Amjad Izhar Blog

Category: International Law

  • International Law and International Relations

    International Law and International Relations

    The provided text comprises excerpts from various scholarly articles exploring international law and relations. Key themes include the formation and effectiveness of international regimes, focusing on factors like state self-interest, power dynamics, and norms. The role of legalization in enhancing compliance with international agreements, particularly in trade and human rights, is extensively examined. Different theoretical perspectives, such as realism, rationalism, and constructivism, are applied to analyze state behavior and the design of international institutions. Several case studies, including the European Convention on Human Rights, the GATT/WTO, and oil pollution control, illustrate the complexities of international cooperation and compliance.

    International Law and Relations: A Study Guide

    Short Answer Quiz

    1. How did the detention of ships lacking the International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) certificate contribute to the success of MARPOL?
    2. Explain the concept of “transnational dispute resolution” and provide examples given in the text.
    3. According to James, what defines a sovereign state? What is a key aspect of sovereignty’s nature?
    4. Differentiate between “juridical statehood” and “empirical statehood.” What does juridical statehood represent in international relations?
    5. What are the key characteristics that determine the robustness of an international norm?
    6. How did the German navy’s view of submarine warfare differ from other nations, and what impact did this have on its actions during World War II?
    7. How did Britain use the concept of “normative capital” to its advantage in World War II?
    8. What role do norms play in signaling a state’s intentions, and how did Germany’s actions in 1939 reflect this?
    9. What is meant by “issue density” and how does it relate to the demand for international regimes?
    10. What is the “logic of appropriateness,” and how is it related to compliance with international regimes?

    Answer Key

    1. The detention of ships lacking the IOPP certificate was critical because it imposed significant costs on violators, as a single day of detention cost a tanker operator approximately $20,000 in opportunity costs, far higher than typical fines. This acted as a powerful deterrent against future violations, incentivizing compliance.
    2. Transnational dispute resolution refers to an institutional arrangement where adjudicators, agenda, and enforcement are substantially independent of individual and collective pressure from national governments. Examples include the EU and the ECHR, where judges are insulated from national governments, societal individuals and groups.
    3. James defines sovereign statehood as “constitutional independence” from other states, meaning a state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement. Sovereignty, in essence, is a historical phenomenon and a legal order that can be acquired, lost, and changed.
    4. “Juridical statehood” is derived from a right of self-determination, also referred to as negative sovereignty, whereas “empirical statehood” involves a capacity for effective and civil government, or positive sovereignty. Juridical statehood allowed many underdeveloped areas to join the international community on a basis of equal sovereignty.
    5. A norm’s robustness is determined by several factors, including its specificity, its longevity/legitimacy, and whether violations are penalized. Violations do not necessarily invalidate the norm, but a strong norm is more resilient to violations.
    6. Unlike many nations, the German navy viewed submarines as a valued combat tool. Because of their ethos based on their WWI unrestricted trade offensive, their plans, operations and advice were biased in favor of violation of the international norm related to submarine warfare.
    7. Britain concluded that its own restraint, despite German transgressions, would garner it favor from third parties. They planned to build “normative capital” that they could leverage to gain support at a later point.
    8. Violating prohibitions can be an indicator of a state’s ambitions. For example, Germany, after its invasion of Poland in 1939, sought accommodation with Britain, but it knew that its use of unrestricted submarine warfare would signal its aggressive nature, despite this desire for peace.
    9. Issue density refers to the number of interactions and connections between states related to a particular issue. Higher issue density tends to increase the demand for international regimes to manage those interactions.
    10. The “logic of appropriateness” suggests actors follow norms because they believe it is the right thing to do, regardless of immediate self-interest, which is often contrasted with the “logic of consequences”. This concept is used to explain compliance with international regimes, though it’s less applicable to the initial design of those regimes.

    Essay Questions

    1. Analyze the concept of sovereignty as presented in the text. How does it evolve in the context of international relations, and what are the key challenges to traditional notions of state sovereignty in the modern world?
    2. Discuss the role of international norms in shaping state behavior, using examples from the text. How are norms established, maintained, and challenged? How do different theoretical perspectives account for the power of international norms?
    3. Explore the causes and consequences of territorial disputes in international relations. What role do international organizations play in managing these disputes, and how effective are they?
    4. Evaluate the effectiveness of different enforcement mechanisms in international law, such as detention and sanctions. What factors make these mechanisms more or less effective in ensuring compliance?
    5. Critically assess the different theoretical frameworks used to explain compliance with international rules (realism, idealism, and republican liberalism). How do these different frameworks account for variation in states’ adherence to international law and norms?

    Glossary of Key Terms

    Empirical Statehood: A state’s capacity for effective and civil government; also referred to as positive sovereignty.

    Juridical Statehood: The status of a state being recognized as sovereign under international law, often based on a right to self-determination, also referred to as negative sovereignty.

    Logic of Appropriateness: A concept that suggests actors follow norms not primarily for self-interest, but because they believe it is the proper or right thing to do, a key aspect of constructivist theory.

    Normative Capital: The accumulated positive reputation and goodwill a state earns by adhering to international norms and acting with restraint, which can be strategically leveraged later for political advantage.

    Norm Robustness: The strength and resilience of an international norm, determined by factors such as its specificity, longevity, legitimacy, and whether violations are penalized.

    Sovereign Statehood: The condition of a state having constitutional independence from other states, meaning that its constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement.

    Transnational Dispute Resolution: An institutional arrangement where adjudicators, agenda, and enforcement mechanisms are substantially independent of national governments’ pressures and where judges are insulated from national governments.

    Issue Density: The number of interactions and connections between states related to a particular issue, often driving the need for international regimes to manage those interactions.

    IOPP Certificate: International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate, a mandatory certification for tankers to ensure they meet international standards for preventing oil pollution.

    MARPOL: The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, an international treaty focused on preventing pollution by ships.

    International Law, Norms, and State Behavior

    Okay, here’s a detailed briefing document summarizing the main themes and important ideas from the provided sources:

    Briefing Document: International Law, Norms, and State Behavior

    Introduction:

    This document summarizes key concepts and arguments presented in the provided excerpts, focusing on international law, norms, state sovereignty, dispute resolution, the dynamics of war and peace, and the role of international institutions. It explores how these factors shape state behavior and the international system.

    I. International Law and Compliance

    • Enforcement Mechanisms Beyond Fines: The excerpts emphasize that traditional fines are often insufficient to deter violations of international law, particularly in areas like maritime pollution. The text argues that “Detention provisions have altered behavior because they have had the virtue of imposing . . . high costs on the violator, making their use more credible and more potent . . . detention is a large enough penalty to deter a ship from committing future violations.” The opportunity costs associated with ship detention ($20,000/day) far outweigh typical fines, demonstrating the effectiveness of such measures.
    • Transnational Dispute Resolution: A key distinction is drawn between state-controlled dispute resolution, where national governments influence the judges, agenda, and enforcement, and transnational dispute resolution. This ideal type “judges are insulated from national governments, societal individuals and groups,” as seen in the EU and ECHR, which operate with a level of independence from state influence.
    • Legalization of International Monetary Affairs: The document discusses the “legalization” of international monetary conduct, noting that while control over national currency is a closely guarded prerogative of nation-states, international rules have increasingly become formalized and legally binding.

    II. The Concept of Sovereignty

    • Sovereignty as a Human Convention: Sovereignty is not viewed as an inherent or static condition but as “something that can be acquired and lost, claimed or denied, respected or violated, celebrated or condemned, changed or abandoned.” It is a historical phenomenon with a legal basis.
    • Constitutional Independence: The source cites James’s definition of sovereign statehood as “constitutional independence” where a state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement.
    • Juridical vs. Empirical Statehood: A distinction is made between “juridical statehood,” derived from the right of self-determination (negative sovereignty), and “empirical statehood,” which reflects a capacity for effective government (positive sovereignty). Juridical statehood allowed many developing countries, especially in Africa, to enter the international community on a basis of equal sovereignty, despite their limited capacity for governance.

    III. International Norms and State Behavior

    • Definition of Norms: The document defines norms as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity,” emphasizing that strong regulatory norms are widely respected and viewed as legally binding.
    • Norm Robustness: The robustness of a norm is assessed based on factors like its specificity, the extent of its legitimacy, and whether violations are penalized. A violation of a norm doesn’t necessarily invalidate the norm if the norm is robust enough.
    • Norms Limiting the Use of Force: Specific prohibitions are examined, including submarine warfare against civilian ships, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare. The document highlights how the stigma associated with violating these norms varied, with submarine warfare against civilian vessels facing strong condemnation.
    • Gaining Advantage Through Norms: States sometimes adhere to norms not just for moral reasons, but also to gain a strategic advantage. For example, Britain’s restraint in submarine warfare during WWII was intended to accumulate “normative capital” and build goodwill with neutral countries.
    • Signaling Intentions: Violating prohibitions can signal a state’s intentions and ambitions to other actors. For example, Germany sought accommodation with Britain after invading Poland, even though its use of unrestricted submarine warfare was a norm violation.
    • Internalized Self-Restraint: Beyond strategic calculation, actors may follow norms because they have internalized them as the “right thing to do” within their society, suggesting a “logic of appropriateness.” This highlights how norms can shape identity and values.

    IV. Territorial Disputes and Wars

    • Territorial Wars and International Organizations: The document analyzes numerous territorial wars, showing that international organizations, like the UN, NATO, and OAS, often play a role in ending conflicts, supporting the norm against territorial aggression. Multilateral responses often reflect broad international backing for the norm.
    • Economic Factors: The increasing economic costs and benefits of territorial aggrandizement have influenced state behavior. Interdependencies make wars less appealing, although this is not always sufficient to deter conflict.
    • Fear of Irredentism: Many developing states fear territorial aggression due to the risk of irredentist claims resulting from overlapping borders and their own military weakness. The 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples sought to mitigate these fears by reinforcing the norm against territorial expansion.
    • Territorial Changes After Conflict: Most territorial conflicts resulted in no major boundary changes, with international actors supporting pre-existing borders.

    V. International Institutions and Cooperation

    • The Design of Institutions: The document raises critical questions about international institutional design:
    • Who are the designers? Typically states are the designers.
    • What values should institutions pursue? Wealth? Power? Justice?
    • For whom are these values pursued? Nations? Civilizations? Humanity?
    • Time Horizon? Should future generations be considered?
    • Reputation in Agreement Making: A state’s reputation for reliability is valuable over time, which acts as a “performance bond” to ensure commitments are upheld. When states have short-term horizons, they are more likely to break agreements.
    • Third-Party Review: The document details the role of third-party review in various international agreements, ranging from non-binding conciliation reports to binding arbitration decisions. The level of legalism in these agreements varies widely.
    • Asymmetry: Asymmetry in pact agreements influences how easily agreements can be made and kept. For example, pacts between states with more evenly distributed GDP share are more likely to be followed.
    • Risk and Uncertainty: The document analyzes the impact of uncertainty and risk on the durability of agreements, specifically regarding “agreement shock,” highlighting how unexpected events can influence the stability of international cooperation.
    • Logics of Appropriateness: Norms can lead to “internalized self-restraint,” where actors follow norms because they believe it is the right thing to do, not because of self-interest.

    VI. State Identity and the International System

    • Social Construction of States: The excerpts emphasize that state identity is not fixed but is continuously constructed through practices. States, as corporate actors with particular rights and powers, are a product of ongoing social processes.
    • Normative Implications of Design: The choices made in designing international institutions are not neutral but have normative consequences, as they can legitimate certain state powers (e.g., war-making) and privilege some interests over others.

    VII. Factors Influencing State Behavior in International Relations

    • Realism, Idealism, and Republican Liberalism: The document outlines three theoretical perspectives on the factors that drive state behavior in international relations:
    • Realism: Great powers employ coercion or inducement to extend national ideals derived from national pride.
    • Ideational Theory: Democratic states seek to extend perceived universal norms, while less democratic states are socialized into compliance through transnational networks.
    • Republican Liberalism: Governments seek to prevent domestic oppression and conflict through international standards, while being constrained by the risk of domestic law being struck down.
    • Democracy: New democracies are most likely to support legally binding international commitments. Established democracies tend to only accept optional or rhetorical commitments. Non-democracies oppose.
    • Domestic Factors: Domestic rule of law and democratic systems often influence a state’s compliance with international obligations and norms. For example, states with a strong rule of law are more likely to comply with international monetary rules.
    • Regional Norms: States are more likely to violate international rules if their regional neighbors do so.

    VIII. War Crimes Tribunals

    • The Role of Law in International Politics: The document considers the role of international criminal tribunals, using the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as examples, in holding individuals accountable for violations of international law, and in establishing a sense of justice and reconciliation.
    • Tension Between Justice and Politics: It acknowledges the tensions and debates about the role of war crimes tribunals. There is the “realpolitik” view that tribunals will never be useful in bringing perpetrators to justice, and the “idealist” view that tribunals are essential for fostering peace.

    Conclusion:

    These excerpts highlight the complex interplay between international law, norms, state sovereignty, and international institutions in shaping state behavior. The analysis moves beyond simple notions of power to explore the roles of values, identity, strategic calculation, and institutional design in international relations. The material emphasizes that states are not simply rational actors pursuing self-interest, but are also influenced by normative considerations, social expectations, and the need to maintain a credible reputation within the international community. This has a practical effect on how international law should be developed and enforced.

    International Law and State Behavior

    FAQ on International Law, Norms, and State Behavior

    1. What role do sanctions and enforcement play in the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, such as MARPOL?
    2. Sanctions and enforcement are critical components of effective international environmental agreements. While transparency is important, the ability to impose significant costs on violators is what ultimately drives behavioral change. In the case of MARPOL, the possibility of a ship being barred from port or detained carries huge opportunity costs (potentially $20,000 per day), which far outweigh typical fines and act as a potent deterrent. This is because the costs are direct, immediate, and significant enough to make violations undesirable.
    3. What is the difference between national dispute resolution and transnational dispute resolution?
    4. National dispute resolution is characterized by individual states deciding who the judges are, what they judge, and how judgments are enforced. This system is heavily influenced by national governments and their priorities. In contrast, transnational dispute resolution, exemplified by institutions like the EU and ECHR, features adjudicators, agendas, and enforcement mechanisms that are substantially independent of individual national governments and societal pressures. In this system, judges are insulated from national influence, allowing for more impartial rulings and potentially more robust enforcement of international law.
    5. What is the concept of “sovereignty” in international relations, and is it a static concept?
    6. Sovereignty, as defined in international relations, refers to the “constitutional independence” of states, meaning a state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement. However, sovereignty is not a static concept. It is a historical phenomenon, constantly subject to change, acquisition, loss, claims, denials, respect, violation, celebration, and condemnation. It is a legal order that is constructed and maintained through interactions among states, and can be challenged or altered over time.
    7. How does the idea of “juridical statehood” relate to “positive sovereignty,” particularly in the context of developing nations?
    8. Juridical statehood refers to the international legal recognition of a state, typically stemming from a right of self-determination, and is considered “negative sovereignty” as it refers to freedom from outside control. In contrast, positive sovereignty concerns the state’s ability to establish effective and civil governance. Developing nations, especially in Africa, often achieve juridical statehood as a basis for equal inclusion into the international community, but may initially lack the empirical state capacity for positive sovereignty, which they must build over time.
    9. How are norms in international relations assessed for their robustness, and what factors contribute to their strength or weakness?
    10. The robustness of a norm is assessed by considering several factors: first, specificity (how clearly the norm is defined), second, its long-standing legitimacy, and third, if violations are penalized, therefore reinforcing the norm. A norm’s robustness is not guaranteed; violations occur, but if they are consistently penalized, the norm is strengthened. In particular contexts, like submarine warfare, a robust norm can significantly influence state behavior, whereas norms with low specificity or inconsistent enforcement may have little impact.
    11. How do states consider norms when calculating their advantage or disadvantage?
    12. States weigh the costs and benefits of adhering to norms and may use those norms to gain advantages. For instance, states might choose restraint to garner international goodwill, aiming to “cash in” this “normative capital” later. Violating established norms is also a way for a state to signal its intentions or ambitions, and states consider the risks of negative consequences when assessing these advantages.
    13. How do economic interdependencies and territorial integrity norms influence conflict and cooperation between states?
    14. Economic interdependencies can deter wars because they lead to high economic costs if there is conflict. However, their impact is not guaranteed because interdependencies have not deterred wars in the past, suggesting that they only impact the decision to wage war once they are strong enough, and the value of war is lowered due to the costs of disrupted trade, etc. Regarding territorial integrity, there has been a strong global norm against territorial conquest. Though many states have broken this norm, and there are economic benefits to be had from conquest in some cases, the norm has had a large effect and has been strengthened by the negative responses from other nations when violated.
    15. What are some key factors that influence whether states adhere to or violate international agreements and norms?
    16. Factors influencing state adherence or violations of international agreements and norms include: the presence of enforcement mechanisms (like detention provisions), the desire to gain a reputational advantage, domestic political structures (democratic states are more likely to adhere), economic costs and benefits, and the robustness and clarity of the norm itself. Additionally, self-restraint, based on internalized norms of appropriate behavior, and the calculation of future benefits also play a role. States make calculated decisions based on their perception of costs, benefits, and the influence of norms on their legitimacy.

    Sovereignty, War, and International Law: A Historical Perspective

    Okay, here is a detailed timeline and cast of characters based on the provided text:

    Timeline of Main Events

    • Pre-1648: Implied existence of a system where victors of wars could claim territorial spoils.
    • 1648-1945: 119 Interstate wars in “the European and global states system,” 93 of which were territorial wars.
    • Early 20th Century: Increased legalization of international rules of good monetary conduct.
    • 1914: Strong economic interdependencies between nations were not enough to deter the start of major wars.
    • 1919: Post World War I discussions and planning regarding submarine warfare.
    • Captain Herbert Richmond makes diary entries about submarine warfare.
    • 1920: Continued discussion and planning regarding submarine warfare.
    • 1931: Stimson Doctrine is formulated, an international position on non-recognition of territorial changes resulting from aggression.
    • 1933: Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States.
    • Pre-1939: Norms developed limiting the use of force, specifically concerning submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare.
    • 1939 (Fall): Germany invades Poland, then attempts accommodation with Britain.
    • 1939 (October): Discussions within the British navy about adhering to or loosening rules for submarine warfare.
    • October 25: Minute by Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff regarding submarine warfare.
    • October: Minute by Head of Military Branch regarding submarine warfare.
    • 1939 (November): Continued discussion within the British navy about adhering to or loosening rules for submarine warfare.
    • November 3: Minute by Director of Plans regarding submarine warfare.
    • 1939-1945: World War II, a major conflict where norms of submarine warfare are frequently violated. German navy viewed submarines as a valued combat tool and continued using unrestricted trade offensive.
    • 1945: End of World War II. The Baltic states were integrated into the Soviet Union by Stalin, and the Soviet Union absorbed territories from Poland, Germany, Finland, Rumania, Japan.
    • 1946 – Present: Analysis of the causes and outcomes of interstate territorial conflicts across the globe.
    • Multiple instances of territorial disputes and aggression across Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia and the Middle East are cited.
    • Europe:1974-Present: Turkey invades Cyprus.
    • 1991: Yugoslavia attacks Slovenia; war between Yugoslavia and Croatia.
    • 1992-95: War between Yugoslavia and Bosnia.
    • Americas:1957: Nicaragua occupies part of Honduras.
    • 1982: Argentina occupies Falkland Islands, leading to war with Britain.
    • 1995: Ecuador sends troops into a disputed area with Peru.
    • Africa:1963: Ghana occupies part of Upper Volta, Algeria occupies part of Morocco.
    • 1964: Somalia sends troops to Ethiopia and Kenya to assist rebels.
    • 1973-87: Libya occupies part of Chad (Aouzou Strip).
    • 1975: Mali occupies area of Burkina Faso; Morocco lays claim to Spanish Sahara.
    • 1976-80: Somalia occupies part of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region.
    • 1978: Uganda occupies part of Tanzania.
    • 1981-82: Libya puts pressure on Chad to accept political union.
    • 1985: Mali-Burkina Faso dispute leads to arbitration by the ICJ.
    • 1998-2000: Border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
    • Middle EastMultiple conflicts between Arab States and Israel, occurring in 1947-49, 1967, and 1973.
    • 1990-91 Iraq invades Kuwait.
    • Asia1947-48: Conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
    • 1950-53: Korean War.
    • 1956: China moves troops into a border area of Burma.
    • 1961: Afghanistan sends troops into Pakistan
    • 1961-62: Indonesia claims West New Guinea.
    • 1962: China occupies disputed territories claimed by India.
    • 1962-75: War between North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
    • 1963-65: Indonesia disputes territory with Malaysia.
    • 1965: Pakistan attacks India in the Rann of Kutch, and also later in the year again in Kashmir.
    • 1971: India intervenes in East Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh.
    • 1971: Iran occupies islands belonging to the UAE in the Strait of Hormuz.
    • 1974: China expels South Vietnam from the Paracel Islands
    • 1975-99: Indonesia invades East Timor.
    • 1977-78: Cambodia attacks Vietnam.
    • 1980-88: Iran-Iraq War.
    • Many of the above conflicts involving the following organizations are noted:
    • UN: Involved in numerous conflicts, calling for ceasefires, withdrawal of troops, and negotiations, also playing an increasing role in enforcing territorial integrity norms.
    • OAS: Involved in disputes between Nicaragua and Honduras.
    • OAU: Involved in various conflicts in Africa, working towards withdrawal of troops and promoting the original boundaries.
    • ICJ: Arbitrates territorial disputes between multiple nations, for example between Nicaragua and Honduras, Mali and Burkina Faso, and Libya and Chad.
    • 1960s-1990s: Development and increasing enforcement of the MARPOL treaty to address oil tanker pollution.
    • 1973: The Mano River Union is founded.
    • 1981: The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is founded.
    • 1990s: Increased use of detention as a sanction for oil tanker violations. Also increased discussions about the legitimacy of the powers of sovereign states.
    • 1990s-2000s: Increased complexity in the use of international law and tribunals as mechanisms for dispute resolution.
    • 1992: Discussions about the US ability to enforce the use of segregated ballast tanks on oil tankers. Also the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is signed.
    • 1994: ICJ rules in favor of Chad in the dispute with Libya. Also the treaties between Chile and Colombia, and Romania and the Czech Republic are signed.
    • 1995: The treaty between Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic is signed. The Dayton Accords are reached, defining boundaries of the former Yugoslavia.
    • Present Day: Ongoing construction of modes of subjectivity and how this matters to the design of international laws. Also continuing discussions about what values states should pursue and for whom, and what their time horizon should be.

    Cast of Characters

    • Herbert Richmond: Captain (later Admiral) in the British Navy. His diary entries in 1919 reveal discussions about submarine warfare and its ethics.
    • Stalin: Leader of the Soviet Union during the mid 20th century. Responsible for the integration of Baltic states into the Soviet Union.
    • E.J.M. Ball: Interviewed regarding oil tanker pollution regulations.
    • John Foxwell: Official at Shell International Marine, interviewed about MARPOL and related regulations.
    • Harold Demsetz: Economist known for his theory of property rights, which is discussed in relation to the establishment of territorial rights by sovereign states.
    • Kenneth Abbott: scholar who studies legal institutions, incorporating political factors that shape the law.
    • Grotius: His writings on international law are cited, including the concept of jus in bello.
    • Hans Morgenthau: Political scientist and historian whose ideas about realism are cited.
    • Oscar Schachter: Scholar in international law and legal theory, whose work is cited.
    • Andrew Moravcsik: Political scientist who studies international relations with a focus on liberalism.
    • Henry Schermers: Legal scholar, whose work is cited when discussing European law and jurisdiction.

    Additional Notes

    • Norms: The sources emphasize the role of international norms in shaping state behavior, particularly in areas like warfare, territorial integrity, and environmental protection.
    • Sovereignty: The concept of sovereignty is constantly being redefined throughout the text. It is seen as something that can be gained, lost, violated, changed, and constructed. There are discussions about negative (juridical) sovereignty and positive (empirical) sovereignty.
    • International Organizations: The text shows the increasing role of the UN, OAS, and OAU in attempting to resolve territorial disputes and enforcing international norms.
    • Legalization: The increasing “legalization” of international affairs is also noted, with a rising dependence on international courts and tribunals to resolve disputes.

    Let me know if you would like me to elaborate on any of these points or if you have more questions.

    International Regimes: Principles, Norms, and Decision-Making

    International regimes are defined as the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area [1, 2]. Regimes can be seen as intervening variables that stand between basic causal factors and related outcomes and behavior [1].

    The importance of regimes is viewed in different ways [1]:

    • Conventional structural orientations see regimes as ineffectual [1].
    • Grotian orientations consider regimes an integral part of the international system [1].
    • Modified structural perspectives view regimes as significant only under certain constrained conditions [1].

    Regime development is seen as a function of five basic causal variables: egoistic self-interest, political power, diffuse norms and principles, custom and usage, and knowledge [3].

    Regimes are demanded because they facilitate agreements by providing information and reducing transaction costs in world politics [4]. Increased interdependence among issues will lead to an increased demand for regimes [4].

    International legalization is a form of institutionalization characterized by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation [5].

    • Obligation means that states are legally bound by rules or commitments and are subject to international law [5].
    • Precision means that the rules are definite and unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe [6].
    • Delegation grants authority to third parties for the implementation of rules, including their interpretation and application, dispute settlement, and further rule-making [6].

    There are two ideal types of international third-party dispute resolution: interstate and transnational [7].

    • Under interstate dispute resolution, states closely control the selection of, access to, and compliance with international courts and tribunals [7].
    • Under transnational dispute resolution, individuals and non-governmental entities have significant influence over selection, access, and implementation [7]. Transnational dispute resolution tends to be associated with greater compliance with international legal judgments [8].

    Changes within regimes include alterations of rules and procedures, as long as principles and norms are unaltered [9]. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself [9]. A weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior [10].

    From a realist perspective, regimes are phenomena that need to be explained; from a Grotian perspective, they are data to be described [11]. Conventional structural arguments do not take regimes seriously, while modified structural arguments see regimes as mattering only when independent decision-making leads to undesired outcomes [11]. Grotian perspectives accept regimes as a fundamental part of all patterned human interaction [12].

    Egoistic self-interest is a prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes, where the desire is to maximize one’s own utility function without including the utility of another party [12]. Usage, custom, and knowledge can contribute to the development of regimes [13].

    International regimes are not quasi-governments but are more like contracts involving actors with long-term objectives [14]. A major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making of specific agreements [15]. Regimes help to make governments’ expectations consistent with one another [16].

    Regimes facilitate agreements by providing rules, norms, principles, and procedures that help actors to overcome barriers to agreement [17]. Regimes can correct institutional defects in world politics by establishing legal liability, improving information, and reducing transaction costs [18, 19]. The optimal size of a regime will increase if there are increasing returns to regime-scale [20].

    International regimes may be of value to actors by providing information [21]. High-quality information reduces uncertainty [21].

    Some mechanisms are highly legalistic with standing tribunals, while others are diplomatic, requiring only that the disputing countries make a good-faith effort to resolve their differences through consultations [22].

    Legalized delegation introduces new actors and new forms of politics into interstate relations [23].

    Interstate dispute resolution is consistent with the view that public international law comprises a set of rules and practices governing relations among states, while transnational dispute resolution empowers individuals and groups to seek enforcement of international legal provisions in domestic courts [24, 25].

    International regimes may be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations [26]. The term “international regimes” is preferred because it denotes principles and rules and not merely regularities or norms [27].

    International norms and rules can be contradicted and overwhelmed by social understandings [28]. The clearer, more durable, and more widely endorsed a prescription is, the greater its impact [29].

    Informal agreements are a common form of international cooperation [30]. Informality is a device for minimizing impediments to cooperation at both domestic and international levels [31]. In international affairs, the term “binding agreement” is a misleading hyperbole [32]. States must enforce their bargains themselves [32].

    Discussions of dispute settlement range from direct negotiation to third-party adjudication [33]. The question is whether arbitral or judicial rulings are formally binding in international legal terms [34].

    International law performs two functions: providing mechanisms for cross-border interactions, and shaping the values and goals these interactions are pursuing [35]. These are termed the “operating system” and “normative system,” respectively [35].

    The operating system includes rules regarding lawmaking, actors, jurisdiction, and courts or institutions [36-40]. The normative system functions to create norms out of particular values or policies, and directs specific changes in state and other actors’ behaviors [41]. The operating system may not always respond to normative changes [42].

    International regimes can be interpreted as devices to facilitate the making of substantive agreements [17]. Regimes facilitate agreements by providing rules, norms, principles, and procedures that help actors to overcome barriers to agreement [17].

    Regime complexes are an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area [43]. Regime complexes are marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are created and maintained in distinct fora with different sets of actors [44].

    Regime complexes will demonstrate path dependence, where existing arrangements will constrain and channel the process of creating new rules [45]. The existence of distinct negotiating fora will spur forum shopping, and a dense array of institutions will lead to legal inconsistencies [46, 47].

    In regime complexes, rules evolve against a backdrop of existing rules; there is no clean institutional slate [48].

    International Regime Development

    Regime development is a complex process influenced by various factors and perspectives [1, 2].

    Causal Variables:

    • Egoistic Self-Interest: Regimes can develop from the desire to maximize one’s own utility, without considering the utility of others [3].
    • Political Power: The existing distribution of power in the international system influences regime formation [2]. A hegemonic state can shape a regime, but if that state’s power declines, the regime may also collapse [4].
    • Diffuse Norms and Principles: Shared beliefs and standards of behavior can contribute to regime development [2, 5, 6].
    • Custom and Usage: Practices and shared expectations can become infused with principles and norms, reinforcing the development of regimes [2, 7].
    • Knowledge: Technical information and theories can also shape the development of regimes [2, 7].

    Theoretical Perspectives:

    • Conventional Structuralism: This perspective views regimes as having little to no impact, merely reflecting changes in basic causal factors [8, 9]. Regimes are seen as epiphenomenal, with a direct connection between basic causal factors and outcomes, excluding regimes [8].
    • Modified Structuralism: This perspective suggests that regimes may matter, but only under certain conditions, such as when independent decision-making leads to undesired outcomes [2, 9, 10].
    • Grotian Perspective: This perspective sees regimes as a fundamental part of all patterned human interaction, including international relations [8, 9, 11].

    Key Aspects of Regime Development:

    • Intervening Variables: Regimes can be seen as intervening variables that stand between basic causal factors and related outcomes and behaviors [1].
    • Demand for Regimes: Regimes are demanded because they facilitate agreements by providing information and reducing transaction costs [12-14]. Increased interdependence among issues can increase the demand for regimes [15].
    • Regimes as Contracts: Regimes are not like governments but are more like contracts between actors with long-term objectives [16].
    • Facilitating Agreements: A major function of international regimes is to facilitate specific agreements within an issue area [17]. Regimes help governments have consistent expectations [13].
    • Path Dependence: In a regime complex, existing arrangements can constrain the creation of new rules [18].
    • Forum Shopping: Actors may attempt to select the forum that best suits their interests when multiple negotiating forums are available [19, 20].
    • Bottom-Up Evolution: Regime rules may evolve through implementation and interpretation, as negotiators adopt broad rules anticipating that conflicts can be resolved later [21, 22].
    • Legalization: International legalization is characterized by obligation, precision, and delegation [23].
    • Norms: The clearer, more durable, and widely endorsed a norm is, the greater its impact on behavior [24].
    • Weakening of a regime: Occurs when there is incoherence among its components or an inconsistency between the regime and related behavior [25].

    Regime Change:

    • Changes within a regime include alterations of rules and procedures without altering principles and norms, whereas changes to principles and norms represent a change of the regime itself [6].
    • Weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior [25].
    • Lags in Regime Change: There can be a lag between structural changes and regime change. This can be explained by the demand that regimes create for their own continuance through the creation of accepted norms and transgovernmental relations [26].

    Regime Complexes:

    • Overlapping Institutions: Regime complexes are characterized by partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area [27-29].
    • Multiple Agreements: They involve multiple legal agreements created and maintained in distinct forums with different sets of actors [30].
    • Inconsistencies: Regime complexes may have conflicting rules during transitions [30]. Legal inconsistencies can spur efforts at reconciliation and bargaining [31].

    These factors and perspectives contribute to a complex understanding of how international regimes develop, evolve, and sometimes decline [6, 8, 25, 32].

    International Dispute Settlement: Mechanisms, Design, and Compliance

    Dispute settlement in international relations is a complex area with a range of mechanisms and approaches. The sources discuss various aspects of dispute settlement, including its legal dimensions, institutional design, and its impact on state behavior.

    Legalization and Dispute Resolution

    • International legalization is characterized by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation [1]. Delegation involves granting authority to third parties for dispute resolution, as well as the interpretation and application of rules [1, 2].
    • Dispute settlement mechanisms can range from highly legalistic, with standing tribunals that resemble national courts, to diplomatic, requiring only that the disputing countries make a good-faith effort to resolve their differences through consultations [3, 4].
    • Most international dispute resolution lies between these two extremes, with actors combining varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation [2].

    Types of Dispute Resolution

    • Two ideal types of international third-party dispute resolution are identified: interstate and transnational [5, 6].
    • In interstate dispute resolution, states closely control the selection of, access to, and compliance with international courts and tribunals [5, 7, 8]. States act as gatekeepers to the international legal process [9].
    • In transnational dispute resolution, individuals and non-governmental entities have significant influence over selection, access, and implementation [5, 9]. Transnational dispute resolution tends to be associated with greater compliance with international legal judgments [10].
    • Interstate dispute resolution is consistent with the view that international law governs relations between states, conceived of as unitary actors [8].
    • Transnational dispute resolution is more open to individuals and groups in civil society, with states losing some of their gatekeeping capacities [9].

    Key Variables in Dispute Resolution

    • Three explanatory variables are used to distinguish between interstate and transnational dispute resolution: independence, access, and embeddedness [11].
    • Independence refers to the extent to which tribunals can reach legal judgments independently of national governments [12].
    • Access measures the range of social and political actors who have legal standing to submit a dispute to be resolved [13].
    • Embeddedness refers to the degree of control exercised by individual governments over the implementation of judgments [14, 15].
    • The spectrum of embeddedness ranges from strong control by national governments to very weak control [15].

    Institutional Design and Legalism

    • The level of legalism in dispute settlement mechanisms varies [16].
    • Legalistic mechanisms feature standing tribunals with powers and procedures similar to national courts [3].
    • Diplomatic mechanisms only require disputing countries to make a good-faith effort to resolve their differences through consultations [3].
    • Key features of institutional design that affect the level of legalism include:
    • The right to third-party review [17]
    • The status of rulings, whether they are formally binding [18].
    • The number, term, and method of selecting arbitrators or judges [18].
    • The range of actors with standing to bring disputes [19].
    • The available remedies for treaty violations [19].
    • The more legalistic a dispute settlement mechanism, the more likely it is to produce impartial, consistent, and legally binding third-party rulings [20].

    Dispute Resolution in Practice

    • GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have evolved over time, becoming more legalized. The WTO dispute settlement body has compulsory jurisdiction and enjoys high rates of compliance [21-23].
    • The GATT system was closer to the ideal type of interstate dispute resolution, while the WTO system is more legalized [23].
    • The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system have compulsory jurisdiction over member states and territories [22].
    • Informal agreements can be used to resolve disputes when formal mechanisms are not suitable [24, 25].
    • The International Court of Justice (ICJ) allows states to control access, either by requiring all parties to a dispute to agree to third-party intervention or by crafting a specific submission to the court’s jurisdiction [26].
    • Dispute resolution can also be delegated to third-party tribunals that apply general legal principles [6].

    Compliance and Enforcement

    • Compliance with international legal judgments tends to be greater in transnational dispute resolution, especially when autonomous domestic institutions mediate between individuals and international institutions [10].
    • Dispute settlement mechanisms improve government compliance by providing information about violations and in some instances by enforcing commitments [27].
    • Managerialist perspectives argue that non-compliance is not necessarily a deliberate violation, but may be due to ambiguity or capacity deficits [28, 29].
    • Strategies to induce compliance include improving dispute resolution procedures, providing technical and financial assistance, and increasing transparency [30].

    Political Context

    • The formal arrangements of dispute resolution are important, but their effects depend on the broader political context [31].
    • The politics of litigation and compliance are different under transnational dispute resolution than under interstate dispute resolution [32].
    • The degree of authority of a particular tribunal, and access to it, are themselves sites of political struggle [32].

    Trade Agreements

    • Dispute settlement design in trade pacts reflects a trade-off between treaty compliance and policy discretion [33, 34].
    • Governments choose the level of legalism in dispute settlement mechanisms based on their assessment of the benefits of compliance and the costs of constrained policy autonomy [27, 35].
    • Deeper integration and greater economic asymmetry among states tend to be associated with more legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms [36, 37].
    • The dispute settlement mechanism in the GATT may have optimized the trade-off between constraint and flexibility [38].

    In summary, dispute settlement is a critical aspect of international relations, with variations in legalism, institutional design, and the involvement of different actors affecting outcomes and compliance. The choice of dispute settlement mechanism often involves balancing the need for compliance with the desire for policy discretion, and is influenced by the specific context of each agreement.

    Treaty Compliance in International Relations

    Treaty compliance is a complex issue in international relations, with various factors influencing whether states adhere to their treaty obligations. The sources offer several perspectives on compliance, ranging from managerial approaches to the role of self-interest and enforcement [1, 2].

    General Observations on Compliance

    • Assumptions about compliance: There are differing assumptions about compliance, with some scholars believing that nations generally comply with their international agreements, while others suggest violations occur whenever it is in a state’s interest [3, 4]. The general level of compliance with international agreements cannot be fully empirically verified [3, 4].
    • Acceptable level of compliance: Treaty regimes should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is “acceptable” in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard [5-7].
    • Treaty as a Compromise: A treaty is necessarily a compromise, and if noncompliance and enforcement become endemic, it might indicate that the original bargain did not adequately reflect the interests of those living under it [8].
    • Compliance as the norm: The adoption of a treaty establishes an authoritative rule system, and compliance is the normal organizational presumption [9].
    • Pacta sunt servanda: The fundamental norm of international law is that treaties are to be obeyed [10]. States operate under a sense of obligation to conform their conduct to governing norms [11].

    Why States Comply

    • Expectations and Constraints: The act of making commitments embodied in an international agreement changes the calculus at the compliance stage, because it generates expectations of compliance in others [12].
    • Reputational Costs: States choose to impose costs on themselves by entering into treaties to benefit from the counterpromises of others. The more formal and public the agreement, the higher the reputational costs of noncompliance [13]. States may sign treaties to signal their intentions with special intensity and gravity [14].
    • Self-Interest: States often comply with treaties when it is in their self-interest to do so [1, 15].
    • Political costs of noncompliance: The effect of treaties is to raise the political costs of noncompliance, which may be loss of reputation as a reliable partner and may give rise to specific, costly retaliation [13, 16].

    Why States Deviate from Treaty Obligations

    • Not Always Deliberate: Compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking [6].
    • Ambiguity and Indeterminacy: The language of treaties is often ambiguous, which can lead to issues of interpretation and compliance [17-19]. Even conscientious legal advice may not avoid compliance issues when treaty norms are indeterminate [19].
    • Capacity Limitations: States may not be able to fully comply with treaty obligations due to limitations on their capacity [17]. Developing countries, for example, may need technical assistance to comply [20].
    • Temporal Dimension: The social and economic changes contemplated by regulatory treaties take time to accomplish. A cross-section at any particular moment may give a misleading picture of the state of compliance [17, 21].
    • Domestic Constituencies: A state may enter into an international agreement to appease a domestic or international constituency but have little intention of carrying it out [22].
    • Testing Limits: A state may consciously seek to discover the limits of its obligation by testing its treaty partners’ responses [23].
    • “Voluntary Restraint Agreements:” States may design an activity to comply with the letter of an obligation, leaving others to argue about the spirit [23].

    The Managerial Approach to Compliance

    • Emphasis on Management: The managerial school emphasizes that compliance problems are best addressed as management issues rather than enforcement problems [24].
    • Cooperative Venture: The dominant atmosphere is that of actors engaged in a cooperative venture, in which performance that seems unsatisfactory represents a problem to be solved by mutual consultation and analysis [25].
    • Strategies to induce compliance: The managerial school suggests that strategies necessary to induce compliance and maintain cooperation involve: (1) improving dispute resolution procedures, (2) technical and financial assistance, and (3) increasing transparency [26].

    Enforcement

    • Enforcement Mechanisms: Enforcement plays a significant role in cases where noncompliance occurs [15].
    • Self-Enforcement: Treaties must be enforced endogenously, because there is an absence of effective international courts [14].
    • Limitations of Enforcement: Unilateral sanctions can be imposed only by major powers, which makes their legitimacy as a device for treaty enforcement suspect [25].
    • Linkages and Enforcement: Enforcement can be achieved through the threat of a loss of reputation as a reliable partner, specific costly retaliation, and broader forms of noncooperation [16].
    • Political Power: Political power is often deployed in the interest of greater compliance [27].
    • Importance of Depth of Cooperation: The depth of cooperation represented by a given treaty and the amount of enforcement needed are logically connected [28].
    • Treaty Design: Whether a treaty elicits compliance depends on identifiable characteristics of the regime’s compliance systems [29].

    Compliance in Different Contexts

    • Regulatory Treaties: If treaties require states to reduce some collectively dysfunctional behavior, compliance often results from the fact that most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement [30].
    • Arms Agreements: Many arms agreements are observed voluntarily because each participant perceives them as valuable and that cheating would prove too costly [31].

    Compliance and Legalization

    • Legalization and Compliance: Legalization refers to the presumption that, once signed, nations will adhere to treaty obligations [32].
    • Interpreting Legal Obligations: Interpretations of legal responsibility are typically rendered by lawyers using a discourse focusing on rules and not on interests [32].
    • Ambiguity of Legal Obligations: Many treaty commitments are vague and general [33].
    • Domestic Legal Systems: In domestic legal systems, binding agreements are adjudicated and enforced by courts [34].

    In conclusion, treaty compliance is influenced by a complex interplay of factors, including self-interest, reputational concerns, managerial strategies, and enforcement mechanisms. The specific context of each treaty, as well as the nature of the obligations it imposes, plays a crucial role in determining the level of compliance achieved. States may also deviate from treaty obligations due to ambiguity, capacity limitations, and the temporal dimension of the changes required by the treaty.

    International Legalization: A Multifaceted Analysis

    Legalization is a multifaceted concept in international relations, referring to the degree to which international institutions and agreements possess characteristics such as obligation, precision, and delegation [1-3]. It is not a simple binary but rather a continuum with varying degrees of these characteristics [4, 5].

    Key Dimensions of Legalization:

    • Obligation: This refers to the extent to which states are legally bound by rules or commitments [1, 3]. It involves the idea that states are subject to general rules and procedures [1]. Legal obligations can vary from “hard” legal rules, like those in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to “soft” commitments that are not legally binding [6, 7].
    • Precision: This relates to the clarity and specificity of the rules [1, 7, 8]. Precise rules leave less room for interpretation and ambiguity [8]. The lack of precision can lead to legal inconsistencies, as seen in regime complexes where rules may overlap and have multiple interpretations [9].
    • Delegation: This involves the extent to which states delegate authority to third parties, such as courts or international organizations, to implement, interpret, and apply rules, as well as to resolve disputes and potentially make further rules [5, 7]. Delegation can range from ad hoc arbitration to more permanent institutions with significant powers [10].

    The Continuum of Legalization:

    • Legalization exists on a continuum, from “hard” legalization, where obligation, precision, and delegation are high, to “soft” legalization, with varying degrees of these attributes, and finally to situations where law is largely absent [4, 5, 11].
    • Most international legalization lies between the extremes, where actors combine and invoke varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation [4].
    • Each of these dimensions is a matter of degree and gradation, and they can vary independently [5].

    Legalization and International Relations:

    • The concept of legalization provides a common ground for political scientists and lawyers, moving beyond the narrow view of law as requiring enforcement by a coercive sovereign [12].
    • Legalization introduces new actors and new forms of politics into interstate relations [10].
    • Legalization is a form of institutionalization, distinguished by obligation, precision, and delegation [13].
    • Law and politics are intertwined at all levels of legalization [14].

    Variability of Legalization

    • The overall legalization of international norms, agreements, and regimes varies [15].
    • Different combinations of obligation, precision, and delegation result in different forms of legalization [11].
    • The concept encompasses a wide range of institutional possibilities [16].

    Critiques of Legalization

    • Narrow Definition: Some scholars argue that the definition of “legalization” as only obligation, precision, and delegation is too narrow, neglecting other important aspects of law, such as legitimacy, custom, and social practice [2, 17].
    • Limited Scope: The focus on formal institutions and dispute resolution overlooks law’s creative and generative powers in social life [18].
    • Problematic Application: The concept of legalization is sometimes seen as peripheral, in need of revision, or generating incorrect hypotheses when applied to empirical cases [17].
    • Unintended Consequences: Legalization may not always lead to greater cooperation, and may have unintended consequences on domestic political processes [19, 20]. For example, increased precision in trade agreements can mobilize protectionist groups [21, 22].
    • Causal Effects: It is difficult to identify the causal effects of legalization because compliance occurs for many reasons other than the legal status of the rules [14].

    Legalization and Trade

    • The international trade regime has become increasingly legalized over time [19].
    • Increased legalization has changed the information environment and the nature of government obligations, which in turn have affected the pattern of mobilization of domestic interest groups on trade [19].
    • Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes [19].
    • Legalization in the trade regime has increased the obligatory nature of international rules [23].
    • Legalization has also changed the nature of dispute resolution in trade [24-26].

    Legalization and Dispute Resolution

    • Legalization affects the politics of dispute settlement [27].
    • The form that legalization takes matters [28].
    • The more we move toward transnational dispute resolution, the harder it is to trace individual judicial decisions and states’ responses to them back to any simple, short-term matrix of state or social preferences [29].
    • Legalization imposes real constraints on state behavior [29].

    In summary, legalization is a complex and multifaceted concept that encompasses a range of institutional possibilities [16]. While it is often viewed as a means to enhance cooperation and reduce opportunism, it also has potential negative consequences that must be carefully weighed [19, 20, 30]. The concept is not without its critics, who argue that it is too narrowly defined and fails to capture the full complexity of law in international relations [17, 31, 32].

    By Amjad Izhar
    Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
    https://amjadizhar.blog

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