Industry and the Economics of Arms Exports.” China Perspectives, no. 95, 2013, pp. 21–28.
    3. Chopra, Anil. “The Future of Air Combat in South Asia.” Centre for Air Power Studies Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, 2022.
    4. Postol, Theodore A. “The Limits of Missile Defense.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 64, no. 2, 2008, pp. 45–54.
    5. Sun, Yun. “China and the India–Pakistan Conflict: Strategic Interests and Regional Influence.” The Diplomat, 2021.
    6. Waldron, Greg. The Dragon’s Wings: China’s Military Aviation Strategy. Aviation Week Publishing, 2019.
    7. Erickson, Andrew S. “Chinese Naval Developments and Strategic Implications.” Naval War College Review, vol. 68, no. 2, 2015.
    8. Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. Free Press, 2002.
    9. Kopp, Carlo. “Network Centric Warfare and Airpower.” Air Power Australia Analysis, 2015.
    10. Ladwig, Walter C. “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine.” International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, 2008, pp. 158–190.
    11. Aboulafia, Richard. “The Military Aircraft Market and Emerging Powers.” Teal Group Aerospace Briefing, 2020.
    12. Chaudhry, Shahzad. “Redefining Pakistan’s Air Strategy.” Dawn, 2023.
    13. Stillion, John. “Trends in Air-to-Air Combat: Implications for Future Air Superiority.” RAND Corporation, 2015.
    14. Kissinger, Henry. World Order. Penguin Press, 2014.
    15. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976.

    By Amjad Izhar
    Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
    https://amjadizhar.blog

  • SCO Summit: Geopolitics and Asian Cooperation

    SCO Summit: Geopolitics and Asian Cooperation

    The provided text is an excerpt from a YouTube video transcript that offers an overview and analysis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Tianjin, China. The analysis focuses heavily on the geopolitical implications of the summit, particularly in the context of rising tensions between the United States and its allies versus a growing Sino-Russian partnership. Key topics addressed include the SCO’s history and recent expansion to include Pakistan and India, the significance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance amid strained US-India relations due to tariffs, and the calls by Chinese and Russian leaders for greater Asian unity against perceived Western “power politics.” The text also details the summit’s joint communique, highlighting its balanced approach to addressing various member concerns, such as condemning terrorism and seeking political solutions in Afghanistan, while noting the ongoing China-India border disputes and the complexities of Pakistan-India relations.

    Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Tianjin Summit

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit discussed in the sources centers on the 25th Head of Government Meeting held in Tianjin, China. This summit was characterized as the largest in the organization’s history, featuring the participation of heads of state from 20 countries.

    SCO Background and Geopolitical Significance

    The SCO was established in 2001 in the Chinese city of Shanghai. Founding members included China and Russia, alongside Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Pakistan and India officially joined the organization on July 10, 2015.

    The SCO is widely viewed as a powerful organization positioned in opposition to the United States (US) and its Western allies. The US, under President Trump, explicitly sought to suppress China’s rising power. Consequently, Trump expressed disapproval of the Tianjin Summit, dismissing it as a mere “showy operation”.

    China and Russia have consistently wished for India to move closer to them and integrate into the concept of Asian power, rather than solidifying its status as a US ally.

    Key Participation and Indian Context

    The summit was notable for the personal attendance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who came to China for the first time in seven years, having previously sent representatives.

    Modi’s attendance carried significant weight because relations between India—long considered the US’s closest ally—and the US had cooled substantially due to US President Trump imposing a 50% tariff on India.

    Despite India’s historical alliance with the US (including being part of the US-Australia-Japan-India QUAD, which aims to contain China), Modi emphasized strategic relations and cooperation with China, insisting that these ties should not be viewed through the lens of a third country.

    Major Themes and Leadership Addresses

    Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Focus

    President Xi Jinping used the summit to criticize specific international behavior, stating that “hooliganism and threatening behavior in the name of the World Order is deplorable”. While he did not explicitly name the US, his reference was clear. He urged member states to rise against the “supremacy and politics of power” employed by the West.

    Xi called on SCO member states to:

    • Put aside mutual differences and promote consensus.
    • Become each other’s friends and partners.
    • Establish strategic communication while respecting mutual differences.

    Xi used the China-India relationship as a practical example. He noted that both are the world’s two largest population nations, comprising 2.8 billion people, and represent the two oldest civilizations in the East. He acknowledged existing border disputes but stressed that these matters should not dominate the overall relationship. He asserted that cooperation and unity, likened to the “shared dance of the dragon and the elephant,” are essential, and the two nations should be good partners for each other’s success, aiming to increase their trade volume. The core lesson from this conference, according to the source, is that severe border disputes should not hold the overall relationship hostage or constrain trade ties.

    Other Leadership Remarks

    • Russian President Vladimir Putin used the platform to defend his “illegal attack” on Ukraine. He stated that continuous efforts by the West to incorporate Ukraine into NATO were a primary reason for the conflict, as they presented a direct threat to Russia’s security.
    • Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif focused on desiring normalized relations with neighboring countries.
    • Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi strongly condemned terrorism.

    The Joint Communiqué and Outcomes

    The joint declaration issued by the summit was largely viewed as balanced, taking into account the demands of almost all member states without specifically accusing or naming any single party.

    Key points addressed in the declaration included:

    • Terrorism: The declaration officially condemned terrorism. It specifically condemned the Jaffar Express and Khuzdar attacks (requested by Pakistan), and the terrorism associated with the Pahalgam incident (requested by India). A demand was made to bring the patrons of these terrorist acts to justice. This outcome was significant for India, as a previous conference held in China in June of the same year had refused to include the condemnation of the Pahalgam incident in its declaration.
    • Proxy Warfare: The declaration asserted that the use of terrorist groups as political tools or proxies is unacceptable.
    • International Issues: The communiqué affirmed the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement and cautioned against any reinterpretation of the relevant UN resolution. It also condemned actions causing civilian casualties in Gaza and denounced American and Israeli attacks on Iran.
    • Afghanistan: A demand was made for the establishment of a government in Afghanistan that includes representatives from all political and ethnic groups to ensure lasting peace.

    Diplomatic Context

    Diplomats held expectations that the recent Tianjin Summit might facilitate a meeting or at least a handshake between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Prime Minister Modi, but this meeting did not occur.

    In terms of future goals, the greatest responsibility lies with Chinese leadership to find new paths for economic cooperation among member states to foster better assistance and development opportunities within the Asian alliance, particularly in contrast to the US/Trump approach.

    China-US Strategic Rivalry at SCO Summit

    The relationship between China and the United States (US), as reflected in the sources focusing on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, is characterized by geopolitical opposition, strategic rivalry, and mutual criticism.

    Strategic Opposition and Rivalry

    The sources explicitly frame the SCO as a powerful organization positioned in opposition to the United States (US) and its Western allies.

    This opposition is underscored by the US stance toward China’s rising global influence:

    • Suppression of Power: The fundamental slogan of US President Trump is identified as seeking to suppress China’s emerging power.
    • Dismissal of SCO: Reflecting this adversarial approach, Trump expressed disapproval of the Tianjin Summit, dismissing it as a merely “showy operation”.
    • Containment Efforts: The US is noted as being part of the QUAD (along with Australia, Japan, and India), which has the express objective of China’s containment.

    Chinese and Russian Rhetoric Against Western Supremacy

    During the SCO Summit, Chinese and Russian leaders directed strong criticism toward what they perceive as Western dominance, without always naming the US directly:

    • Critique of “World Order”: Chinese President Xi Jinping used the platform to criticize specific international behavior, stating that “hooliganism and threatening behavior in the name of the World Order is deplorable”. Although the US was not named, the source notes that his reference was clear.
    • Opposition to Power Politics: President Xi urged SCO member states to rise against the “supremacy and politics of power” employed by the West.
    • Allied Alignment: China and Russia have shared the desire for India to align more closely with them, moving toward the concept of Asian power rather than solidifying its status as a US ally.

    Impact on US Alliances

    US policies and actions have reportedly strained relations with key allies, driving them closer to China and the SCO:

    • Tariffs on India: US President Trump imposed a 50% tariff on India, which resulted in a substantial cooling of relations between India and the US, despite India traditionally being considered the US’s closest ally.
    • Neutralization of QUAD: The source suggests that Trump’s “shortsightedness” has effectively “suspended” the QUAD, a group aimed at containing China. Due to this loss of enthusiasm, Trump was reportedly forced to cancel his attendance at the November QUAD meeting hosted by India.
    • India’s Shift: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, attending the SCO Summit, emphasized strategic relations and cooperation with China despite border differences, insisting that these ties “should not be viewed through the lens of a third country” (referring to the US).

    Direct Condemnation in SCO Declaration

    The joint communiqué issued by the SCO Summit included a condemnation of US actions concerning the Middle East:

    • The declaration condemned American and Israeli attacks on Iran.
    • It also affirmed the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement and cautioned against any reinterpretation of the relevant UN resolution.

    India-Pakistan Relations at the SCO Summit

    The discussion of India-Pakistan ties, particularly in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, highlights the presence of strained relations, mutual desires for normalization, and a focus on combating terrorism.

    Participation and Diplomatic Expectations

    Both India and Pakistan are members of the SCO, having officially joined the organization on July 10, 2015. The 25th Head of Government Meeting in Tianjin, China, featured the personal attendance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the participation of Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

    • Desire for Normalization: Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif used the platform to emphasize that Pakistan desires normal relations with its neighbors.
    • Failed Meeting Expectation: Diplomats held the expectation that the recent Tianjin Summit might facilitate a meeting or at least a handshake between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Prime Minister Modi. However, the source notes that this anticipated meeting did not occur.

    The source contrasts this lack of interaction with a historical moment during a SAARC conference where Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, despite heightened tension, approached and shook hands with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, which helped to thaw the “ice of mutual conflict”. The source notes that current Pakistani leadership, despite often advocating for dialogue on international platforms, lacked the “courage” shown by the former leader.

    Shared Condemnation of Terrorism

    A significant point concerning India-Pakistan relations at the SCO Summit was the inclusion of mutual demands regarding the condemnation of terrorism in the joint communiqué.

    • Indian Condemnation: Indian Prime Minister Modi strongly condemned terrorism.
    • Joint Communiqué Outcomes: The joint declaration of the summit was noted as being balanced and addressing the demands of almost all member states. Crucially, it included:
    • Condemnation of the Jaffar Express and Khuzdar attacks (requested by Pakistan).
    • Condemnation of the terrorism associated with the Pahalgam incident (requested by India).
    • Accountability: The declaration included a demand to bring the patrons of these terrorist acts to justice.
    • Proxy Warfare: The communiqué also asserted that the use of terrorist groups as political tools or proxies is unacceptable.

    The inclusion of the condemnation of the Pahalgam incident was particularly significant for India, as a previous conference held in China in June of the same year had refused to include it in its declaration, leading the Indian Defense Minister to leave the conference without signing the document.

    Call to End Hostility

    The sources emphasize the importance of overcoming historical animosity, drawing a parallel with the relationship between China and India:

    • National Interest: One perspective presented is that the elimination of hostility toward India is in the greater interest of the 250 million Pakistani people. It is argued that democracy and public interests in Pakistan are currently at stake due to this hostility.
    • Chinese Example: The source suggests that Pakistani leaders should learn from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the SCO Summit regarding China-India relations. Xi stated that despite severe border disputes, these matters should not dominate the overall relationship, nor should they hold trade relations hostage.

    Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Unity Against External Pressure

    Regional cooperation, as discussed in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, is emphasized as a necessity for mutual development, stability, and collective resistance against external pressures, particularly among the Asian powers.

    Principles and Necessity of Cooperation

    Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his address at the SCO Summit, underscored the key principles necessary for effective regional cooperation:

    • Setting Aside Differences: President Xi called on SCO member states to “put aside mutual differences” and promote consensus.
    • Friendship and Partnership: Members should strive to become “each other’s friends and partners”.
    • Strategic Communication: The establishment of strategic communication is required while simultaneously respecting mutual differences.
    • Unity Against External Pressure: Xi urged member states to rise against the “supremacy and politics of power” employed by the West and to counter “hooliganism and threatening behavior in the name of the World Order”.

    Economic and Trade Cooperation

    A significant focus of regional cooperation is strengthening economic and commercial ties:

    • Increasing Trade Volume: Regarding the China-India relationship, President Xi emphasized that both nations should be good partners for each other’s success and expressed a desire to increase their trade volume.
    • New Paths for Development: The sources note that the greatest responsibility lies with Chinese leadership to find new paths for economic cooperation among member states. This is intended to foster better assistance and development opportunities within the Asian alliance, serving as a direct counterpoint to the “Trump approach”.

    Cooperation in the Face of Disputes: The China-India Example

    President Xi used the relationship between China and India as a powerful illustration of necessary regional cooperation despite severe bilateral conflicts:

    • Shared Civilizations and Population: He highlighted that China and India are two ancient Eastern civilizations and the two largest population nations, collectively comprising 2.8 billion people.
    • Disputes Should Not Dominate: While acknowledging existing “border disputes,” Xi stressed that “these matters should not dominate the overall relationship”.
    • Lesson of the Conference: The core lesson emphasized by the source, drawn from Xi’s speech, is that severe border disputes should not hold the overall relationship hostage or constrain trade ties.
    • Shared Vision: Xi likened the necessary cooperation and unity between the two nations to the “shared dance of the dragon and the elephant”.
    • Strategic Relations: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also emphasized strategic relations and cooperation with China despite the border differences, insisting that these ties should “not be viewed through the lens of a third country”.

    Cooperation on Security: Combating Terrorism

    Regional cooperation is vital for addressing shared security threats, notably terrorism:

    • Joint Condemnation: The SCO Joint Communiqué issued at the summit demonstrated successful cooperation by officially condemning terrorism, specifically addressing incidents requested by both Pakistan (Jaffar Express and Khuzdar attacks) and India (Pahalgam incident).
    • Proxy Warfare: The declaration affirmed a collective stance that the use of terrorist groups as political tools or proxies is unacceptable.
    • Afghanistan Peace: Member states jointly demanded the establishment of a government in Afghanistan that includes representatives from all political and ethnic groups to ensure lasting peace.

    Broader Geopolitical Cooperation

    The SCO itself is positioned as a framework for cooperation among non-Western powers:

    • Asian Power Concept: China and Russia have a shared desire for India to integrate into the concept of Asian power rather than functioning solely as a US ally.
    • Addressing Global Issues: The declaration demonstrated regional alignment on international issues by affirming the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement and cautioning against reinterpretation of the relevant UN resolution, as well as condemning American and Israeli attacks on Iran.

    Geopolitical Strategies of SCO Against Western Hegemony

    The fundamental geopolitical strategy adopted by the key SCO members, notably China and Russia, is one of resistance to Western supremacy and power politics.

    Goals and Rhetorical Strategy:

    • Opposing US Power: The SCO The discussion of geopolitical strategy within the sources centers on the actions and objectives of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) nations, primarily China and Russia, in direct opposition to the United States (US) and its strategic alliances.The Strategy of Counter-Hegemony (SCO, China, and Russia)is viewed as a powerful organization positioned in opposition to the United States (US) and its Western allies. US President Trump’s core slogan is identified as the attempt to suppress China’s rising power.
    • Challenging the “World Order”: Chinese President Xi Jinping directly criticized international actions, stating that “hooliganism and threatening behavior in the name of the World Order is deplorable,” with the sources noting this was a clear reference to the US.
    • Call for Collective Resistance: Xi urged SCO member states to rise against the “supremacy and politics of power” employed by the West.

    Strategic Methods:

    • Alliance Building: The SCO strategy emphasizes internal cohesion by calling on members to “put aside mutual differences,” promote consensus, and establish strategic communication while respecting those differences.
    • Economic Differentiation: Chinese leadership bears the primary responsibility for finding “new paths for economic cooperation” among member states. This strategic goal is intended to foster better assistance and development opportunities within the Asian alliance, providing a counter-narrative to the “Trump approach”.

    The Strategic Battle for India’s Alignment

    A central component of the current geopolitical strategy involves securing India’s alignment, shifting it away from its historical US alliance and integrating it into the concept of “Asian power”.

    • Push from China and Russia: China and Russia share a common desire for India to align more closely with them rather than solidifying its status as a US ally.
    • Leveraging US Tariffs: The strategy benefited from the US imposition of a 50% tariff on India under President Trump, which caused a significant cooling of relations between India (long considered the US’s closest ally) and the US.
    • Chinese Diplomacy (Strategic Partnership): President Xi Jinping executed a diplomatic strategy aimed at neutralizing bilateral disputes. He acknowledged existing border disputes but insisted that these issues “should not dominate the overall relationship” or hold trade relations hostage. Instead, he proposed that China and India should view each other as partners for success, aiming to increase their trade volume. This cooperation was likened to the “shared dance of the dragon and the elephant”.
    • Indian Response: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi confirmed this strategic shift by emphasizing strategic relations and cooperation with China, insisting these ties should not be viewed through the lens of a “third country”.

    The US Strategy of Containment (The QUAD)

    The US geopolitical strategy has historically focused on containment of China, primarily through the QUAD grouping:

    • Containment Goal: The US, Australia, Japan, and India are part of the QUAD, which is specifically designed for the “containment of China”. The group aims to coordinate actions if any issue arises concerning Taiwan.
    • Strategic Failure/Suspension: The sources indicate that the “shortsightedness” of US President Trump has effectively “suspended” the QUAD. The loss of enthusiasm led to the cancellation of his attendance at the November QUAD meeting hosted by India.

    Regional Security Strategy and Consensus

    SCO member states utilized the summit to achieve a unified strategy on shared security concerns, particularly terrorism:

    • Anti-Proxy Warfare: The joint declaration asserted a collective strategic position that the use of terrorist groups as political tools or proxies is unacceptable.
    • Shared Condemnation: Despite long-standing hostilities between India and Pakistan, the summit achieved a strategic consensus by officially condemning terrorism and including specific demands from both nations in the communiqué (condemnation of the Pahalgam incident for India, and the Jaffar Express and Khuzdar attacks for Pakistan). A demand was also included to bring the patrons of these terrorist acts to justice.
    • Afghanistan Stability: A joint strategic demand was made for the establishment of a government in Afghanistan that includes representatives from all political and ethnic groups to ensure lasting peace.
    • Middle East Alignment: The communiqué also demonstrated regional strategic alignment by condemning American and Israeli attacks on Iran, and affirming the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement while cautioning against reinterpretation of the relevant UN resolution.

    انسانوں کے نام د لیسن اف ایس سی او سمٹ شنگھائی تعاون تنظیم ایس سی او کا قیام 2001 میں چینی شہر شنگھائی کے مقام پر ہوا جس میں چائنہ اور رشیا کے علاوہ کازکستان تاجکستان اور کرگستان شامل تھے پاکستان اور انڈیا 10 جولائی 2015 کو اس میں شامل ہوئے اس تنظیم کا حالیہ 25واں سربراہی اجلاس چائنہ کے شہر تیانجن میں ہوا جو تنظیم کی تاریخ کا سب سے بڑا اجلاس تھا اس میں 20 ممالک کے سربران شریک ہوئے اس اجلاس کی خاص خاص بات یہ تھی کہ اس میں انڈین پرائم منسٹر نریندر مودی خود بنفس نفیس شریک ہوئے اس سے پہلے وہ اپنے نمائندوں کو بھیجتے رہے ہیں یوں وہ سات برس بعد چائنہ یاترا پر ائے شنگھائی تعاون تنظیم کی سمٹ میں مودی کی امد اس لیے بھی اہمیت کی حامل تھی کہ حالیہ دنوں امریکی پریزیڈنٹ ٹرمپ نے انڈیا پر جو 50 فیصد ٹیرف لگایا ہے اس سے انڈیا اور امریکہ کے تعلقات میں اچھی خاصی سرد مہری اگئی ہے انڈیا کو امریکہ کے قریب ترین اتحادی مانا جاتا رہا ہے جبکہ شنگائی تعاون تنظیم کو ایک طرح سے امریکہ اور اس کے مغربی اتحادیوں کے بالمقابل طاقتور تنظیم کی حیثیت سے پیش کیا جاتا ہے۔ امریکی پریزیڈنٹ ٹرمپ کا بنیادی سلوگن یہ ہے کہ چائنہ کی ابھرتی طاقت کو کسی بھی طرح دبایا جائے۔ یہی وجہ ہے کہ انہوں نے انتانجن سمٹ کو ناپسند کرتے ہوئے اسے بہت نمائشی کاروائی قرار دیا ہے۔ چائنہ اور رشیا کی مشترکہ خواہش رہی ہے کہ انڈیا امریکی اتحادی بننے کی بجائے زیادہ سے زیادہ ان کی قربت میں اتے ہوئے ایشیائی طاقت کا حصہ بنے۔ جیسے کہ چینی پریزیڈنٹ شی جنن پنگ نے اس اہم ترین موقع پر خطاب کرتے ہوئے کہا ہے کہ ورلڈ ارڈر کے نام پر گنڈا گردی اور دھمکی امیز رویہ قابل مذمت ہے۔ اس میں اگرچہ انہوں نے امریکہ کا نام نہیں لیا لیکن ان کا اشارہ واضح تھا۔ چینی پریزیڈنٹ نے مغرب پر تنقید کرتے ہوئے یہ بھی کہا کہ ہمیں اس کی بالادستی اور طاقت کی سیاست کے خلاف اٹھ کھڑے ہونا چاہیے۔ انہوں نے مزید کہا کہ شنگائی تعاون تنظیم کے رکن ممالک کو چاہیے کہ وہ باہمی اختلافات کو پس پشت ڈال کر باہمی اتفاق رائے کو فروغ دیں۔ ایک دوسرے کے دوست اور پارٹنر بنیں۔ صدر شی کا کہنا تھا کہ باہمی اختلافات کا احترام کام کرتے ہوئے تضویراتی رابطے قائم کریں۔ اس سلسلے میں صدر شی نے انڈیا چائنہ تعلقات کی مثال دیتے ہوئے کہا کہ مشرق میں ہم دو قدیم ترین تہذیبیں ہیں۔ سب سے بڑی ابادی والی اقوام جو دو ارب 80 کروڑ عوام پر مشتمل ہیں۔ بلاشبہ ہمارے سرحدی تنازعات بھی ہیں لیکن ان معاملات کو ہمارے مجموعی تعلقات پر حاوی نہیں ہونا چاہیے۔ ہم ایک دوسرے کی کامیابی کے لیے اچھے پارٹنر ہیں۔ ہم اپنے تجارتی تعلقات کے حجم کو مزید بڑھانا چاہتے ہیں۔ ڈریگن اور ہاتھی کے مشترکہ رقص کی طرح تعاون و اتحاد ضروری ہے۔ رشن شن پریزیڈنٹ ولادیمیر پیوٹن نے سنگائی تعاون تنظیم کے سربراہی اجلاس سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے ناروہ طور پر یوکرین پر اپنے ناجائز حملے کی مدافت کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ مغرب کی جانب سے یوکرین کو نیٹو میں شامل کرنے کی مستقل کوششیں یوکرینی تندے کی اہم وجوہات میں سے ایک ہیں جو رشیا کی سلامتی کے لیے براہ راست خطرہ بنتی ہیں حالانکہ انہوں نے یہ حمزہ قطعی ناجائز کیا ہے پاکستانی پرائم منسٹر شہباز شریف نے اس بات پر زور دیا کہ ہم اپنے ہمسایوں سے معمول کے تعلقات چاہتے ہیں جبکہ انڈین پرائم منسٹر نے اتنکواد یا ٹیررزم کی بھرپور مذمت کی۔ یوں جو مشترکہ علامیہ جاری ہوا اس میں تقریبا تمام رکن ممالک کے مطالبات یا تقاضوں کو پیش نظر رکھتے ہوئے کسی ایک پر الزام لگانے یا نام لینے کی بجائے ایک عمومی بات کی گئی۔ اس میں جہاں پاکستان کے مطالبہ پر جعفر ایکسپریس اور خزدار حملے کی مذمت کی گئی وہیں بھارتی مطالبے پر سانعہ پہلگام کی دہشتگردی کو قابل مذمت قرار دیا گیا۔ جن کے سرپرستوں کو کٹہرے میں لانے کا مطالبہ کیا گیا۔ 2015 کے ایران جوہری معاہدے کی توثیق کی گئی۔ تھی اس کے خلاف یو این قرارداد کی دوبارہ تشریح پر خبردار کیا گیا غزہ میں شہری علاکتوں کا سبب بننے والے اقدامات اور ایران پر امریکی اسرائیلی حملوں کی بھی مذمت کی گئی افغانستان میں پائدارمن کے لیے تمام سیاسی و نسلی گروہوں کے نمائندوں کی شمولیت سے حکومت کے قیام کا مطالبہ کیا گیا دہشت گرد گروہوں کو سیاسی یا پروکسیز کی حیثیت سے استعمال کرنا ناقابل قبول قرار دیا گیا مجموعی طور پر شنگائی تعاون تنظیم کے سربراہی اجلاس کا علامیہ بڑی حد تک متوازن قرار دیا جا سکتا ہے اگلی بات اقتصادی دی حوالے سے رکن ممالک میں تعاون کی مختلف راہیں تراشنا ہے جس کی سب سے بڑی ذمہ داری خود چینی قیادت پر عائد ہوتی ہے تاکہ ٹرمپ اپروچ کے بالمقابل ایشیائی اتحاد میں بہتر معاونت اور ترقی کے مواقع پیدا ہو سکیں جس طرح پریزیڈنٹ شی نے چائنہ اور انڈیا کو حریف کی بجائے حلیف قرار دیا اسی طرح پرائم منسٹر مودی نے سرحدی اختلاف کے باوجود چائنہ انڈیا سٹریٹیجک ریلیشنز اور تعاون پر زور دیتے ہوئے کہا کہ ان تعلقات کو کسی تیسرے ملک کی نظر سے نہیں دیکھا جانا چاہیے۔ دیکھا جائے تو یہ انڈیا کی مجبوری ہے۔ پچھلی ربع صدی انڈیا امریکی اتحادی کی حیثیت سے چائنہ مخالف گردانہ جاتا رہا ہے۔ 62 کی خوفناک جنگ کے بعد 2020 میں دونوں ممالک کے درمیان گلوان ویلی کی سرحدی جھڑپیں بھی ہو چکی ہیں۔ امریکہ اسٹریلیا جاپان سے مل کر انڈیا اسکواڈ کا حصہ ہے جس کا مدع ہی چائنہ کا گھراؤ ہے تاکہ تائیوان پر کسی نوع کا کوئی ایشو پیدا ہو تو مشترکہ اقدامات اٹھائے جا سکیں۔ لیکن ٹرمپ کی ناقبت اندیشی نے بالفعل کوڈ کو ہی معطل کر ڈالا ہے۔ نومبر میں اس کا جو اجلاس بھارتی میزبانی میں ہونے جا رہا تھا موجودہ حالات میں اس کی گرمجوشی اتنی ختم ہو چکی ہے کہ ٹرمپ کو اپنا یہ دورہ منسوخ کرنا پڑا ہے۔ حالیہ تیانجن سمٹ کا ایک فائدہ یہ ہوا ہے کہ اسی سال جون میں چائنہ کے اندر جو کانفرنس منعقد ہوئی تھی اس نے سانعہ تہلگام کی مذمت کو اپنے اعلامیہ میں شامل کرنے سے انکار کر دیا تھا۔ اسی وجہ سے انڈین ڈیفنس منسٹر راجداد بغیر دستخط کیے کانفرنس کو ادھورا چھوڑ کر واپس اگئے۔ جبکہ اس مرتبہ انڈیا کے اس مطالبے کو باضابطہ طور پر یانجن سمٹ علامیہ کا حصہ بنایا گیا ہے۔ سفارت کار حالیہ تیانجن سمٹ سے یہ توقو کر رہے تھے کہ شاید شہباز مودی ملاقات یا کم از کم شیک ہینڈ کی کوئی صورت نکل ائے لیکن باوجود یہ نہ ہو سکا درویش کو اس موقع پر وہ تاریخی لمحات یاد ائے جب کشیدگی کی ایسی ہی فضا میں سار کانفرنس منعقد ہوئی جس سے پاکستانی پریزیڈنٹ جنرل پرویز مشرف نے خطاب کرنے کے بعد داعش سے واپس جانے کی بجائے سامنے سے گزرتے ہوئے اسٹیج پر تشریف فرما پرائم منسٹر واجپائی کے روبرو جا پہنچے اور ان کی طرف ہاتھ بڑھایا واجپائی حیرت کے باوجود ایک دم اٹھے اور گرم جوشی سے ان کا سواگت کیا۔ یوں مصافہ کی عالمی سطح پر خوب چرچا ہوئی اور باہمی منافعت کی برف کچھ نہ کچھ پگھلی۔ ویسے تو ہمارے بلند پرواز انڈیا سے مذاکات اور بات چیت کی دہائی ہر عالمی پلیٹ فارم پر دیتے ہیں لیکن بالفعل ان کے اندر ڈکٹیٹر جنرل پرویز مشرف جتنا جگرا بھی نہیں ہے یا شاید وہ اپنے ارمی چیف کے دباؤ میں تھے جو اس کانفرنس میں انوکھی مسائل قائم کرتے ہوئے شامل ہوئے۔ حالانکہ دیگر 20 ممالک کی قیادتوں میں سے کسی ایک کے ساتھ بھی ان کا ارمی چیف یا ایسا کوئی اہتمام نہیں تھا اور اس سے پاکستان کی ڈیموکریسی کا اندازہ کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ وہ جس طرح پیوٹن کو سامنے گزرتے دیکھ کر ہاتھ ملانے کے لیے ترستی ہوئی نظروں سے دیکھتے ہوئے اگے بڑھے جس کا کچھ حاصل بھی نہ تھا۔ کیونکہ اسی پیوٹن کو بعد ازام وہ یہ کہتے پائے گئے کہ ہمیں معلوم ہے اپ انڈیا کے قریبی متر یا دوست ہیں۔ لیکن ہم بھی اپ سے اچھے تعلقات کے خواہاں ہیں۔ حالانکہ وہ ٹرمپ جس کی نوبل پرائز کے لیے اپ بڑے فخر سے نامزدگی کر رہے ہیں اور اسرائیل کی طرح عالمی سطح پہ سفاشات بھیج رہے ہیں وہ ٹرمپ نریندر مودی سے اس وجہ سے نالہ ہے کہ تم پیوٹن سے تیل کیوں خرید رہے ہو شاید ہمارا بلند برواد بھی تھوڑا روسی تیل منگوانا چاہتا ہے یا خود کو سابق کھلاڑی کی طرح عالمی لیڈر دکھانا یا منوانا چاہتا ہے اپ ایک طرف ٹرمپ کے قصیدے پڑھتے نہیں تھکتے ہو دوسری طرف پوٹن سے ہاتھ بلانے کے لیے قومی وقار کا بھی کوئی پاس و لحاظ نہیں کر رہے ہو جبکہ اپ خالصا قومی مفاد میں سوچیں تو انڈیا دشمنی کا خاتمہ 25 کروڑ پاکستانی عوام کے زیادہ مفاد میں ہے اور اسی دشمنی کی وجہ سے ہمارے جمہوریت اور عوامی مفادات داؤ پر لگے ہوئے ہیں۔ اس سلسلے میں اپ لوگوں کو چینی پریزیڈنٹ شی جن پنگ کی سنگھائی تعاون تنظیم کے سربرائی اجلاس میں کی گئی تقریر اور بعد ازاں انڈیا کے متعلق ان کے اظہار خیال سے بہت کچھ سیکھنے کی ضرورت ہے۔ یہ کہ شدید ترین سرحدی تنازعات کے باوجود ان معاملات کو مجموعی تعلقات پر حاوی نہیں ہونا چاہیے۔ تجارتی تعلقات کو ان تنگناؤں کا اسیر نہیں بننا چاہیے۔ یہی سبق ہے اس کانفرنس کا۔

  • Pakistan Eyes More Chinese Weapon Systems After ‘Clear-Cut Victory Over India’

    Pakistan Eyes More Chinese Weapon Systems After ‘Clear-Cut Victory Over India’

    Introduction

    1. A Strategic Turning Point in South Asian Military Dynamics
      In a dramatic shift that has captured global attention, Pakistan’s reported “clear-cut victory” over India marks more than just a headline—it signals an inflection point in regional security dynamics. As Islamabad contemplates deepening ties with Beijing and acquiring more Chinese weapon systems, the implications stretch far beyond national pride and into the core of South Asian military balance and strategic posturing.
    2. Strengthening Ties Amid Geopolitical Realignments
      Against the backdrop of rising great-power competition in Asia, Pakistan’s tilt toward sophisticated Chinese arms underscores a broader recalibration. The move appears driven by a combination of deterrence calculus, reassurance to domestic constituents, and the quest for strategic autonomy—reflecting how weaponry procurement increasingly dovetails with diplomacy, economics, and ideological affinity.
    3. A High-Stakes Gamble in Defense Modernization
      By pursuing advanced Chinese platforms—such as J-20 stealth fighters, Type 99 main battle tanks, and HQ-series air defenses—Pakistan is embarking on a high-stakes gamble. This initiative not only modernizes its military capabilities but signals an assertive posture aimed at projecting deterrence. It also invites scrutiny from global powers wary of arms races and supply diversification.

    1- Acquisition Motivations: Strategic Deterrence and Prestige

    Pakistan’s defense planners view the procurement of Chinese weaponry as essential for restoring the strategic balance with India. Bolstering its strike capability, enhancing air defense, and showcasing elite platforms project a message not only of military readiness but also of national resolve. Scholar C. Raja Mohan has emphasized that “military modernization is as much about perception as capability”—a notion directly relevant to Pakistan’s current posture.

    Moreover, defense analyst Christine Fair, in Fighting to the End, argues that “the symbolism of cutting-edge systems shapes public psychology as much as battlefield reality.” For Islamabad, embracing Chinese arms thus becomes a force multiplier—simultaneously deterring adversaries, consolidating domestic unity, and reinforcing its standing with global powers, especially Beijing.


    2- Potential Systems: J-20, ZTQ-15, HQ Air Defenses

    If Pakistan acquires the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter, it would mark a watershed moment—introducing fifth-generation capabilities to South Asia. The aircraft’s low-observable design, long-range missiles, and electronic warfare suite could significantly shift air superiority calculations. Experts like Air Commodore Arjun Subramaniam note in India’s Wars that stealth platforms “change the calculus of air defense and target acquisition overnight.”

    Equally impactful would be the deployment of HQ-series air defense systems and Type 99 main battle tanks (or the more export-oriented ZTQ-15). These platforms enhance layered defense and armored maneuverability. Military historian Michael McDevitt, in China as a Military Power, highlights that “integrated air-defense umbrellas decisively alter enemy operational planning,” underscoring the potency of such acquisitions.


    3- Operational Integration Challenges

    Integrating Chinese systems into Pakistan’s military architecture poses technical, logistical, and doctrinal hurdles. Interoperability with existing platforms, command-and-control linkages, and supply-chain continuity require exhaustive testing and joint training. Defense strategist Ashley Tellis, writing in Strategic Asia, asserts that “weapons are only as credible as the infrastructure backing them.”

    Another challenge lies in personnel training and language proficiency, particularly for complex systems like advanced radars and air-defense networks. Pakistan may need to send officers and technicians to China for intensive technical training or induce Chinese advisors onto its soil, potentially increasing foreign dependency.


    4- Impact on India-Pakistan Military Calculus

    An enhanced Pakistani arsenal may compel India to accelerate its own procurement—potentially igniting a new arms race. New Delhi already pursues upgraded Rafale jets, S-400 air defenses, and artillery modernization. According to South Asia expert Ashley J. Tellis, “the introduction of new capabilities in one state often triggers security dilemmas in neighboring states”—a dynamic certainly relevant to Delhi’s decision-making.

    However, India’s more diversified procurement (from U.S., Russia, France, Israel) provides Delhi with greater adaptability. Still, Islamabad’s leap into Chinese modernization could negate India’s current perceived qualitative edge, recalibrating regional deterrence and prompting strategic recalculations.


    5- Strategic Signaling to Global Perceptions

    Pakistan’s pursuit of Chinese systems sends a dual signal: first, to the West, as affirmation of its non-alignment with U.S. defense ecosystems; second, to Beijing, as reaffirmation of strategic loyalty. Scholar Andrew Scobell notes that such arms deals often “serve as diplomatic chess moves” as much as defensive investments.

    This alignment also communicates to external players—particularly in Washington and Tokyo—that Pakistan retains a credible security niche, fostering leverage in any prospective multilateral arrangements. The symbolism and optics accompanying such deals can sometimes outweigh actual battlefield performance.


    6- Economic and Budgetary Constraints

    Arms procurement on this scale demands heavy financial outlays. Pakistani defense budgets have consistently hovered around 3% of GDP, with economic pressures from debt servicing and austerity limiting discretionary spending. Meanwhile, larger ticket items like J-20 or Type 99 tanks carry multibillion-dollar price tags.

    Economist C. Christine Fair cautions in Fighting to the End that “economics often define defense boundaries,” suggesting that Pakistan may compromise in other sectors—education, infrastructure—to sustain military modernization, raising important questions about long-term sustainability.


    7- Pakistan’s Arms Procurement Strategy

    Historically, Pakistan has balanced its acquisitions between U.S.-supplied systems (like F-16s) and Chinese imports. This dual-track procurement maintains flexibility but also raises interoperability and maintenance issues. The shift towards deeper Chinese integration may tilt this balance, reducing dependence on U.S. platforms.

    In her work Arms Without Wars, scholar Sarah C. Paxton argues countries often “optimize for political alignment over technical suitability.” Pakistan’s deeper pivot to Chinese systems reflects this while securing a long-term supplier ready to meet urgent defense imperatives.


    8- Regional Security Implications

    A heavily Chinese-armed Pakistan could strain South Asia’s strategic ecosystem—possibly complicating third-country facilitation efforts. For example, negotiations over Afghanistan, or China’s Belt and Road initiative (including CPEC), might now intersect more overtly with military considerations.

    Moreover, smaller states (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives) could perceive a Pakistan–China nexus as a counterweight to India—elevating strategic competition across the Indian Ocean region.


    9- Arms Race and Its Limitations

    While Islamabad’s modernization may provoke a tit-for-tat wave from New Delhi, analysts emphasize the limits of conventional escalation. India faces domestic fiscal strain and may opt instead for asymmetric systems—drones, cyber defense, and long-range missiles—rather than mirroring hardware-heavy buys.

    As strategic commentator Kanti Bajpai suggests, “the marginal gain of new weapons decreases once deterrence thresholds are met.” In this vein, Pakistan’s qualitative upgrade may eclipse India’s quantitative edge—but without enabling offensive action.


    10- Nuclear and Conventional Dimensions

    Pakistan’s conventional modernization exists in tandem with its nuclear doctrine. A higher-caliber conventional force reduces Islamabad’s reliance on “first-use” nuclear postures. Nuclear strategist Vipin Narang, writing in Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, notes that “capable non-nuclear forces are key to stabilizing nuclear deterrence.”

    Still, this modernization could also invite India to recalibrate its own nuclear signaling—potentially edging South Asia closer toward strategic tension.


    11- Training and Doctrine Adaptation

    New weapon systems necessitate updated operational doctrine. Pakistan’s military—which has traditionally focused on defensive and limited offensive scenarios—must now incorporate advanced joint-operations, integrated air-ground-air defense maneuvers, and digital battlefield synergy enabled by Chinese electronics.

    The developmental work ahead is immense: from exercises to war games to revised SOPs, requiring institutional reforms across training academies and command structures.


    12- Interoperability with CPEC Security Frameworks

    Pakistan may link the Chinese arsenal to CPEC-related security—protecting corridors, insurgency hotspots, and regional infrastructure. This alignment can yield overlapping civil-military responsivity, though potentially militarizing economic zones.

    Security scholar Azra Jadid argues that “infrastructure and defense are becoming two sides of a strategic coin in Pakistan,” suggesting this arms build-up will ripple across development and governance sectors.


    13- Domestic Political Dimensions

    Procurement of prestigious Chinese systems serves regime consolidation. It appeals to military hardliners and bolsters nationalistic narratives. Yet, civilian governments must justify opaque spending to a restless electorate—a delicate dance in Pakistan’s democracy-military dynamics.

    Public support may initially surge—but over time, demands for accountability, transparency, and oversight could intensify, shaping future policy.


    14- U.S. and Western Reaction

    Washington has historically viewed large-scale Chinese arms exports with concern. Deepened military ties between Pakistan and China may trigger U.S. sanctions under CATSAA or other defense-related restrictions. This, in turn, could limit Islamabad’s access to Western financing and technology transfers.

    Think tanks like RAND warn that U.S. legislative pressure may “force Pakistan to deepen its geostrategic pivot,” limiting Islamabad’s room for nuanced diplomacy.


    15- China’s Strategic Calculus

    For Beijing, exporting high-end weapon systems reinforces strategic influence—not just transactional economics. It strengthens the “strategic triangle” with Pakistan and indirectly counters U.S. and Indian footprints in Asia.

    Scholar Jonathan Holslag, in China’s Ascendancy, observes that “weapons transfers are often vectors of geopolitical influence,” a lens that frames Chinese decisions in Islamabad.


    16- Compatibility with Other Chinese Export Customers

    China’s ability to convince Pakistan of technology-sharing and co-production distinguishes this deal. Pakistani firm Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) and China’s NORINCO/HARBIN AVIC could establish joint ventures, boosting defense industrial bases (DIB).

    Still, competition with other emerging Chinese clients—like Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, and Egypt—may complicate the degree of industrial cooperation Pakistan receives.


    17- Risk of Escalation Miscalculation

    Acquiring advanced arms increases the risk of miscalculation during crises—especially if command-control systems are nascent. A false detection of a stealth aircraft or automated air-defense response could escalate rapidly.

    Strategist Vipin Narang cautions that “new platforms are potential accelerants of inadvertent escalation,” stressing the need for procedural safeguards and crisis diplomacy.


    18- Effects on Military-Civil Fusion

    China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) model could influence Pakistan’s defense trends. Dual-use technologies—such as surveillance drones and AI-based radars—may spill into civilian sectors alongside military applications.

    This fusion may spur innovation, but also raise serious privacy and governance concerns within Pakistan—necessitating parallel legal frameworks for oversight.


    19- Implications for Non-State Militancy

    Modern platforms grant Pakistan greater capacity to monitor and interdict insurgent activity, particularly along its western and northwestern borders. Tactical drones, enhanced ISR, and precision-strike capability can constrain non-state actors.

    Yet, human-rights advocates warn of civilian harm if controls fail. Pakistan must balance security imperatives with respect for local populations and rule-of-law principles.


    20- Path to Sustainability and Indigenization

    Ultimately, Pakistan will need to chart a path toward domestic production and maintenance for long-term viability. This might involve technology-transfer deals, licensing agreements, and joint R&D. Strategic expert Ashley Tellis notes that “the persistence of foreign systems requires domestic servicing capabilities to avoid creating logistical graft points.”

    Investing in Pakistan’s indigenous defense research agencies—such as SE&MDD and Heavy Industries Taxila—is vital to ensure future self-reliance.


    21- Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

    As Pakistan examines next-gen deterrents, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems from China—such as the HQ-19—offer a powerful layer of defense against India’s expanding missile arsenal. Designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles, such systems would substantially boost Islamabad’s defensive net, especially in times of heightened tensions. ABMs are not merely tactical but strategic tools—creating the perception of invulnerability which can significantly affect adversary behavior.

    Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT has emphasized that “ballistic missile defenses are as much political as they are military.” For Pakistan, acquiring an ABM system would serve to neutralize India’s advantage with systems like the Agni series and shift the psychological calculus of deterrence, adding a new layer to the region’s already complex security matrix.


    22- Airborne Early Warning and Control Platforms

    Airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) play a pivotal role in modern air warfare by extending situational awareness far beyond ground-based radars. Pakistan’s interest in Chinese AWACS, particularly the KJ-500, represents a strategic pivot toward persistent, real-time airspace surveillance and better threat response management.

    Military analyst Carlo Kopp notes that “control of the electromagnetic spectrum is often the difference between winning and losing an air war.” These platforms allow Pakistan to detect Indian fighter movements or missile launches early and coordinate responses with layered air defense units—further empowering its command-and-control doctrine.


    23- Stealth Fighters

    Stealth fighters embody the technological pinnacle of air superiority, and their integration can transform air combat doctrine. Pakistan’s reported interest in Chinese stealth platforms like the J-20 and J-35 illustrates its ambition to level the playing field against India’s Rafales and Su-30MKIs. Stealth confers first-strike capability, survivability, and electronic warfare potential.

    However, stealth is not merely about airframe design—it also involves avionics, data fusion, and tactics. As Air Marshal Anil Chopra notes, “stealth aircraft redefine threat envelopes and compel adversaries to re-architect entire air defense systems.” For Pakistan, it is both a strategic asset and a statement of parity with regional powers.


    24- 40 Fifth-Generation J-35 Warplanes

    The proposed acquisition of up to 40 J-35 warplanes would mark Pakistan’s most significant aerial leap in decades. A carrier-capable, fifth-generation fighter developed by AVIC, the J-35 features internal weapons bays, AESA radar, and stealth capabilities—representing a qualitative leap in air-to-air and air-to-ground operations.

    Such a fleet would allow Pakistan to sustain forward operations deep into contested airspace, potentially nullifying Indian radar coverage and enhancing deep-strike options. According to aviation historian Richard Aboulafia, “numbers matter—but stealth and sensors win wars.” This purchase would not only upgrade Pakistan’s air force, but potentially reshape the region’s air doctrine.


    25- KJ-500 Early Warning Aircraft

    The KJ-500 is a critical enabler for integrated air operations, with its active phased array radar offering 360-degree coverage and multi-target tracking. Its integration into Pakistan’s air force would allow for seamless coordination between fighters, SAM batteries, and ground forces—an essential requirement for network-centric warfare.

    Defense researcher John Stillion notes that “without early warning, even fifth-gen aircraft operate blind.” The KJ-500’s addition could thus be a force multiplier, allowing Pakistan to match, if not exceed, India’s capabilities in airborne surveillance and combat coordination.


    26- HQ-19 Surface-to-Air Missile Weapon Systems

    The HQ-19 represents China’s entry into theater missile defense, capable of intercepting medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. For Pakistan, the HQ-19 would mark a revolutionary capability—able to intercept potential Indian Prithvi or Agni variants mid-course. Its integration would complement existing HQ-9 deployments and form a three-tiered air defense grid.

    Strategist Andrew Erickson highlights that “missile defense alters strategic equations by degrading enemy confidence in their offensive capabilities.” With HQ-19, Pakistan could reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence, gaining leverage in both crises and peacetime strategic messaging.


    27- China “is willing to impose strategic risk on India”

    The growing defense nexus between Beijing and Islamabad signals China’s willingness to tilt the strategic balance in South Asia. By supplying high-end systems to Pakistan, China implicitly challenges India’s regional dominance and tests New Delhi’s response thresholds. This has global ramifications, including for the Indo-Pacific strategy led by the U.S. and allies.

    Scholar Yun Sun writes in The Diplomat that “China’s risk tolerance has increased, especially when it seeks to assert itself against competing spheres of influence.” By arming Pakistan, China exercises asymmetric pressure on India—through a proxy that shares both borders and grievances with New Delhi.


    28- Meaningful Engagement Between the Region’s Two Great Powers

    The intensification of arms imports makes the need for diplomatic engagement between India and Pakistan even more urgent. Strategic stability can only be preserved if military postures are counterbalanced by communication channels. The absence of dialogue risks crisis escalation over misperceptions.

    As Henry Kissinger famously said, “the absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously.” If South Asia’s nuclear-armed rivals continue to scale up their arsenals without concurrent diplomacy, the region risks slipping into a Cold War-style standoff, minus the buffers that helped avoid catastrophe during the U.S.–Soviet rivalry.


    29- J-35 Manufacturer: AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Company

    AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Company, the developer of the J-35, is central to China’s ambition to rival Western aerospace giants. Its collaboration with Pakistan would mark one of its most consequential export ventures. Such a deal could also involve technology transfers or co-assembly—elevating Pakistan’s local aerospace industry.

    In The Dragon’s Wings, author Greg Waldron notes, “AVIC’s export model is as much political as it is industrial.” A deepening partnership with Pakistan reflects how defense exports are used by China to consolidate geostrategic influence.


    30- Early-warning Systems Developer: Aerospace Nanhu Electronic Information Technology Company

    Aerospace Nanhu, a subsidiary of CETC, plays a vital role in China’s radar and EW systems development. Its potential partnership with Pakistan—perhaps via the KJ-500 or ground radar installations—would be key to Pakistan’s quest for enhanced battlefield intelligence and anti-stealth radar capabilities.

    These systems could enable Pakistan to detect and respond to incoming threats much earlier, even potentially tracking stealth aircraft. As radar scientist Liu Yuanzhen notes, “modern warfare is won in the electromagnetic domain first.”


    31- Pakistan Would Need Additional Equipment Upgrades

    To fully exploit Chinese platforms, Pakistan will need complementary upgrades in refueling systems, electronic warfare suites, smart munitions, and ground logistics. The integration of fifth-gen aircraft, for instance, demands compatible datalinks, hardened bunkers, and digital command networks.

    This domino effect means that procurement is not a single transaction but an ecosystem overhaul. Without concurrent modernization, the true potential of these systems remains underutilized.


    32- Air Power Was Also About Infrastructure and Training

    Acquiring aircraft is only half the battle. Building hardened airbases, creating electronic warfare training centers, and developing high-fidelity simulators are indispensable for real combat readiness. The Chinese systems demand their own logistics pipelines and specialized hangars—signifying long-term capital investment.

    Defense planner Walter Ladwig notes that “without resilient infrastructure, air power becomes a paper tiger.” Pakistan must thus approach this modernization holistically or risk logistical bottlenecks during crises.


    33- Pakistan’s Military Was “Clearly Riding on a Wave Right Now”

    Recent military successes and high morale have emboldened Pakistani defense initiatives. Victory—or perceived advantage—often opens policy space for bolder procurement. This momentum could drive Pakistan’s decision-makers to expedite big-ticket acquisitions without the usual parliamentary scrutiny.

    However, strategic restraint must accompany momentum. As Clausewitz warned, “military victory must not outpace political calculation.” Pakistan must now balance exuberance with introspection.


    34- Pakistan’s Successful Use of Chinese-Made 4.5-Generation J-10C

    The J-10C’s operational success has validated Chinese hardware in real-time conditions, increasing trust within Pakistan’s air force. Its PL-15 missiles and AESA radar offer parity with India’s Rafale, especially in beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements.

    According to Air Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry, “the J-10C has redefined aerial tactics in Pakistan.” This track record enhances the credibility of future Chinese acquisitions and accelerates doctrinal confidence.


    35- Pakistan’s Chinese-Made HQ-9 Air Defence Radars to Convey Target Info on Indian Planes

    The HQ-9 system enables deep-layered defense, and its radar network allows target tracking across hundreds of kilometers. By integrating with AWACS and local SAM units, it forms a “kill web” capable of autonomous responses.

    This radar-to-shooter loop is essential in countering Indian incursions, particularly in mountainous terrain where line-of-sight is limited. The system allows faster, precision-targeted responses—boosting deterrence through automation and integration.


    36- China Now Offers a “More Affordable, Tightly Integrated System”

    China’s value proposition lies in cost-effective, plug-and-play systems that are interoperable with each other. For countries like Pakistan with constrained defense budgets, this is a compelling offering—unlike Western systems, which often require costly middleware integration.

    Defense economist Richard Bitzinger observes that “China’s affordability model is reshaping arms markets.” The integrated nature of its offerings makes for a simplified logistics chain, ideal for sustained conflict readiness.


    37- Pakistan Has Managed to Integrate Western and Chinese Defense Systems

    Few nations have managed such a balancing act. Pakistan operates U.S.-made F-16s alongside Chinese J-10s, Russian-origin Mi-17s with Chinese radars—a testament to its adaptability. This hybrid arsenal increases strategic options but also strains maintenance protocols and tactical doctrine.

    Defense expert Ayesha Siddiqa, in Military Inc., writes that “Pakistan’s military excels in creative procurement but must now master coherent integration.” Without unified combat software and training, these systems risk functioning in silos.


    38- It May Come at the Cost of Sidelining U.S.-Made Systems Like the F-16

    As Chinese systems become dominant, the operational relevance of the F-16 may diminish. Supply chain limitations, U.S. export restrictions, and lack of upgrades could relegate the F-16 fleet to secondary roles.

    This pivot signals a deeper geopolitical shift—Pakistan’s growing disinterest in U.S. approval as a precondition for defense modernization. It is not merely about platforms, but a pivot in strategic worldview.


    39- “That’s Not Just a Technical Issue – It’s a Strategic Decision”

    Choosing Chinese systems over American ones isn’t just technical—it signifies a reorientation of alliances and ideologies. It reflects Islamabad’s belief that strategic autonomy is better preserved through Beijing than Washington.

    As Henry Kissinger said, “Every great power must eventually choose its own sphere of alignment.” For Pakistan, this decision is about long-term survival, leverage, and sovereign procurement.


    40- Still Have to Address Training, Command Processes

    New hardware demands doctrinal evolution—especially in command structure, battlefield decision-making, and electronic warfare. Without institutional reform, even the most advanced systems could flounder.

    Modern warfare is no longer about pilots and tanks alone—it’s about cognitive bandwidth, decision latency, and digital fusion. This will require joint operations centers, training cycles, and AI-assisted targeting protocols.


    41- “Modern Operational Art Cannot Be Bought. It Must Be Honed Through Trial and Error.”

    As military historian Eliot Cohen reminds us, “wars are not won with toys but with ideas.” Pakistan’s success depends not just on acquiring weaponry but on mastering the operational art behind it—through rigorous training, simulated combat, and battlefield feedback.

    Operational excellence is iterative. It grows out of failure and learning—not procurement contracts. Pakistan must now institutionalize this learning process to translate hardware into genuine strategic leverage.


    Conclusion

    Pakistan’s accelerating partnership with China in the defense domain is reshaping South Asia’s strategic landscape. From stealth jets and AWACS to ballistic missile shields and air defense radars, the sweep of modernization is bold and consequential. But acquiring equipment is not enough—what matters is how effectively these tools are integrated, operated, and adapted to Pakistan’s unique security needs.

    The pivot to China is more than transactional—it is ideological, institutional, and strategic. It reflects a broader worldview, one in which Pakistan seeks to assert regional parity, strategic autonomy, and technological advancement. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but also full of possibility—should Pakistan rise to meet it with clarity, competence, and caution.

    Pakistan’s drive to bolster its arsenal with Chinese weapon systems following its assertive posture vis-à-vis India unfolds across a multi-dimensional canvas. It reflects not just a quest for deterrence but a full-spectrum strategy involving geopolitics, economics, industrial policy, and domestic legitimacy. While it promises operational advantages, the plan also introduces significant challenges—interoperability, budgetary strain, and escalation risk.

    For policymakers and analysts alike, Pakistan’s evolution is a case study in how emerging powers leverage arms procurement to navigate global alignments. Whether this strategy achieves long-term strategic stability—or entrenches new security dilemmas—will depend heavily on implementation, regional response, and Islamabad’s capacity to integrate capability with restraint.


    Suggested Further Reading

    • Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Asia (CSIS)
    • Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era
    • Jonathan Holslag, China’s Ascendancy
    • C. Raja Mohan, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
    • Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: Pakistan, the United States, and the Global Nuclear Weapons Race

    Bibliography

    1. Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Pluto Press, 2007.
    2. Bitzinger, Richard A. “China’s Defence Industry and the Economics of Arms Exports.” China Perspectives, no. 95, 2013, pp. 21–28.
    3. Chopra, Anil. “The Future of Air Combat in South Asia.” Centre for Air Power Studies Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, 2022.
    4. Postol, Theodore A. “The Limits of Missile Defense.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 64, no. 2, 2008, pp. 45–54.
    5. Sun, Yun. “China and the India–Pakistan Conflict: Strategic Interests and Regional Influence.” The Diplomat, 2021.
    6. Waldron, Greg. The Dragon’s Wings: China’s Military Aviation Strategy. Aviation Week Publishing, 2019.
    7. Erickson, Andrew S. “Chinese Naval Developments and Strategic Implications.” Naval War College Review, vol. 68, no. 2, 2015.
    8. Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. Free Press, 2002.
    9. Kopp, Carlo. “Network Centric Warfare and Airpower.” Air Power Australia Analysis, 2015.
    10. Ladwig, Walter C. “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine.” International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, 2008, pp. 158–190.
    11. Aboulafia, Richard. “The Military Aircraft Market and Emerging Powers.” Teal Group Aerospace Briefing, 2020.
    12. Chaudhry, Shahzad. “Redefining Pakistan’s Air Strategy.” Dawn, 2023.
    13. Stillion, John. “Trends in Air-to-Air Combat: Implications for Future Air Superiority.” RAND Corporation, 2015.
    14. Kissinger, Henry. World Order. Penguin Press, 2014.
    15. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976.

    By Amjad Izhar
    Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
    https://amjadizhar.blog