Bertrand Russell’s Basic Writings

This compilation offers a broad overview of Bertrand Russell’s philosophical perspectives across various domains. The text highlights Russell’s examination of international relations and the challenges of power, particularly in the nuclear age, alongside his reflections on the nature of human understanding and the limitations of knowledge based solely on experience. It explores his thoughts on the role of science in society and its impact on values, while also detailing his critiques of traditional religious beliefs and metaphysical concepts like substance and sin. Additionally, the source touches upon his views on education and its potential to cultivate independent thought and a global perspective, contrasting this with systems focused on obedience and uniformity.

Russell on War and Peace

Based on the provided sources, Bertrand Russell extensively discussed international affairs, particularly focusing on the causes of conflict and the potential paths to achieving lasting peace in the modern world. His analysis draws heavily on psychology, history, and the implications of scientific advancements, especially in weaponry.

Here are some key points regarding international affairs from the sources:

• Russell as an Analyst of International Affairs: Part XVII of “The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell” is specifically dedicated to “The Analyst of International Affairs”. Russell is described as having lectured on four continents and writing informatively and critically about different civilizations, including after visits to Russia and China. He brings his critical acumen to bear on the practical import of political theories in the daily political scene. Analyzing world problems in the second half of the twentieth century is complex due to the turbulence of the period and the unpredictability of human behaviour; mistakes in international affairs today could result in the destruction of civilization.
• The Danger of War: Russell considered the prevention of war to be imperative for the continuation of civilized life and perhaps any kind of life. The First World War gave a new direction to his interests, absorbing him along with the problem of preventing future wars. He viewed the First World War as a folly and a crime by all involved powers. The Second World War, which he thought necessary, was seen as an outcome of the first, leading to Russian Communism, Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and a chaotic, unstable world with the prospect of further carnage. He believed that if Britain had remained neutral in the first war, it would have been short, Germany would have won, America would not have been involved, Britain would have remained strong, and Russia might not have had the Communist Revolution. War is described as a geographical phenomenon.
• Causes of International Conflict:
• Psychological Factors: Russell thought that current discussions of politics and political theory insufficiently accounted for psychology. He identified fear and hate as two closely related passions prevalent in human beings. It is normal to hate what is feared, and frequently to fear what is hated. This primitive mechanism controls the instinctive reaction to foreign nations, viewing all foreigners as the savage regards a member of another herd. People love those who hate their enemies, and without enemies, there would be very few people to love. The conquest of fear is very important, as fear is degrading, becomes an obsession, produces hate, and leads to excesses of cruelty. Fear, at present, overshadows the world, driven by weapons like the atom bomb and bacterial bomb, making world leaders tremble and driving men towards disaster.
• Herd Mentality and Ideologies: Politics is concerned with herds rather than individuals, and important political passions are those where members of a herd can feel alike. The instinctive mechanism for political structures is co-operation within the herd and hostility towards other herds. Ideologies, such as Communism and Capitalism, are seen as ways of grouping people, with the involved passions being those between rival groups. While reasons like property, religion, democracy, and liberty are given for hating Communists, Russell suggested these are not the real grounds; the real reason is fear and the threat they pose. Ideologies are fundamentally a method by which herds are created, and the psychology is similar regardless of how the herd is generated. The world is currently obsessed by the conflict of rival ideologies.
• Nationalism and Fanaticism: Russell strongly opposed militant nationalism. Education, particularly the teaching of history, is used by states to promote national pride through distortions and suppressions. The false ideas taught encourage strife and bigoted nationalism. In totalitarian countries, education instils fanatical bigots ignorant of the outside world and unaccustomed to free discussion. Fanatical nationalism was most emphasized in teaching the young in countries like Nazi Germany and Russia, making men of different countries lack common ground and preventing a conception of common civilization. The decay of cultural internationalism has increased since WWI, with a tendency to prioritize nationality over competence in appointments. Nationalist propaganda, in any violent form, would have to be illegal in a better future world, and children should not be taught to hate and despise foreign nations. Nationalist and theological fanaticism is identified as one of the great dangers of our time.
• Economic Factors: Marx regarded economic conflicts as always between classes, but Russell noted that most have been between races or nations. While conflicts between nations are largely economic, the grouping by nations has non-economic causes. Economic interdependence is greater than ever, but instead of producing friendliness, it tends to cause hostility due to the system of private profit and separate national sovereignties. Economic issues are subordinate to politics.
• Clash of Interests: Genuine clashes exist between interests of different parts of the world, regarded as vital enough to fight over. These conflicts centre around population, race, and creed. For example, the issue between Communism and Capitalism is unlikely to be settled peaceably.
• Proposed Solutions and Paths to Peace:
• World Government: Russell argued that the world can only be made safe from war through the creation of a single world-wide authority possessing a monopoly of major weapons. This international authority is seen as the most important reform from an educational and every other point of view. This authority must have a monopoly of major weapons and adequate loyal armed forces. It would proclaim rules, such as requiring states to submit to its decisions in disputes, and using force against any state employing force against another. While it might originate from consent and conquest, it cannot be stable until every important country has a nearly stationary population.
• Internationalist Education: Education should be reformed to promote international cooperation. Schools should teach world history from an impartial point of view, using textbooks free from national bias. Children should learn about the interdependence of groups and the importance of cooperation. A new morality of growth and mutual adaptation should replace the older morality of prohibitions and conflicts. Teachers have a crucial role in conveying an understanding of the world in time and space, seeing their country as one among many with equal rights, and recognizing the value of those who have contributed positively to human life. They should help students develop skills in detecting bias, such as by comparing different newspapers’ accounts of events.
• Addressing Underlying Issues: Progress requires the utmost scope for personal initiative compatible with social order, while security and justice require centralized control, ideally a world government. Devoluting authority can help balance these aims. Cultural matters require diversity and independence from the state. Economic welfare in Asia and Africa is necessary to prevent envy and destructiveness towards the West. Raising the standard of life requires not only investment and modernization but also population limitation. Overcoming the suspicion of white imperialism requires time, patience, and honesty.
• Direct Communication and Conferences: Given the disastrous nature of a great war for all involved, Russell suggested that both sides have a common interest in avoiding it. He proposed a conference of all great powers solely focused on the destruction to be expected in a new world war, strictly forbidding boasting or suggestions of concessions. The sole business should be to draw up an authoritative statement of expected sufferings. Such a conference might generate mutual belief that the other side is aware of the inevitable evils and is unlikely to start a war unless compelled.
• Role of Neutrals: Since neither major power feels it can express a desire for accommodation without appearing weak, neutrals can play a vital role. Neutrals could combine to draw up a document detailing the destructive effects of war, inviting comments from both sides. If they admit the justice of the report to neutrals, it’s a small step to admit it to each other. Neutrals have the paramount duty to promote accommodation to ensure their own survival.
• Role of Scientists: Scientists, whose labours created the danger of modern warfare, have a difficult but imperative duty to enlighten mankind about the perils of war and devise methods for prevention. Their loyalty should shift from their state to the human race.
• Open Letter to Leaders: Russell directly appealed to the heads of the two most powerful countries, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, highlighting their power for good or evil. He emphasized the matters where Russian and American interests coincide, such as the danger of unrestricted nuclear weapon diffusion, the immense waste of resources on arms, and the shared interest in survival. He urged them to meet and discuss the conditions of co-existence, seeking agreements to diminish strife rather than gaining advantages.
• Abandoning Force and Hostility: The waste, fear, and despair are unnecessary; what is required is for East and West to recognize their respective rights and substitute argument for force in spreading ideologies. It is not necessary to abandon one’s creed, only the attempt to spread it by force of arms. The present hostility is harmful not only materially but also morally and emotionally, leading to a dreadful mentality focused on mutual destruction. The plainest self-interest makes it imperative to abandon war or the threat of war as a means of settling differences.
• Challenges to Achieving Peace:
• Obstacles to international authority are formidable, especially issues like Communism vs. Capitalism.
• Resolving historical grievances (e.g., Germany, France) and achieving independence for nations (e.g., India, China) are significant hurdles.
• Organized disharmony between nations and classes prevents humanity from enjoying the benefits of science and technical skill.
• The world’s problems stem from passions and emotional habits instilled in youth, leading to destructive impulses. Religion, sex education, nationalism, class feeling, and competition all contribute to social disaster.
• Mutual distrust between East and West is a major obstacle.
• Political obstacles exist on both sides of the Iron Curtain regarding emphasizing the destructive nature of war, as neither side wants to appear weak. The situation is likened to duellists who fear death but dare not say so.
• The policy of “brinkmanship” is seen as an alternative to surrender, but one that risks mutual destruction.

In conclusion, Russell believed that the advent of scientific warfare, particularly nuclear weapons, had made war an existential threat. He argued that psychological factors, nationalism, conflicting ideologies, and economic issues all contribute to international conflict. His proposed solutions included a world government with a monopoly on force, a fundamental reform of education to promote internationalism, addressing global issues like population and poverty, and direct communication between powers focusing on the shared disaster of war. He stressed that survival is the paramount common interest in the nuclear age and that only by abandoning force and cultivating cooperation can mankind achieve a vastly better world.

Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Religion

Based on the provided sources, Bertrand Russell’s views on the philosophy of religion are discussed in several sections, reflecting a topic that engaged his attention throughout his life.

Russell’s Personal Journey and Agnosticism:

• Russell’s interest in religion began in boyhood. He recounts starting philosophical speculations, particularly on religious problems, at the age of fifteen and secretly writing his thoughts in a journal.
• Reading John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography led him to lose his belief in God. Mill’s father’s argument, that if everything requires a cause, then God must too, challenged the first-cause argument which Russell had previously accepted.
• Newly without religious belief, he found that a majority at Cambridge shared his view, to his surprise and delight. For a period, influenced by his love for Lady Ottoline Morrell, he expressed interest in mystical religion, resulting in the essay ‘The Essence of Religion’. After this period, he returned to his usual agnosticism.
• In 1927, he delivered his lecture, ‘Why I Am Not a Christian’, which is reprinted in the sources and is said to have shocked theologians. This was followed by other critical essays on established religion.
• Russell defines an agnostic as someone who holds that there is no way of knowing whether God or a future life exists or not. He explicitly states why he is not a Christian, which involves two main points: why he does not believe in God and immortality, and why he does not believe Christ was the best and wisest of men, although granting him high moral goodness.
• He notes that the Catholic Church dogmatically states that the existence of God can be proved by unaided reason.

Criticisms of Traditional, Dogmatic Religion:

• Russell argues that traditional religions often rely on dogma and appeal to authority or tradition rather than reason or empirical evidence. He suggests that historically, philosophy has often arisen as a reaction against scepticism when authority was insufficient to maintain belief, leading to “nominally rational arguments” being invented to achieve the same result, often infecting philosophy with “deep insincerity”.
• He believes that the dependence of morals upon religion is not as close as religious people think. He distinguishes moral rules with a purely theological basis (like rules about godparents marrying) from those with an obvious basis in social utility.
• Russell contends that dogmatic belief can sanctify cruel passions and enable people to indulge them without remorse, citing persecutions in Christendom as an example. He argues that kindliness and tolerance prevail as dogmatic belief decays, attributing the increased tolerance among modern Christians mainly to the work of free-thinkers who have made dogmatists less dogmatic. He compares the persecuting character of present-day Communism to that of Christianity in earlier centuries.
• He finds an indifference to truth dangerous, particularly when arguments for religion are based on social utility rather than truth. He states that when any belief is considered important for reasons other than its truth, it leads to evils like discouraging inquiry, falsifying historical records, and eventually considering unorthodoxy a crime. He respects those who argue religion is true and should be believed but finds “profound moral reprobation” for those who say it should be believed because it is useful and dismiss asking if it is true.
• He mentions St Thomas Aquinas, the official philosopher of the Catholic Church, as a figure who sought to adapt Aristotle’s philosophy to Christian dogma. Russell notes Aquinas’s detailed discussion of issues like the resurrection of bodies eaten by cannibals and the transmission of original sin. He criticizes Aquinas for not following the argument wherever it leads, but rather starting with conclusions given by the Catholic faith and finding arguments to support them, which Russell considers “special pleading” rather than genuine philosophy.

“The Essence of Religion” and Religion Without Dogma:

• In his essay “The Essence of Religion,” written during a period when he professed interest in mystical religion, Russell explores the possibility of religion without dogma.
• He notes the decay of traditional religious beliefs but argues that the question of the place of religion remains. He suggests that dogmas were valued because they were believed to facilitate a certain attitude: living “in the whole,” free from the self’s finiteness and the “tyranny of desire and daily cares”. Such a life, he argues, is possible without dogma and should not be lost by those who find traditional beliefs incredible.
• He describes this essential religious experience as one of “sudden wisdom”. Mysticism interprets this as contact with a deeper, more unified world, viewing evils as illusions. However, Russell believes this diminishes the experience. Instead, the “quality of infinity” comes from a different way of regarding the same objects—a more impersonal, vast, love-filled contemplation than viewing things based on personal purposes. This beauty and peace are found in the everyday world, viewed by a “universal soul,” with action inspired by its vision. Evils are not illusions, but the universal soul finds love that overcomes imperfections.
• The loss of dogma makes religions resting on it precarious for many whose nature is religious, leading them to lose the sense of the whole and the “inexplicable sense of union” that gives rise to compassion and service.
• Russell posits that it is important to preserve religion without dependence on dogmas that are intellectually difficult to accept.
• He describes three essential elements of religion: worship, acquiescence, and love.
• Worship: Evolves from fear-inspired worship to contemplation with joy, reverence, and a sense of mystery. The worship of the ideal good brings joy but also pain from the world’s imperfection, leading to a sense of exile. Worship must also be given to what exists, requiring an impartial emotion without judgment of goodness, finding mystery and joy in all existence and bringing “love to all that has life”. This impartial worship is independent of dogma and does not require the belief that the universe is good or one.
• Acquiescence: Involves accepting the inevitable and fundamental evils, not as good, but without allowing them to prevent “impartial contemplation” and “universal love and worship”. It requires moral discipline and suppression of self.
• Love: Includes both worship of the ideal good (like love of God in theistic religion) and love of man (service). Worship of good guides love of man and inspires compassion by showing the potential of human life versus its reality. Acquiescence helps love of man by removing anger, indignation, and strife.
• These three elements are interconnected and form a unity that can exist without dogma.
• Religion derives its power from the sense of union with the universe. Union achieved by assimilating the universe to our concept of good (e.g., God is love) is precarious due to the decay of traditional belief. A new mode of union must ask nothing of the world and depend only on ourselves, achievable through impartial worship and universal love, which ignore good and bad.
• This form of religion is freed from the endeavor to impose self upon the world and relies on subordination of the finite part of life to the infinite part. The “animal being” (instinct, welfare of body/descendants) is good or bad only as it helps or hinders the “universal or divine being” in its search for union.
• Union with the world, where the soul finds freedom, occurs in three ways: in thought (knowledge), in feeling (love), and in will (service). Disunion is error, hatred, and strife, caused by insistent instinct. Union is promoted by the combination of knowledge, love, and consequent service, which is wisdom.

Russell’s Preference for Buddhism:

• When asked about which existing religion he most respects, Russell names Buddhism, especially its earliest forms, because it has had the smallest element of persecution.

Russell’s Theory of Knowledge

Based on the sources, Bertrand Russell dedicated considerable attention to the Theory of Knowledge, viewing it as a complex field intertwined with psychology, logic, and the physical sciences. His engagement with this area evolved throughout his career, reflecting a dynamic process of continued reflection. Russell saw theory of knowledge as one of the primary sources of the “new philosophy” of logical analysis, which he helped develop.

A fundamental distinction in Russell’s theory of knowledge is between Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.

• Knowledge by Acquaintance is direct awareness of something, without inference or needing knowledge of truths about it. The most obvious examples are sense-data, such as the colour or shape of an object you are seeing. We are immediately conscious of these just as they are. Another kind of thing we are acquainted with are universals, which are general ideas like whiteness, diversity, or brotherhood; being aware of universals is called conceiving. According to Russell, all our knowledge rests upon acquaintance as its foundation.
• Knowledge by Description occurs when we know that a specific object exists, and know truths about it based on a description (a phrase like “the so-and-so,” meaning there is one object with a certain property), but we are not directly acquainted with that object. For instance, our knowledge of a physical object like a table is typically knowledge by description, obtained through acquaintance with the sense-data it causes. Similarly, we have knowledge by description of historical figures like the man with the iron mask or Julius Caesar, as we are not acquainted with them directly but know them through descriptions (“the man who was assassinated on the Ides of March,” or even just “the man whose name was Julius Caesar”). Knowledge by description always involves some knowledge of truths as its source, and any proposition we can understand must ultimately be composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. The chief importance of this type of knowledge is that it allows us to extend our knowledge beyond the narrow limits of our personal, immediate experience.

Regarding the sources of knowledge, Russell notes that beyond immediate acquaintance, we must use general principles to draw inferences from our data (sense-data and ourselves) to learn about things we don’t directly experience, such as matter, other people, or the past and future. Perception is a source of knowledge, although it can also lead to error if one is logically careless. Memory provides knowledge of past sense-data.

The inductive principle is central to extending knowledge beyond direct experience. This principle is the basis for believing general principles of science like the reign of law or causality. Belief in these principles stems from observing innumerable past instances of their truth, but this provides no evidence for their truth in the future unless the inductive principle itself is assumed. The existence and justification of such beliefs, which experience can neither confirm nor refute, pose significant problems in philosophy. The logical problem of induction is to show how knowledge of past instances can make future generalizations probable.

Russell distinguishes between empirical propositions, which are known through studying actual facts (like Socrates being a man), and logical propositions (or pure mathematics), which can be known a priori, without needing to appeal to experience. Logical propositions are characterized by being “analytic” or “tautological,” expressible wholly in terms of variables and logical constants.

Russell is critical of certain approaches to theory of knowledge:

• He argues against the over-emphasis on “experience” found in some philosophies, particularly idealism and certain forms of empiricism. He believes philosophers sometimes become “artificially stupid” by asserting that only what is experienced can be known, when in fact, we routinely accept propositions about unexperienced things.
• He disagrees with the view, influenced by Kantian idealism, that knowledge necessarily modifies the object known. The “new philosophy” (logical analysis) maintains that knowledge, as a rule, makes no difference to what is known, and there is no reason why things cannot exist without being known.
• He classifies philosophers based on their view of the relation between words and non-verbal facts, being critical of those who infer properties of the world solely from language or claim knowledge is only of words. However, he believes studying language, like syntax, can yield knowledge about the world’s structure.
• Russell offers a strong critique of Pragmatism and Instrumentalism, particularly as developed by John Dewey. He rejects the substitution of “utility” or “warranted assertibility” for the traditional concept of “truth”. He sees Dewey’s view of “inquiry” as starting in doubt and ending in removing doubt as problematic, suggesting it could lead to a lack of objective standards. Russell views this philosophy as potentially aligning with a desire for power rather than a disinterested search for truth, as it focuses on changing the world (technique/utility) rather than understanding it. He suggests pragmatism could lead to justifying the use of force to establish “truth”.

Russell also considers a behaviourist perspective on knowledge. From this viewpoint, knowledge is seen as a characteristic of the stimulus-reaction process, exhibited in certain responses to the environment. Behaviouristically considered, knowledge is closely related to desire, existing in relation to satisfying desire or enabling one to choose the right means to achieve ends. It’s a matter of degree. This perspective is useful when studying human behaviour externally but is not presented as a complete account of knowledge.

Regarding certainty and doubt, Russell’s position is characterized as being halfway between dogma and scepticism. He holds that almost all knowledge is doubtful to some degree, with the exception of pure mathematics and present sense-perception. Doubtfulness is a matter of degree. While acknowledging complete scepticism as a possible philosophy, he dismisses it as uninteresting due to its simplicity.

Russell views philosophy as fundamentally one with science when it comes to what can be known, differing primarily in the generality of its problems. All knowledge that can be known, can be known through scientific methods. Scientific theories are seen as tentative, useful hypotheses rather than immutably perfect truths. However, he also points out that science alone cannot address questions of ultimate value. Russell reprobates the historical tendency of philosophers to blend theories of the world with ethical doctrines, allowing desires for edification or virtue to bias their search for truth. A true philosopher seeks truth disinterestedly, without imposing preconceived limits based on assumed utility or morality.

Finally, Russell distinguishes wisdom from knowledge alone. While knowledge is an essential ingredient of wisdom, wisdom is a broader synthesis of knowledge, will, and feeling. He rejects the Socratic notion that knowledge alone guarantees virtuous behaviour, noting that immense knowledge could coexist with immense malevolence.

Bertrand Russell: Power, Politics, and Progress

Based on the sources provided, Bertrand Russell extensively discussed a range of social and political issues, viewing them as complex areas intertwined with psychology, economics, history, and even philosophy. While he initially pursued philosophy professionally, his interest in politics remained strong throughout his life, influenced by his family background. He saw social reconstruction as a vital, though not strictly “philosophical,” endeavor driven by a desire to improve the state of the world.

A central theme in Russell’s political theory is the analysis and taming of power. He viewed the love of power, alongside the economic motive, as one of the chief forces in politics. He recognized that while the pursuit of knowledge and scientific technique is often motivated by a love of power, this motive can be either useful or pernicious depending on the social system and individual capacities. The historical struggle between different political systems (democracy, oligarchy, autocracy, etc.) can be seen as various attempts to solve the problem of taming power, a problem he believed had not yet been solved.

Russell saw the fundamental problem of ethics and politics as finding a way to reconcile the needs of social life with the urgency of individual desires. He noted an age-long battle between those prioritizing social cohesion and those valuing individual initiative. He argued that society should exist to bring a good life to the individuals who compose it, emphasizing that ultimate value is to be sought in individuals, not in the whole. While survival in the modern world requires a great deal of government due to science and technique, the value of survival must come mainly from sources outside government.

Regarding political systems, Russell believed democracy was an essential part of the solution for taming power, although not a complete solution on its own. He highlighted its “negative merits,” such as preventing certain evils like the oppression of majorities by minorities who hold a monopoly of political power. Democracy, if taken seriously, demands a certain impartiality, and where collective action is necessary, the practicable form of impartiality is the rule of the majority. However, he acknowledged the limitations of democracy in large modern states, where citizens often feel a sense of impotence and ignorance regarding remote political issues, contrasting this with the potentially greater engagement possible in smaller units like the ancient City State or local government. He suggested organizing various interests and representing them in political bargaining as a way to make democracy exist psychologically as well as politically. He noted that victory in every important war since 1700 had gone to the more democratic side. For democracy to succeed, it requires a tolerant spirit, not too much hate or love of violence. He also stressed the need to safeguard individuals and minorities against tyranny even within a democracy.

Russell was critical of systems that prioritized the whole over the individual. He famously criticized Plato’s Republic as a “totalitarian tract,” where individual happiness doesn’t matter, and the state aims to preserve the status quo through rigid control, censorship, and even infanticide, arguing its persuasive force came from a deceptive blend of aristocratic prejudice and ‘divine philosophy’. Similarly, he found Hegel’s philosophy led to the view that true liberty consists in obedience to arbitrary authority and that war is good. He viewed modern autocracy, as seen in Nazi Germany and Russia, as dangerous, combining rule with a dogmatic creed instilled in the young through repetition and mass hysteria, leading to fanatical bigots incapable of free discussion.

He also critiqued Marxism on several points. While he acknowledged Marx’s thesis on social units increasing in size with technique and his point that political democracy alone is insufficient if economic power remains oligarchic, he argued that modern followers of Marx had abandoned the demand for a democratic state, concentrating both economic and political power in the hands of an oligarchy more tyrannical than before. He disagreed with Marx’s view that political upheavals are primarily non-mental conflicts driven by the clash between productive forces and modes of production. Russell argued that politics is governed by human desires, which are far more complex than Marx’s assumption that every politically conscious person is solely driven by the desire to increase their share of commodities; motives like power, pride, and the desire for victory also play crucial roles. He suggested that Marxism’s rigidity stemmed from its reliance on an outdated, intellectually optimistic psychology regarding the life of instinct.

Russell saw a strong connection between education and politics. He argued that almost all education has a political motive, aiming to strengthen a particular group (national, religious, social) in competition with others. Institutions conduct education not for the child’s sake or inward growth, but for maintaining the existing order or promoting worldly success. He criticized the mental habits often instilled, such as obedience, ruthlessness, contempt, and credulity, advocating instead for independence, justice in thought, reverence, and constructive doubt. He viewed State education as necessary but involving significant dangers, exemplified by the enforced dogmas, suppression of free thought, and instillation of fear and subservience seen in totalitarian countries. He believed teachers should be safeguards against such dangers, standing outside party strife, fostering impartial inquiry, and teaching pupils to critically evaluate information, especially from biased sources like newspapers.

Russell identified several significant dangers and challenges facing society:

• Fear: He saw fear as a primary driver of harmful political actions and a major obstacle to progress, leading to hate, cruelty, and driving nations towards disaster. Removing mutual distrust was the single condition needed for humanity to rapidly approach a better world.
• Dogmatism and Fanaticism: He viewed dogmatic political creeds and fanaticism (nationalist, theological) as immense dangers, preventing reasoned discussion and leading to conflict and the suppression of liberty.
• War: Russell considered war, particularly large-scale scientific warfare, an existential threat to the human race, emphasizing the urgent need for social institutions to make war impossible. He noted the historical pattern of nations cultivating sentiments in the young that make war inevitable, despite knowing its horrors.
• Power of Technique: While acknowledging the benefits of scientific technique, he also saw its dangers. It contributes to the increasing size and interdependence of social units, making some limitations on individual freedom necessary. It gives rulers increased power over human beings via propaganda and education. It presents challenges like the exhaustion of resources, which politicians are incentivized to ignore for short-term gain. The triumph of technique has shifted the value of science from knowing the world to changing it, a view proclaimed by Marx and adopted widely.
• Population Problem: He viewed rapid population growth as a critical issue, making the abolition of poverty and excessive work impossible and contributing to international conflicts over resources.
• Economic Inequality: Significant economic inequality throughout the world fosters envy and hatred, making a stable world government difficult.

In discussing the relation between morality and social/political life, Russell questioned the traditional dependence of morals on religion, suggesting that some important virtues, like intellectual integrity, are more likely to be found among those who reject dogma. He highlighted a “deep duality” in ethics between the political (Law) and the personal (Prophets), arguing that both civic morality (for community survival) and personal morality (giving value to survival) are equally necessary. He was critical of traditional religious individualism and the conception of virtue as a difficult, negative struggle against natural impulses, suggesting a need for ways of thinking and feeling adapted to the modern world, where individuals are guided away from destructive impulses not by rigid prohibitions but by their own thoughts and feelings.

Ultimately, despite the dangers and perplexities of the modern world, Russell held out high hopes for the future, believing that humanity is on the threshold of either utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievements. He suggested that a better world is possible if people can shed dogmatic creeds, use science and technique wisely to provide both opportunity and security, and overcome mutual distrust and destructive passions. He called for a change in outlook, urging calm thought over fear and advocating for a perspective that embraces the whole human race in sympathy.

Russell: Logic, Mathematics, and Analysis

Based on the provided sources, Bertrand Russell extensively discussed the relationship between Logic and Mathematics, ultimately arguing for their deep connection and, in a significant sense, their identity.

Historically, logic and mathematics were seen as entirely distinct studies, with logic linked to Greek philosophy and mathematics to science. However, in modern times, both disciplines developed in ways that brought them closer: logic became more mathematical, and mathematics became more logical. This convergence has made it “wholly impossible to draw a line between the two”. Russell views them as differing only like boy and man, where logic is the youth and mathematics is the manhood. He challenges anyone who disagrees to identify the precise point in the definitions and deductions of Principia Mathematica where logic ends and mathematics begins, suggesting any such answer would be arbitrary.

A central project in Russell’s work, particularly in the collaborative Principia Mathematica with Alfred North Whitehead, was the demonstration that mathematics is nothing but a prolongation of deductive logic. This project aimed to deduce ordinary mathematics from fundamental logical premises. It sought the greatest possible analysis of ideas and demonstration processes, reducing the number of undefined ideas and undemonstrated propositions to a minimum. The work also aimed for the perfectly precise expression of mathematical propositions in symbols.

Russell’s interest in this area began early, troubled by the foundations of mathematics since age eleven. He found both Kant’s synthetic a priori and empiricism unsatisfactory for explaining arithmetic. A pivotal moment was his encounter with Peano’s work in 1900, which offered a precision he had not seen before. Mastering Peano’s notation allowed him to invent a notation for relations and, working with Whitehead, rapidly develop the reduction of arithmetic concepts like series, cardinals, and ordinals to logic. Much of this ground had been covered independently by Frege, whose work Russell deeply respected and was influenced by, despite identifying an error in Frege’s premises due to contradictions.

Symbolic logic, or formal logic, is the study of general types of deduction. Its use of mathematical symbols is described as a convenient but theoretically irrelevant characteristic. The subject gained momentum from recognizing non-syllogistic inferences beyond the traditional syllogism. Russell considered symbolic logic absolutely essential for philosophical logicians and necessary for comprehending and practicing certain branches of mathematics. It investigates the general rules of inference and requires classifying relations or propositions based on the notions these rules introduce, which are the logical constants.

Logical constants are the fundamental, indefinable notions (Russell suggests around eight or nine) in terms of which all propositions of symbolic logic and mathematics can be stated. Examples include implication between propositions, the relation of a term to a class, the notion of “such that,” the notion of relation, and truth. More broadly, they are what remains constant across a group of propositions that can be transformed into one another by substituting terms, essentially expressing the form of propositions. All mathematical constants, such as the number 1, are logical constants or defined using them.

The subject of symbolic logic comprises the calculus of propositions, the calculus of classes, and the calculus of relations. While there is a parallelism between the calculus of propositions and classes, it is limited and can be misleading. Russell emphasized distinguishing between genuine propositions (which are true or false) and propositional functions (expressions containing real variables, like “x is a man,” which are neither true nor false).

Crucially, logic and pure mathematics do not deal with particular things or properties; they deal formally with what can be said about any thing or property. A proposition of logic is one where, if expressed in a suitable language, it could be asserted by someone who knows the syntax but not a single word of the vocabulary, using only variables and symbols for logical constants. The core characteristic of logical or mathematical propositions is that they are analytic or tautological. Their truth results from the meanings of symbols rather than from empirical observation of the world. Russell struggled to define “tautology” satisfactorily but felt thoroughly familiar with the characteristic. He later came to believe that mathematics consists of tautologies, which made it seem less sublime and timeless than he once thought, its timelessness merely meaning the mathematician is not talking about time.

The philosophical school of logical analysis, influenced strongly by mathematics and logic, aimed to incorporate mathematics into empiricism and use a powerful logical technique to tackle philosophical problems. This method involves analyzing scientific doctrine to see what entities and relations must be assumed. Many philosophical problems, or aspects of them, can be reduced to or clarified by studying syntax, although the idea that all problems are syntactical might be an overstatement. This approach helps achieve definite answers to certain long-standing philosophical questions, like “What is number?” or “What are space and time?” with a scientific quality. It views things traditionally considered substances, like pieces of matter or minds, as ultimately composed of events, with differences being in arrangement rather than fundamental nature.

Mathematical logic also serves as an essential tool for constructing a bridge between the world of sense and the world of science. It shows how the smooth, structured entities used in mathematical physics (like points, instants, particles) can be constructed from the more “higgledy-piggledy” things found in nature, making mathematical physics applicable to the real world.

Russell was critical of traditional Aristotelian logic, not for its historical importance, but for its limitations when viewed as the end of formal logic. He pointed out its formal defects, its overestimation of the syllogism (which is rarely used in mathematics and only one type of deduction), and its overestimation of deduction in general compared to other forms of argument like induction. He argued that traditional elementary logic can be a significant barrier to clear thinking unless overcome by learning new techniques.

By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog

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