Camp Mystic – Amjad Izhar Blog

The source details the tragic events surrounding a devastating flood at Camp Mystic, a long-standing all-girls Christian camp in Texas, which resulted in fatalities among campers and staff, including the executive director. Despite receiving a severe flood warning, camp leadership delayed evacuation, a decision compounded by the camp’s isolated location, limited communication infrastructure, and cabins situated dangerously close to the rising Guadalupe River. The article examines the challenges faced by counselors attempting to protect campers, the struggle of authorities to respond, and the broader context of flood risks in the area, highlighting previous flood events and lapses in warning systems, ultimately portraying a series of critical decisions and environmental factors that led to the catastrophe.

Camp Mystic Flood: Warnings and Response

Flood warnings played a significant role in the events surrounding the Camp Mystic flood, though their effectiveness and the response to them are subject to scrutiny.

Here’s a breakdown of the flood warnings and related issues:

Initial Warning to Camp Leadership:
Camp Mystic Executive Director Richard “Dick” Eastland received a severe flood warning on his phone from the National Weather Service (NWS) at 1:14 a.m. on July 4.
This NWS alert specifically warned of “life threatening flash flooding” in Kerr County, where Camp Mystic is situated in a flood zone.
The camp had previously been under a flood watch, which leadership was aware of.
Notably, the NWS alert did not include an evacuation order, as federal agencies like the NWS do not have the authority to issue such orders; this power typically rests with local governments.
The NWS alert also predicted significantly less rainfall than what ultimately reached the camp.
Camp Mystic’s Response to the Warning:
Dick Eastland did not begin to evacuate campers for more than an hour after receiving the 1:14 a.m. NWS alert.
Soon after the alert, Eastland used walkie-talkies to rally family members, some of whom lived and worked at the camp, to “assess the situation“.
At 2:30 a.m., when rain was falling “hard and fast,” Eastland decided to begin evacuating campers.
As the waters rose, counselors were given conflicting messages about how to keep campers safe. One 19-year-old counselor recalled yelling “Are we staying or leaving?” and hearing a staff member shout back, “Stay in your cabin!” even as water was breaching cabins around 3 a.m..
The camp had a loudspeaker system, but it would have gone silent without electricity during the flood.
It remains unclear whether camp leaders called 911, as the Hunt Volunteer Fire Department’s chief did not recall receiving any requests for help from the camp.
Broader Warning Systems and Communication Failures:
An automated flood warning system using water gauges was installed along the Guadalupe River in 1989. However, it was shut down a decade later when the company monitoring it closed.
Subsequently, locals reverted to an “old-fashioned way” of river spotters issuing warnings via telephone along the waterway.
Kerr County officials possessed the technology to turn every cellphone in the river valley into an alarm, similar to Amber Alerts, but did not utilize it to alert people until more than two days after the crisis’s height.
Parents received the first official email communication from Camp Mystic at 11:28 a.m. on July 4, hours after enduring reports of devastation on social media and news outlets.
A mother of a survivor recounted repeatedly trying to call the Kerr County Sheriff’s Office for information, but was told by a deputy that they “had no communication with Mystic“.
Perspectives on the Warnings and Response:
Serena Aldrich, a lawyer and former camper whose daughters were rescued, stated her opinion that camp leaders “should have been paying attention to those warnings and evacuated the camp” and that “ignoring the warnings doesn’t make a lot of sense to me,” especially given that flooding is “not a new thing” in the area.
Richard Eastland Jr., Dick Eastland’s son, stated that “the warning came fast” and that those in charge “did not expect the ferocity of the flood to come,” emphasizing that they’d “never had water this high, ever”.
Kerr County Judge Robert Kelly asserted on July 5 that “no one knew this kind of flood was coming,” despite the area being considered “the most dangerous river valley in the United States” for floods.
Lara Clement, a counselor’s mother, while reluctant to criticize staff decisions, suggested that “evacuating earlier, and just assuming the worst” might have been an alternative.
Mark Nacol, an attorney involved in a successful lawsuit related to a 1987 flash flood at another Christian camp on the Guadalupe River, was stunned by the repeat tragedy, recalling that the lesson from four decades prior was the need for sirens and alarms.
Contributing Factors Hindering Warning Effectiveness:
Camp Mystic’s isolation, located six miles from the nearest town, along with its policy limiting cellphone use for campers and mostly keeping counselors’ phones locked away, contributed to communication challenges. The camp also had spotty cell service.
The tremendous speed and ferocity of the flood, with the river rising “another foot” every minute, presented an immediate and overwhelming challenge.

Camp Mystic Flood: A Cascade of Evacuation Failures

The events surrounding the Camp Mystic flood highlight significant issues related to delayed evacuation at multiple levels, from the camp’s leadership response to broader county-wide warning systems.

Delayed Evacuation at Camp Mystic:

Camp Mystic Executive Director Richard “Dick” Eastland received a severe flood warning on his phone from the National Weather Service (NWS) at 1:14 a.m. on July 4. This alert specifically warned of “life threatening flash flooding” in Kerr County, where Camp Mystic is located in a flood zone.
Despite this urgent warning, Eastland did not begin to evacuate campers for more than an hour after receiving the alert.
Soon after the 1:14 a.m. alert, Eastland used walkie-talkies to rally family members to “assess the situation”.
It was not until 2:30 a.m., when rain was falling “hard and fast,” that Eastland decided to begin evacuating campers.
Richard Eastland Jr., Dick Eastland’s son, stated that “the warning came fast” and they “did not expect the ferocity of the flood to come,” emphasizing that they’d “never had water this high, ever” and that the river was rising “another foot” every minute. The NWS alert also predicted significantly less rainfall than what actually occurred at the camp.
The camp’s isolation (six miles from the nearest town), its policy limiting cellphone use for campers, and mostly locked-away counselor phones contributed to communication challenges that could hinder rapid response.

Internal Confusion and Conflicting Messages During Delay:

As Dick Eastland conferred with family members and employees, the camp reportedly “descended into chaos as the floodwaters rose”.
Interviews with counselors reveal that as waters began rising around 2 a.m., they were given conflicting messages about how to keep campers safe.
One 19-year-old counselor recalled yelling “Are we staying or leaving?” and hearing a staff member shout back, “Stay in your cabin!” even as water was breaching cabins around 3 a.m.. Counselors eventually decided to leave when water entered their cabins.

Broader Systemic Warning and Communication Delays:

Lack of automated flood warning systems: An automated flood warning system using water gauges was installed along the Guadalupe River in 1989 but was shut down a decade later when the company monitoring it closed. Locals reverted to an “old-fashioned way” of river spotters issuing warnings via telephone.
County-level alert delays: Kerr County officials possessed the technology to turn every cellphone in the river valley into an alarm (similar to Amber Alerts) but did not utilize it to alert people until more than two days after the crisis’s height.
Delayed communication to parents: Parents received the first official email communication from Camp Mystic at 11:28 a.m. on July 4. This was hours after many had seen reports of devastation on social media and news outlets. The camp initially decided to only call parents whose children were missing.
Lack of 911 contact: It remains unclear whether camp leaders called 911; the Hunt Volunteer Fire Department’s chief did not recall receiving any requests for help from Camp Mystic.
Failed communication with authorities: A mother of a survivor recounted repeatedly trying to call the Kerr County Sheriff’s Office for information, but was told by a deputy that they “had no communication with Mystic“.

Opinions and Perspectives on Delayed Evacuation:

Serena Aldrich, a lawyer whose daughters were rescued from the camp, stated her opinion that camp leaders “should have been paying attention to those warnings and evacuated the camp,” noting that “ignoring the warnings doesn’t make a lot of sense,” especially given that flooding is “not a new thing” in the area.
Lara Clement, a counselor’s mother, suggested that “evacuating earlier, and just assuming the worst” might have been an alternative.
Mark Nacol, an attorney involved in a lawsuit related to a 1987 flash flood at another Christian camp on the Guadalupe River, was “stunned” by the repeat tragedy, recalling that the lesson from four decades prior was the need for sirens and alarms.
Kerr County Judge Robert Kelly asserted on July 5 that “no one knew this kind of flood was coming,” despite acknowledging the area as “the most dangerous river valley in the United States” for floods.

The delay in evacuation, combined with the extreme speed and ferocity of the flood, and systemic communication failures, significantly compounded the tragedy at Camp Mystic.

Camp Mystic: The Perils of Isolation During a Flood

The isolation of Camp Mystic played a significant role in exacerbating the challenges during the flood, particularly impacting communication and emergency response efforts.

Here’s a breakdown of how camp isolation manifested and its consequences:

Geographic Isolation:
Camp Mystic was situated six miles from the nearest town. This physical distance inherently made it more challenging for external emergency services to reach the camp quickly when floodwaters blocked roads.
The “peaceful backdrop” and “relative isolation” were part of the camp’s allure for decades, but this idyll also “masked the danger” inherent in its location by the Guadalupe River.
Communication Isolation (Policy & Infrastructure):
A key aspect of the camp’s special character and traditions was its strict policy regarding electronic devices: campers were not allowed to bring cellphones, and counselors had to keep theirs mostly locked away. This meant that once the flood began, the primary means of communication within the camp was limited to walkie-talkies, which were used to alert a group around 1:35 a.m..
Adding to this, the camp had spotty cell service. This meant that even if counselors had their phones, reliable communication with the outside world would have been difficult or impossible.
The camp’s loudspeaker system would have gone silent without electricity during the flood, further limiting a widespread internal alert system.
Impact of Isolation on Warning Effectiveness and Evacuation:
While Camp Mystic’s Executive Director, Dick Eastland, did receive a “life threatening flash flooding” alert on his phone at 1:14 a.m., the camp’s isolation and internal communication policies likely contributed to the more than an hour delay before evacuation began at 2:30 a.m..
As the camp “descended into chaos”, teenage counselors, “cut off from others,” were left to make frantic life-and-death decisions, sometimes receiving conflicting messages about safety protocols.
The Hunt Volunteer Fire Department’s chief did not recall receiving any requests for help from Camp Mystic, which is about eight miles from the fire station, highlighting a potential communication breakdown exacerbated by isolation.
Parents experienced hours of anxiety, seeing devastation reports on social media and news, before receiving official communication from the camp via email at 11:28 a.m. on July 4. One mother was told by a Kerr County Sheriff’s Office deputy that they “had no communication with Mystic,” describing this as “terrifying”.
After the immediate surge, camp officials reportedly “struggled on their own for hours to manage the rescue operation”. Mary Liz Eastland, a co-director, later texted alumni groups for “military tanks or something” to assist with evacuations, indicating the severe challenge of external access.

In summary, while the camp’s isolation fostered its unique traditions and appeal, it simultaneously heightened the risks during the unprecedented flood event by hindering timely communication, effective warning dissemination, and external rescue efforts, ultimately contributing to the tragic delays and outcomes.

Camp Mystic: A Flood of Errors in Leadership

The events at Camp Mystic highlight several critical leadership decisions made by the camp’s Executive Director, Richard “Dick” Eastland, and other staff members, both before and during the catastrophic flood on July 4. These decisions, or the lack thereof, significantly influenced the tragic outcomes.

Pre-Flood Preparations and Underlying Risks:

Embracing Location Despite Flood Risk: For decades, Camp Mystic’s appeal was tied to its location along the Guadalupe River, with traditions like canoe races, swimming, and baptisms in its waters. While minor flooding was common, this peaceful backdrop and relative isolation masked the inherent danger. Experts stated it was “obvious that this is a place that should never have been built upon,” with an expert from Fathom calling it “unforgivable what’s happened here”.
Reliance on Outdated Warning Systems: The camp was in an area where an automated flood warning system had been shut down a decade prior, leading locals to revert to “old-fashioned” river spotters and telephone warnings. This suggests a reliance on a less robust warning infrastructure.
Internal Communication Policies: The camp maintained strict policies against campers having cellphones, and counselors’ phones were mostly locked away. This decision, part of what made the camp “special”, severely limited rapid communication options within the isolated camp during a crisis. The loudspeaker system would have gone silent without electricity.
Disaster Plan Training: A state health inspector who visited on July 2 noted that the camp had a written disaster plan and that staff had been trained on it, and everything was in working order. However, the effectiveness of this training under extreme circumstances is questioned by subsequent events.

During the Flood – Delayed Evacuation and Internal Chaos:

Delayed Evacuation After Severe Warning: Dick Eastland received a “life threatening flash flooding” alert on his phone from the National Weather Service at 1:14 a.m. on July 4. Despite this urgent warning, he did not begin to evacuate campers for more than an hour, starting evacuation at 2:30 a.m. when rain was falling “hard and fast”.
“Assess the Situation” Period: After receiving the NWS alert, Eastland used walkie-talkies to rally family members living and working at the camp to “assess the situation”. This period of assessment contributed to the delay in evacuation.
Perception of the Flood’s Severity: Richard Eastland Jr., Dick Eastland’s son, stated that “the warning came fast” and they “did not expect the ferocity of the flood to come,” noting they had “never had water this high, ever” and the river was rising “another foot” every minute. The NWS alert also predicted significantly less rainfall than what occurred. Kerr County Judge Robert Kelly also asserted “no one knew this kind of flood was coming,” despite acknowledging the area as “the most dangerous river valley in the United States” for floods.
Conflicting Messages to Counselors: As floodwaters rose, interviews with counselors revealed that they received conflicting messages about how to keep campers safe. One 19-year-old counselor recalled yelling “Are we staying or leaving?” and hearing a staff member shout back, “Stay in your cabin!” even as water was breaching cabins around 3 a.m.. Counselors eventually made their own decisions to leave when water entered their cabins.
Lack of Immediate 911 Contact: It remains unclear whether camp leaders called 911. The Hunt Volunteer Fire Department’s chief did not recall receiving any requests for help from Camp Mystic.

Post-Flood Response and External Communication:

Struggling with Rescue Operations: After the initial surge, camp officials reportedly “struggled on their own for hours to manage the rescue operation”.
Delayed Communication to Parents: Parents received the first official email communication from Camp Mystic at 11:28 a.m. on July 4. This was hours after many had seen reports of devastation on social media and news outlets. The camp initially decided to only call parents whose children were missing.
Lack of Communication with Authorities: A mother of a survivor recounted repeatedly trying to call the Kerr County Sheriff’s Office, only to be told by a deputy that they “had no communication with Mystic“.
Plea for External Assistance: Mary Liz Eastland, a co-director, later texted alumni groups for “military tanks or something” to assist with evacuations, indicating the severe challenge of external access and the need for robust evacuation vehicles.
Protecting Campers from Trauma: Counselors at the adjacent Cypress Lake location, run by the Eastlands, made the decision not to tell their young campers what had happened at the main campus to keep them calm, playing games and focusing on other activities. One counselor even told girls to close their eyes as they evacuated past the devastation.

Critiques of Leadership Decisions:

Ignoring Warnings: Serena Aldrich, a lawyer whose daughters were rescued, stated her opinion that camp leaders “should have been paying attention to those warnings and evacuated the camp,” noting that “ignoring the warnings doesn’t make a lot of sense,” especially given that flooding is “not a new thing” in the area.
Assuming the Worst: Lara Clement, a counselor’s mother, suggested that “evacuating earlier, and just assuming the worst” might have been an alternative.
Repeating Past Mistakes: Mark Nacol, an attorney involved in a lawsuit related to a 1987 flash flood at another Christian camp on the Guadalupe River, was “stunned” by the repeat tragedy, recalling that the lesson from four decades prior was the need for sirens and alarms. This points to a potential failure to implement robust early warning systems after previous disasters.
Personal Sacrifice: Dick Eastland died trying to rescue some of the youngest girls, with Eastland Jr. describing the chaos and his father’s final radio message for help before being found in an SUV with three girls he was trying to rescue, none of whom survived. His actions demonstrate an ultimate personal sacrifice, even as the decisions leading up to that point are scrutinized.

The leadership decisions at Camp Mystic, particularly the delayed evacuation after receiving a severe warning and the challenges in internal and external communication exacerbated by the camp’s isolation and policies, contributed significantly to the tragic outcome.

Camp Mystic Flood: Heroism, Chaos, and Rescue

The rescue efforts at Camp Mystic during and after the catastrophic July 4 flood were marked by internal struggle, delayed external assistance, and significant communication challenges.

Here’s a breakdown of the rescue efforts:

Initial Internal Efforts and Challenges:
After receiving a “life threatening flash flooding” alert at 1:14 a.m., Camp Mystic’s Executive Director, Richard “Dick” Eastland, used walkie-talkies to alert family members and staff to “assess the situation” around 1:35 a.m..
Evacuation efforts officially began around 2:30 a.m.. However, as floodwaters rose, the camp “descended into chaos”.
Conflicting messages were given to counselors about how to keep campers safe. For example, one 19-year-old counselor, Ainslie Bashara, heard a staff member shout “Stay in your cabin!” even as water was breaching cabins around 3 a.m..
Teenage counselors, often “cut off from others,” were left to make frantic life-and-death decisions, rousing girls from cabins and ushering them to higher ground.
Dick Eastland and other staffers quickly realized that the “Bubble Inn” and “Twins” cabins, which held the youngest girls (some as young as 8), were in the most danger due to a swirling eddy of water.
Edward Eastland, Dick’s son, waded through water to rescue girls in the Twins cabins. He was later found clinging to a tree with “10 to 12” girls, all of whom survived.
Tragically, Dick Eastland died trying to rescue some of the youngest girls from the “Bubble Inn”. He was found in a black SUV with three other girls he had been trying to save; none of them survived.
Lack of Immediate External Emergency Response:
It remains unclear whether Camp Mystic leaders called 911.
The Hunt Volunteer Fire Department’s chief, Lee Pool, did not recall receiving any requests for help from Camp Mystic, which is about eight miles from his station. Pool’s 36-member volunteer force was quickly overwhelmed by the widespread flooding, with roads blocked by surging waters.
A mother of a survivor, attempting to get information from the Kerr County Sheriff’s Office, was told by a deputy that they “had no communication with Mystic,” which she described as “terrifying”.
Delayed and Challenged Communication with Parents:
Parents experienced hours of anxiety, seeing devastation reports on social media and news outlets, before receiving official communication from the camp.
The first official email from Camp Mystic was sent at 11:28 a.m. on July 4, hours after the initial flood surge.
Initially, camp officials stated they only called parents whose children were missing. The email confirmed that if a parent had not been personally contacted, their daughter was accounted for.
Mary Liz Eastland, a co-director, communicated with alumni groups via text, indicating the severe need for external assistance, asking for “military tanks or something” to assist with evacuations.
Later External Evacuation:
By the afternoon, campers began to be evacuated by helicopter in small groups to an elementary school in Ingram, which served as an emergency command center.
Protecting Campers from Trauma:
At the adjacent Cypress Lake location, run by other members of the Eastland family, counselors made the decision not to tell their young campers what had happened at the main campus to keep them calm.
Counselors, like Emma Claire Kraft, played card games and focused on other activities, and even told the girls to close their eyes as they evacuated past the devastation to protect them from the sight.

In summary, while the camp staff, including the Eastland family, made efforts to rescue campers during the rapidly escalating flood, these efforts were hampered by the speed and ferocity of the water, the camp’s isolation, internal communication breakdowns, and a lack of immediate external emergency response. The eventual successful evacuation of many campers relied on a combination of internal resilience and later external helicopter assistance.

By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog

Affiliate Disclosure: This blog may contain affiliate links, which means I may earn a small commission if you click on the link and make a purchase. This comes at no additional cost to you. I only recommend products or services that I believe will add value to my readers. Your support helps keep this blog running and allows me to continue providing you with quality content. Thank you for your support!

Category: Camp Mystic

Camp Mystic Flood: Missed Warnings and Tragic Delays