This collection of text excerpts offers a detailed biography of Napoleon Bonaparte, charting his life from his early military education and family dynamics in Corsica and France through his rapid rise to power. The narrative covers his military campaigns, highlighting significant battles and strategic approaches, alongside his political maneuvers and the complexities of his relationships, particularly with his family and with Josephine. The excerpts also explore his attempts to consolidate power through political reforms and expansionist policies across Europe, examining both his successes and failures, culminating in his eventual defeats and exile. Finally, the text touches upon the challenges he faced, both personal and political, and his life and death during his captivity on St. Helena.
Napoleon Bonaparte’s Early Life and Career
Based on the information in the sources, here is a discussion of Napoleon Bonaparte’s early life:
Birth and Family Origins Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, Corsica, on 15 August 1769. This is presented as a necessary factual statement due to the tendency for every aspect of his life to be turned into legend. The Buonaparte family tradition held that they were descended from Francesco Buonaparte, who emigrated to Corsica from the seaport of Sarzana in the early sixteenth century. The family surname, Buonaparte, was said to indicate Imperialist affiliations dating back to Ugo Buonaparte, a tenth-century follower of Emperor Otto II. However, the earliest verifiable record shows a Buonaparte family lawyer as a member of the Council of Ancients in Ajaccio in 1616, with several more serving on this council in the eighteenth century. Like the Ramolinos, the Buonapartes were part of the Corsican nobility. Carlo Buonaparte, Napoleon’s father, pursued a career in law, which along with the Church and the Army, were among the few acceptable professions for nobles, although lower legal positions like Carlo’s (procureur) were still essentially outside the aristocratic pale. Carlo’s aspiration to noble status was a driving force. He succeeded in obtaining patents declaring the Buonaparte family noble in February 1771, ratified on 13 September 1771. While Corsican nobility didn’t confer many advantages like feudal privileges or tax exemptions, this declaration was significant in the long term for the family. Carlo’s activities in the 1770s were characterized by being litigious and by truckling to the French Commissioners who ruled the island. Napoleon’s parents had eight children who survived, although an earlier son, also named Napoleon, was born and died in 1765, followed by a girl who also died. This has led to psychological interpretations that Napoleon may have unconsciously felt like a “replacement child” for the first Napoleon, compounding potential hostility towards his older brother Joseph. Napoleon’s mother, Letizia, is described as having a “Spartan self-sufficiency” and “fanatical devotion to work,” qualities which were later valuable to Napoleon. His father, Carlo, died of cancer on 24 February 1785.
Corsican Environment and Influence Despite Napoleon’s later fury at being called “the Corsican” and his denials of his birthplace’s significance, the sources emphasize the deep influence of his early environment. His later character’s restlessness is partly attributed to the island’s confused and chaotic politics, which he absorbed from infancy. Dorothy Carrington is quoted as saying that childhood conversations, overheard by Napoleon, involved topics of “defeat, resistance, betrayal, heroism, torture, execution and conspiracy,” leaving a permanent imprint on his mind. A Corsican independence movement against Genoese overlords gained momentum after 1729. Pasquale Paoli’s movement took a more serious turn in 1755. Corsica became a pawn on the international diplomatic chessboard, with French troops entering cities by treaty in 1756 and Genoa formally ceding the island to France in 1768, the year before Napoleon’s birth. Napoleon himself lamented being born as the independent Corsica perished, describing the arrival of thirty thousand Frenchmen as drowning “the throne of liberty in waves of blood” and his cradle being “surrounded by the cries of the dying, the groans of the oppressed and tears of despair”. Carlo Buonaparte, however, immediately aligned himself with the new French overlords after Paoli’s retreat in 1769. The Corsican legacy is linked to Napoleon’s ruthless pragmatism, his impatience with abstract theory, and his conviction that problems are ultimately solved by force. The island’s “primitive” nature in the eighteenth century, with its sights, smells, and sounds described as primordial, is also noted. The streets of Ajaccio were filled with the stench of slaughtered animals and tanning hides, exacerbated by flies, heat, and a severe water shortage. It is suggested that Napoleon’s later habit of lying in hot baths was a compensation for this childhood water shortage. Another quintessential primitive aspect of Corsica was the vendetta, the tradition of blood vengeance handed down through generations. Travelers like Rousseau and Boswell, however, also described Corsicans as shrewd, voluble, intelligent, and interested in politics. During 1786-1791, Napoleon was still a fanatical Corsican nationalist and a partisan of Paoli, whom he worshipped intensely. His essay for the Academy of Lyons reflected a Rousseauesque conviction that Corsica represented the height of social and moral achievement. However, Paoli later brutally rebuffed Napoleon’s request for help with his history of Corsica, writing that “Youth is not the age for writing history,” which may have caused a slight decrease in his Paoli-mania. The “traumatic denouement of the Corsican saga” in 1792-93 is identified as a key psychological moment in the formation of the mature Napoleon.
Education Napoleon began his formal education at a young age. He left Corsica at age nine for school in France. His preliminary education was provided at the school at Autun, run by Bishop Marbeuf’s nephew. Marbeuf, who apparently had an affair with Napoleon’s mother, guaranteed payment of fees for Napoleon and his brother Joseph at Autun. Joseph was also going to Autun to learn French before studying for the priesthood. Stories circulated later, likely by enemies, of a systematically destructive and tantrum-prone boy, but some anecdotal evidence from these years is considered genuinely grounded in fact, having been vouched for by Letizia and Joseph. After Autun, Napoleon was assigned to a military school, Brienne. While his academic progress there was fair, his social and personal formation was described as disastrous, turning him into a misanthropic recluse due to brutality, social snobbery, and racial prejudice. Corporal punishment, though officially outlawed, was practiced. One instance involved him being forced to eat dinner kneeling, wearing coarse clothing and a dunce’s cap, which caused hysteria. The military schools at Brienne and Paris, despite their potential aim of promoting social inequality, failed in this regard with Napoleon, as being a poor boy among rich cadets embittered him and fostered cynicism. By the age of sixteen, his experiences there suggested an authoritarian personality in the making. He later insisted on Spartan austerity at military academies when he came to power. He completed his education after the Ecole Royale Militaire in Paris.
Early Military Career and Political Development (Pre-Consulate) Napoleon left the Ecole Royale Militaire on 28 October 1785 and joined the La Fere regiment at Valence. Before heading south, he visited his patron Bishop Marbeuf, receiving letters of introduction. He underwent ten weeks of basic training, progressing from private to corporal to sergeant, a method he later praised and attributed to his “common touch”. He completed his probation as an officer on 10 January 1786. His early duties were not burdensome, mainly mounting guard and looking after the men. He became a highly skilled artilleryman through a combination of assiduous fieldwork and extensive reading. His health was uncertain during this period, suffering from fevers which he attributed to “miasmata”. He wrote about working hard, saving candles by sleeping little and going to bed early, and eating only one meal a day. In April 1789, he was sent with troops to quell grain riots in Seurre, where he remained for two months and made a positive impression on the Intendant of Burgundy. Upon returning to Auxonne, he wrote his famous letter to Paoli lamenting Corsica’s loss of independence. He received leave to return to Corsica, where he attended the Paolistas’ party conference with Joseph and met the returned Paoli in Bastia. His writings from 1786-1791 show him as a fanatical Corsican nationalist and partisan of Paoli. He wrote an essay for the Academy of Lyons prize, which, though unsuccessful, provides insight into his political views around age twenty-two, revealing ideas derivative of Rousseau and a belief that morality is linked to freedom. His contempt for legal land titles compared to rights based on effort (“sweat,” “blood,” “sinews”) is noted as a feature reminiscent of modern fascism. Following his return to France, Napoleon’s ambitions grew. The siege of Toulon was a significant milestone in his career, leading to his promotion to brigadier-general. He met many figures there who would be important later in his career. Despite this success, the political situation remained uncertain. Sources suggest he was both idealistic and cynically ambitious throughout his early career. His time in Thermidorian Paris exposed him to a hedonistic society focused on sensuality and consumption, which contrasted sharply with the poverty of the slums. He noted the power and influence women seemed to hold in Parisian society. He felt like an insignificant officer with a provincial accent in these circles, struggling to adapt from his “coarseness of… demotic speech”. He married Josephine de Beauharnais (formerly Rose). His command of the Army of Italy saw him implementing the Directory’s strategy of having armies live off the land or by plunder, leading to accusations that he turned the campaign into a quest for booty. He wrestled with the excesses of his “hungry soldiers,” vowing to restore order, yet also wrote sycophantic letters boasting of victories. Exploiting France’s technologically advanced artillery, developed during the Revolution, allowed him to become an “artilleryman nonpareil”. His strategic thinking evolved, arguing to the Directory that islands like Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia were more important than Italy for French interests. During this period, the Directory struggled for power, with figures like Barras, Talleyrand, Bernadotte, and Hoche in contention. Hoche, a potential rival, died mysteriously. Napoleon also planned for an invasion of England via Ireland, meeting with Wolfe Tone, who was unimpressed with Napoleon’s knowledge of the British Isles. Increasingly interested in the East, Napoleon wrote to the Directors arguing for the occupation of Egypt to destroy England and secure Levant trade as the Ottoman Empire declined. This reflected an “unassimilated obsession” with the Orient, drawing on his reading and desire to emulate figures like Alexander the Great. He expressed impatience with Europe, stating he hadn’t gained enough glory and “must go east”. The Egyptian campaign saw the establishment of institutions like the Egyptian Institute and achievements by scientists and savants in public works, despite initial ridicule from soldiers. This period culminated in the coup of 18 Brumaire (November 1799), where Napoleon, aligning with Sieyes, seized power from the Directory, despite moments of confusion and bluster during the process. The sources suggest he was, in part, a “creature of circumstances” shaped by the long-standing conflict with Britain, but also one who actively “created the circumstances”. His early career saw a shift in intellectual idols, moving from figures of the Roman Republic like Brutus and Plutarch to those of the Empire like Caesar and Tacitus as he himself moved towards imperial power. He believed history followed a cyclical course, seeing parallels between the chaos of the late Roman Republic leading to Augustus’s rule and the French Revolution’s struggles potentially leading to a dictator.
This period laid the foundation for his personality and career, marked by a blend of Corsican pragmatism, military ambition, evolving political views, and a complex interaction with the revolutionary and European political landscape.
Napoleon Bonaparte’s Military Campaigns
Based on the sources provided, Napoleon Bonaparte’s military campaigns were a defining aspect of his career, characterized by evolving strategies, notable victories, and significant challenges. His early experiences laid the groundwork for the military principles he would employ on a grander scale.
Early Campaigns and Rise to Prominence
Napoleon’s military career began to gain prominence during the French Revolution. He served as a senior gunner in the Army of Italy, which was engaged in a stalemated campaign against Piedmont, supported by the British Navy operating through Genoa. Napoleon devised a stratagem for capturing Oneglia, which fell on 9 April 1794, boosting his reputation. He then wrote a general memorandum on grand strategy, basing his ideas on Guibert de Bourcet. His plan suggested attacking in Piedmont to force Austria to weaken its position on the Rhine, allowing a French strike there. This plan was supported by political commissars like Augustin Robespierre and Saliceti.
The Italian campaign of 1796-97 against Austria is frequently highlighted for revealing Napoleon’s military genius. Appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, Napoleon rapidly advanced, taking control of key mountain passes and destroying a superior enemy force piecemeal through speed of movement. He aimed to march against Beaulieu, force a crossing of the Po, and then seize Lombardy, hoping within a month to be in the Tyrol to link with the Army of the Rhine. He sent glowing letters about his victories to the Directory, exaggerating his achievements for propaganda purposes. While soldiers committed excesses, which Napoleon vowed to correct, he also boasted of his victories. The Army of Italy’s achievements were extensive, recorded on an inscribed flag presented by the Directory, listing numerous battles and captured resources and artworks.
From this campaign evolved military principles Napoleon never altered. These included ensuring open lines of communication, having a clear primary objective (the enemy army, not capitals or towns), always attacking, emphasizing artillery (ideally four guns per thousand men), and recognizing the moral factor as crucial. Above all, he stressed concentration of force, speed, the importance of time, and the cardinal principle of outflanking the enemy’s most exposed flank. Speed allowed for concentration, and a favorite ploy was dispersing to tempt the enemy to counter-disperse, followed by rapid concentration.
Following the success in Italy, Napoleon briefly considered an invasion of England via Ireland in 1796, meeting with Wolfe Tone [cited in Conversation History]. He also occupied Ionian islands, which he argued were strategically important.
The Egyptian Expedition
Increasingly interested in the East, Napoleon argued for the occupation of Egypt to damage England and secure Levant trade as the Ottoman Empire declined [cited in Conversation History, 16]. This reflected an obsession with the Orient and a desire to emulate figures like Alexander the Great [cited in Conversation History]. The Egyptian expedition commenced despite cogent military arguments based on imponderables. If successful, Egypt could be a springboard for reinforcing Indian allies and expelling the British. A Suez canal project was also considered to neutralize British sea power. The invasion was seen as easier and less expensive than a descent on England.
During the campaign, Napoleon drew up his men in rectangular squares at the Battle of the Pyramids (more properly Gizeh), facing roughly equal numbers but with technological superiority. He exhorted his soldiers by pointing to the Pyramids. His Syrian campaign involved battles like Mount Tabor, but the siege of Acre failed, leading to a French retreat. A controversial massacre occurred at Jaffa. After leaving command to Kleber, the French forces in Egypt eventually surrendered to the British in 1801.
Campaign of 1800
After seizing power in the Coup of 18 Brumaire, Napoleon reorganized the Army, preparing for a campaign against Austria. The plan involved a strategic offensive aiming to defeat Austrian armies in the Black Forest/Danube area and Italy. Napoleon’s strategy for the second Italian campaign was complex and, according to military historians, contained at least six major errors, including needing two separate lines of operation and assuming the Austrians would be purely reactive. The Austrians launched an unexpected offensive against Massena at Genoa and made Italy their main theatre. Despite these complexities, Napoleon crossed the St Bernard Pass and achieved victory at Marengo. Concurrently, Moreau campaigned successfully on the Rhine, winning the victory at Hohenlinden.
Campaign of 1805 (Third Coalition)
The grand strategy for the 1805 campaign against Austria was conceived by Lazare Carnot, drawing on Napoleon’s thinking. France fielded a large army, with offensives planned along the Main valley, into Swabia/Danube valley, and in the Po valley under Napoleon. The Italian campaign was initially designed as a sideshow but included provision for an advance into the Tyrol if successful.
Napoleon’s plan was to move 210,000 troops to the Danube quickly to hit the Austrians before the Russians could join them. This involved dividing the army into seven independent corps, each a miniature army capable of living off the land and fighting superior detachments. This corps system was a key feature of his success, enabling surprise and mobility. His strategy involved wheeling south to envelop Mack’s Austrian army, then turning to deal with the Russians. The entire army crossed the Danube, with different corps marching along separate lines to avoid congestion and pressure on supplies, but remaining within one to two days’ march of each other. This lightning advance on the Danube was unprecedented in scale. The campaign culminated in victories such as the Battle of Ulm and the decisive Battle of Austerlitz. At Austerlitz, the Allies fell into Napoleon’s trap by denuding their center for an all-out assault on the French right, which proved stronger than expected. The Grande Armée, while celebrated in propaganda, experienced problems with sickness, horse losses, theft, and indiscipline. The campaign solidified Napoleon’s military system.
Campaigns of 1806-07
War with Prussia broke out in 1806. Napoleon’s campaign against Prussia saw decisive victories at Jena and Auerstedt, leading to the occupation of Berlin. He then campaigned against the Russians in 1806-07. This period included indecisive battles like Pultusk and difficult engagements like Eylau, where Napoleon’s ignorance of terrain and failure to scout ahead put him in a false position. Despite challenges, French victories at Heilsberg and Friedland, described as Ney’s finest hour, led to the Treaty of Tilsit with Russia. However, concerns were raised about Napoleon’s disregard for climatic and geographical factors, reminiscent of debacles in Egypt and Santo Domingo.
The Peninsular War
Spain, allied with France , became a protracted challenge after being occupied by France in 1808. The Peninsular War saw nationwide spontaneous uprisings and evolved into mixed regular and guerrilla warfare. The Spanish army had an early triumph at Bailen. Napoleon’s initial campaign in 1808-09 aimed to encircle Spanish armies using simultaneous flank attacks, but marshals like Lefebvre and Victor failed to cooperate effectively, allowing enemy forces to escape. Despite Napoleon’s victories and chasing armies out of Spain, Sir John Moore’s diversion pulled Napoleon north of Madrid, preventing a southward sweep that might have ended the war swiftly. Moore’s campaign bought Portugal and southern Spain a year’s respite, contributing to the war becoming a persistent problem.
The war was characterized by constant threats to the French supply line due to guerrilla warfare, leading to starvation. Marshals like Marmont highlighted the superior logistics of the British army under Wellington compared to the French, who often lived off the land or carried supplies on soldiers’ backs. Wellington, noted as a master of logistics, organized continuous supply lines. In the final phase (1812-13), Wellington successfully coordinated regular forces and guerrillas. In 1812, Wellington struck at Marmont’s Army of Portugal, leveraging intelligence about the disposition of other French armies and their lack of cooperation.
Campaign of 1809
Austria invaded Bavaria in 1809, leading to Napoleon’s 1809 campaign. Key battles included Eckmühl and the surrender of Vienna. The Battle of Aspern-Essling was a notable struggle, followed by a successful crossing of the Danube and the Battle of Wagram. Napoleon’s dispositions at Wagram were classically Napoleonic, aiming for the center position between enemy wings to allow troop transfer. However, Bernadotte’s insubordination during the battle led to his removal from command. The campaign ended with the Treaty of Schönbrunn.
The Russian Campaign of 1812
The disastrous Russian campaign of 1812 saw a massive mobilization of forces, some 630,000 men, though the Grande Armée numbered around 350,000 in 1805 and had varying corps sizes in 1812. Napoleon planned to engage the Russian army, ideally encircling them, and bringing the war to a swift end. However, Russian commanders Barclay and Bagration eventually united their forces. Despite urgings from his marshals to winter in Smolensk, Napoleon, driven by momentum and news that Barclay would stand, ordered an advance on Moscow. The march was grueling, with soldiers suffering from dust, rain, water shortages, and massive horse losses due to lack of grazing and demanding cavalry tactics. The Battle of Borodino was fought outside Moscow, leading to the occupation of Moscow. The occupation was followed by the devastating retreat from Moscow, plagued by guerrilla warfare and battles like Maloyaroslavets. The sources point to Napoleon’s mistakes, including logistical failures and underestimating geographical factors.
Later Campaigns (1813-1815)
Following the Russian disaster, Napoleon faced renewed pressure. The war in Spain continued to drain resources, and King Joseph struggled with marshals who acted like provincial satraps. Wellington was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, creating a cohesive military force, while Joseph’s appointment changed little.
In Germany (1813), Napoleon raised a new army of raw recruits. His initial moves were fumbling, but he achieved victories at battles like Lutzen and Bautzen. However, the Allies grew stronger. Napoleon’s strategy involved awaiting the enemy at Dresden while other corps advanced on Berlin and defended Hamburg. The Allies attempted to take Dresden, but Napoleon counterattacked and brought up reinforcements, planning a double envelopment on the flanks while fortifying his center. The campaign also saw battles like Leipzig, a turning point.
The campaign in France (1814) saw Napoleon’s armies exhausted with no recruits, and French morale low. The Allies’ political will strengthened. This campaign included battles such as Montmirail. Wellington invaded France from the south, capturing Toulouse.
Finally, in the Belgian campaign of 1815, Napoleon faced the Allies at Waterloo. The battle involved complexities with forces like Grouchy’s corps not being on the field. Ney’s performance was noted as sometimes incompetent.
Throughout his campaigns, Napoleon demonstrated a blend of strategic vision and tactical execution, often relying on the speed, mobility, and loyalty of his army. However, his later campaigns were increasingly marked by logistical challenges, the growing strength and coordination of his enemies, and sometimes questionable decisions or marshal performance.
Napoleon’s Complex Family Dynamics
Based on the sources and our conversation history, the relationships within Napoleon Bonaparte’s family were complex, marked by Corsican origins, personal rivalries, political ambition, and ultimately, a mix of loyalty and significant betrayal.
Corsican Roots and Early Dynamics: Napoleon’s family, the Buonapartes, like the Ramolinos, were part of the Corsican nobility. The island’s chaotic politics, characterized by defeat, resistance, betrayal, heroism, torture, execution, and conspiracy, left a permanent imprint on Napoleon’s mind, shaping his character and perhaps contributing to his later restlessness. The tradition of vendetta, where blood vengeance was handed down and family honor rigorously defended, was a quintessential aspect of Corsican life. This Corsican spirit, particularly the “family sense” or “primogeniture,” is seen by some as influencing Napoleon’s loyalty to Joseph, even when it was detrimental.
Relationships with Parents: Napoleon’s early years involved navigating the challenges presented by his parents. His mother, Letizia, is described as having instilled discipline, pride, and good sense in him. Napoleon expressed great debt to her for these qualities. However, their relationship was also complex, with Napoleon later exhibiting deep ambivalence towards her and a potential “mother complex” that some depth psychologists connect to anxiety about her fidelity. Letizia herself was described as having fear and respect for Napoleon. She remained a strong figure, described as “Madame Mere,” who was legendarily stingy, in charge of imperial charities, and attempted to rule her family with a rod of iron. She constantly meddled and was grasping, keeping up an incessant vendetta against Josephine. Napoleon’s future prospects depended on his father, Carlo. Carlo died in February 1785 after a period of illness. Napoleon had an ambivalent relationship with his father, and some psychological interpretations suggest his conscious anger towards father-figures like Paoli may have tapped into an unconscious rage related to Carlo.
Sibling Rivalries and Napoleon’s Perspective: Early life saw significant rivalry between Napoleon and his elder brother Joseph. Freud suggested Napoleon’s childhood desire to push Joseph aside transformed into love, requiring aggression directed elsewhere. Napoleon later had warm feelings for Joseph and encouraged his sense of importance, which some sources attribute to a “brother-complex” making Napoleon “absurdly weak” concerning him. The relationship with his younger brother Lucien began poorly, with Napoleon acting as a broody and withdrawn custodian who showed no affection. Lucien deeply resented this and always felt repugnance in bowing to Napoleon as Emperor. Lucien was later annoyed by Napoleon’s favoritism towards Joseph. Their relationship deteriorated further after Lucien married without Napoleon’s consent, leading to rage from Napoleon, Lucien storming off, and declaring hatred for Napoleon. Lucien’s defiance, supported by Letizia, meant Napoleon’s efforts to make him leave his wife failed. Napoleon often remarked bitterly that his brothers were useless, lamenting not having capable sons like Genghiz Khan. He saw his family as a source of trouble and was particularly frustrated by their constant meddling.
Assigning Roles and Family as a Liability: As Napoleon rose to power, he appointed his siblings to positions of authority, making Joseph King of Naples and then Spain, Louis King of Holland, and Jerome King of Westphalia, and giving Elisa princely titles. He also used marshals as de facto viceroys in conquered territories. This authoritarian stance was partly intended to ensure his family consulted him. However, his loyalty to Joseph in Spain was considered a “great error,” as Joseph failed significantly there and struggled to control the marshals. Napoleon later regretted not sacrificing Joseph in Spain. Joseph’s appointment as Lieutenant-General in Paris in 1814 was also seen as a major mistake. Louis’s performance as King of Holland was abysmal, leading to Napoleon’s disgust and Louis’s eventual abdication. Jerome also drew Napoleon’s ire for suggesting Westphalians disagreed with Napoleon’s policies.
The Family’s Hatred of Josephine: A central theme is the intense animosity towards Napoleon’s first wife, Josephine, from almost the entire Bonaparte clan. Lucien referred to her contemptuously as an “ageing Creole,” and Letizia always hated her, partly because she had wanted Napoleon to marry Desiree Clary. The sisters, including Pauline and especially Elisa and Caroline, despised her. They could not understand Napoleon’s complaisance regarding her love affairs and spendthrift ways, which they saw as spending “their” money. Pauline tried to engage in a family revenge by pursuing Josephine’s lover, Hippolyte Charles. At Napoleon’s coronation, Pauline and Caroline caused a near-affray at the altar with Josephine. This unrelenting hostility was counterproductive, paradoxically nudging Napoleon towards declaring Josephine Empress.
Marriages and Dynastic Ambition: Napoleon’s marriages were intertwined with personal feelings and political strategy. His engagement to Desiree Clary, Joseph’s sister-in-law, brought a healthy dowry and made sense to the “hardheaded Napoleon”. His treatment of her after his career advanced is described as “despicable”. Desiree later married Bernadotte, a marriage seen as a scheme by the Bonapartist clan to neutralize a rival. Desiree, despite disliking Josephine, still seemed besotted with Napoleon and even spied on Bernadotte for the Bonapartes. His marriage to Josephine, a penniless Creole six years his elder, is attributed to factors ranging from anchoring himself to the ruling elite to potentially acting against his mother’s wishes. While he showed great passion in his early letters, he also harbored suspicion and grew frustrated by her childlessness. Despite the pressures for divorce, Josephine’s appeal to his superstitious nature about her bringing him luck initially delayed the separation. Napoleon’s need for an heir led to his divorce from Josephine and marriage to Marie-Louise of Austria, sister of the Czarina. This marriage, while a political alliance, caused uproar among his family. Napoleon respected Marie-Louise more than Josephine, and Marie-Louise’s letters in 1814 reveal she was genuinely in love with him. However, after his abdication, he seemed unable to respond to her, and Metternich ensured they would likely not reunite. The birth of their son, Napoleon II, was a source of dynastic hope and joy.
Loyalty and Betrayal: The sources highlight instances of both loyalty and significant betrayal within the family. Eugene de Beauharnais, Napoleon’s stepson, stands out as a figure of loyalty, described as a “true man of honour” who refused the crown of Italy offered by the Allies and retreated according to Napoleon’s orders, stating he would remain faithful as the Emperor’s star faded. Later, Pauline, despite her earlier “featherheaded” nature, rushed to join Napoleon in exile, showing unexpected loyalty. In stark contrast, Murat and Caroline’s decision to sign a treaty with Metternich in 1814, agreeing to wage war on Eugene, is described as “quite unspeakable,” “horrible ingratitude,” and “scarcely to be borne”. The cumulative treachery and uselessness of his siblings were deeply frustrating to Napoleon.
In summary, Napoleon’s family relationships were a microcosm of the political and personal complexities of his life, rooted in Corsican traditions, fueled by individual ambitions and rivalries, and ultimately proving to be both a tool for his dynastic aspirations and a significant source of challenge, disappointment, and betrayal.
Napoleon’s Political Maneuvers
Napoleon Bonaparte’s career was significantly shaped by his skillful and often ruthless political maneuvers, which were as crucial to his rise and maintenance of power as his military genius. These tactics evolved from his early experiences in Corsica to his dealings on the international stage as Emperor.
Early Corsican Politics and Fixer Role
Napoleon’s political education began in the complex and chaotic environment of Corsica. He and his elder brother Joseph quickly acquired a reputation as small-time ‘fixers’. Napoleon was active in election campaigns for the new Corsican assembly and attended political meetings. Despite being a military officer, he spent considerable time “stirring up trouble” on the island, drawing complaints from his superiors. He sought to extend his leave from the army, using a clearly bogus reason, to continue his involvement in Corsican politics. For the whole of 1790, he was effectively a Corsican politician.
His political views at this juncture were marked by a “fanatical Corsican nationalist” sentiment and a fervent support for Paoli. However, as his relationship with Paoli deteriorated, Napoleon became a “very unsubtle propagandist,” publicly denouncing Paoli as a traitor who had “sold” the nation.
To advance in Corsican politics, Napoleon meticulously analyzed the island’s power structure. In the election for lieutenant-colonelships in the volunteer battalions, he employed bribery, lodging over two hundred voting volunteers and providing them with lavish board. He also added intimidation to his tactics. During the election itself, his men physically removed one of the supervising commissioners from the house of his opponents, and Pozzo di Borgo, a rival, was physically attacked during the voting process, leading Pozzo to swear eternal vengeance by the code of vendetta. This period also saw Napoleon, influenced by Saliceti, demonstrate “full Machiavellian skill” in manipulating political factions within towns like Ajaccio.
Propaganda and Shaping Public Opinion
Napoleon consistently used propaganda as a political weapon. His early work, Le Souper de Beaucaire, an “unashamed work of propaganda,” was designed to justify the Jacobin position and fiercely attacked Paoli. This successful foray into political propaganda led the powerful political commissar Saliceti to draw the Bonaparte family closer. Later, as commander of the Army of Italy, Napoleon masterfully employed his own newspapers, distributed free to soldiers and even smuggled into France, to shape opinion. These papers, Le Courrier de l’Armee d’Italie and La France vue de l’Armee d’Italie, exaggerated his achievements and presented his errors as “deliberate mistakes,” contributing to the birth of the Napoleonic legend. He understood the importance of “propaganda, image and myth-making” in a way his rivals did not.
Leveraging Connections and Adapting to Political Shifts
Napoleon was adept at using his connections. His early success was linked to figures like du Teil, his commanding officer, and later, powerful political commissars like Saliceti and Augustin Robespierre, who supported his military plans. However, he was also pragmatic, readily abandoning former allies when circumstances changed. His “ready abandonment” of the Robespierres after Thermidor, described by critics as “the most cynical form of realpolitik,” involved distancing himself from them publicly.
He skillfully lobbied and maneuvered within the political system in Paris. Faced with a demotion and an undesirable assignment in the Vendee, he stalled by requesting leave and then lobbied influential friends to get him a better position. He found a key ally in Barras, who helped him get reinstated and, following an Austrian counter-offensive, put forward Napoleon’s name for a command in Italy, where Napoleon had consistently argued the key to victory lay. His appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy was, in part, attributed to Barras rewarding one of his favorites, a point highlighted by the Parisian press.
Political Strategy in Conquered Territories
In Italy, Napoleon engaged in significant political restructuring. He compelled Genoa to accept a French garrison, occupied pro-Austrian Modena, and attempted to pressure Venice. He worked to advance his project for a northern Italian republic, setting up several interim “republics”. He strategically navigated the complex political landscape, aiming to encourage pro-French elements without provoking conservative factions. He openly articulated a Machiavellian approach, supporting aristocratic parties because they were “the party of the rich landowners and priests, who in the long run will end by winning the support of the mass of the people”. He was careful when dealing with the Catholic Church, attempting to appease anticlericals while also writing warmly to the Pope. He set up republics with French-style constitutions. Despite his efforts, he remained cynical about the Italian people’s commitment to liberty and equality.
Navigating the Directory and the Coup of 18 Brumaire
Napoleon closely followed internal French politics. He identified three main power groupings in Paris: the determined republicans, the outright royalists, and the ‘don’t knows’. He particularly despised the fence-sitters. Meanwhile, the Directors themselves had grievances against Napoleon, including his actions in Venice and Genoa without their authority, his looting, and his “unconstitutional” peace terms.
To counter opposition from the Right and navigate the power struggle within the Directory, Napoleon employed several political weapons. He fostered an alliance with Barras, facilitated by figures like Talleyrand. However, Napoleon was strategically hesitant to act too quickly, waiting for the “fruit” to be ripe for his own ascendancy. He openly expressed his contempt for the Directors, viewing them as ineffectual.
The Coup of 18 Brumaire was a complex political maneuver involving multiple plotters. Napoleon played off rivals and factions, appearing to be above party considerations. He collaborated with Sieyes, a key figure wanting to overthrow the existing constitution. Despite initial hesitations and differing goals with Sieyes, Napoleon secured key figures like Fouche’s support to ensure police non-interference. He also sought to neutralize military rivals like Bernadotte, though only secured his neutrality through Joseph’s intervention.
During the coup itself, when faced with resistance and accusations of being a “Caesar, Cromwell, tyrant” in the Council of Ancients, Napoleon’s initial address was reportedly floundering. It was his brother, Lucien Bonaparte, who, as president of the Five Hundred, dramatically intervened to rally the Guardsmen, falsely claiming that assassins were present and urging the soldiers to clear the chamber. This transformed the planned “transfer of parliamentary power by political legerdemain” into one “at the point of a bayonet”. Napoleon succeeded partly because of his “immensely skilful” political maneuvering, his ability to appear reluctant to seize power, and his understanding of propaganda and image.
Consolidating Power as First Consul and Emperor
After Brumaire, Napoleon continued his political maneuvering to consolidate power. He outmaneuvered Sieyes, rejecting the position of ‘Grand Elector’ and using his propaganda machine to highlight his “magnanimity”. He then wore down Sieyes and his faction through protracted negotiations over the new constitution. He skillfully navigated between political factions, appearing to lean Right or Left as needed. He purged the Jacobins to reassure the Right while simultaneously leaking correspondence with Louis XVIII to the Jacobins to demonstrate a lack of royalist sympathy.
He used various political tools to bypass legislative opposition, such as senatus consultum, arrets, and plebiscites. He neutralized political opponents by keeping them under surveillance, exiling them, or removing their relatives from public office. He strategically appointed second-raters or younger men bound by loyalty to ministries to diminish their power and prevent them from developing independent power bases.
One of his most significant political maneuvers was the Concordat with the Catholic Church, which aimed to co-opt their traditional supporters and stabilize the religious landscape after the Revolution. He was declared President of the Cisalpine Republic and Protector of the Helvetic Republic. The creation of the Legion of Honour was a “consummate act of mystification” designed to camouflage his imperial demeanor and co-opt the military elite.
International Diplomacy and Manipulation
On the international stage, Napoleon engaged in complex diplomatic maneuvers. He used Talleyrand to put out peace feelers and whip up French public opinion against adversaries like Austria and Britain. He skillfully played the British game during negotiations in 1803, his anger over press portrayals noted as a factor. He leveraged international rivalries, such as seeking an alliance with Czar Paul I of Russia against British interests in India.
Leading up to the Third Coalition, Talleyrand performed “sterling service” in keeping Prussia neutral. At Austerlitz, Napoleon engaged in elaborate deception, feigning confusion and fear to lure the Allied armies into his trap. He believed in humiliating defeated enemies rather than conciliating them.
The Treaty of Tilsit with Czar Alexander I was a complex political agreement involving spheres of influence, blockades, and secret protocols regarding territories like Turkey, Finland, Spain, and Portugal. It also included informal agreements for a joint Franco-Russian project against British power in India. However, the “insincerity of the two parties” and conflicting interests led to its eventual breakdown. At Erfurt, Napoleon’s attempt to secure a dynastic marriage was sabotaged by Talleyrand, who was secretly plotting with the Czar.
Using Family and Marshals in Governance
Napoleon used his family and marshals as part of his political control over conquered territories. He installed his siblings as kings or rulers in places like Naples, Holland, and Westphalia, and used marshals as “de facto viceroys” in others like Poland and Aragon. These family courts were often supported by loyal French officials.
Later Political Efforts and Mistakes
Even in decline, Napoleon attempted political maneuvers. During the campaign in France in 1814, he promised constitutional reforms and the summoning of an electoral college, making seemingly conciliatory appointments like Carnot and recalling Fouche. He even reconciled with Lucien Bonaparte. However, these reforms were seen as superficial attempts to create a “new liberal image,” with his true intentions being to rescind concessions once militarily secure. His decision to return to Paris after Waterloo and work within constitutional norms was deemed a “gross error” and an act of folly. He later regretted not acting decisively against treacherous figures like Talleyrand and Fouche, who consistently plotted against him. The source notes a “continuing mystery” about his weakness in dealing with the treachery of Bernadotte, Talleyrand, and Fouche.
In summary, Napoleon’s political maneuvers were characterized by adaptability, cunning, effective propaganda, the strategic use of allies and rivals, and an unwavering focus on consolidating and expanding his own power, often at the expense of others.
Napoleon’s Exiles: Elba and St. Helena
Napoleon Bonaparte experienced two periods of exile in his life: first on the island of Elba, and finally on the remote island of St. Helena. These exiles marked the end of his direct rule but were still subject to intense political maneuvering, both by Napoleon himself and by the Allied powers.
Exile on Elba (1814-1815)
Following his abdication in 1814, Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba. The choice of Elba came after considering and rejecting many other potential locations, including the United States (deemed too extreme by Fouche), Corsica and Sardinia (considered too large and potentially defensible), and Corfu (too small and distant). Many proposed sites were British possessions, like Gibraltar, St. Helena, and even Botany Bay, but Tory backbenchers objected to Napoleon sullying these places. The idea of keeping him under house arrest at the British fort of St. George in Scotland was also raised but rejected due to concerns about Whig opposition leaders seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Ultimately, Czar Alexander I was the prime mover behind the idea of Elba as the place of exile.
Napoleon was escorted to Elba by a convoy of fourteen carriages and Polish lancers. Six hundred Guardsmen were planned to follow him. Before leaving Fontainebleau, he delivered an emotional farewell speech to his Old Guard, which became a famous setpiece of Napoleonic iconography.
While on Elba, Napoleon spent time reflecting on his defeats. He concluded that he was not defeated by a popular uprising or nationalism, but by the sheer weight of numbers from a coalition of four powers (Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria). He also realized he had failed to uphold the implicit “social contract” of 1799 by conflicting with the Catholic Church, failing to maintain living standards, and imposing high taxation and conscription.
Despite the relative proximity of Elba to Europe, there was concern among the Allies about his presence. Fouche famously remarked that Napoleon on Elba was to Europe as Vesuvius was to Naples. There was also fear of an assassin’s dagger or bullet from figures like the comte d’Artois. Adding to Napoleon’s situation, Louis XVIII’s government in France refused to pay the annuity that had been agreed upon as part of his abdication settlement.
Napoleon consulted his intimates about returning to the mainland. General Drouot advised against it, but his sister Pauline and mother Madame Mere were enthusiastic. Letizia’s alleged advice was, “Go, my son, fulfil your destiny. You were not made to die on this island”. Napoleon later claimed he had no real option but to return, as his veterans would accuse him of cowardice if he stayed while France suffered under Bourbon rule and the annuity was not paid. There is also a more feasible theory that Austria and England colluded to create a situation where Napoleon would return, providing an excuse to send him to a more distant island to convince the Czar that he could not remain in Europe.
Napoleon’s departure from Elba on a moonless night on August 23, 1799 (this date seems incorrect based on the context, as it relates to his return from Egypt; the return from Elba was in 1815 – Self-correction: Source mentions the return from Egypt on Aug 23, 1799. The return from Elba is discussed later, in the context of the Hundred Days in sources like and focusing on the march to Paris. The sources don’t give the specific date of departure from Elba in the main narrative provided, but the context of chapters 25-27 is 1814-1815). He traveled in three coaches, aiming for Paris, and arrived in Ajaccio on September 30 due to contrary winds. He spent a few nights in his family home, anxious about whether he would arrive in Paris too late.
Exile on St. Helena (1815-1821)
After the defeat at Waterloo, Napoleon returned to Paris. He made what was considered a “gross error” by deciding to work within constitutional norms rather than returning to the field or dissolving the chambers. Fouche campaigned against him, spreading panic and claiming Napoleon intended to become a dictator. Despite plotting by figures like Talleyrand and Fouche, Napoleon did not act decisively against them. He later regretted not having hanged Talleyrand and Fouche, believing he would still be on the throne if he had. Fouche, instrumental in pressuring Napoleon to leave Paris, eventually informed him that he must depart Rochefort and would not be allowed back on French soil.
Faced with limited options (sailing out to likely capture, returning to lead the Army, or surrendering to the British), Napoleon ultimately decided to surrender to the British. His aides negotiated with Captain Maitland of HMS Bellerophon, seeking asylum in England or safe passage to the U.S.A.. Maitland, engaging in “pure machiavellianism,” hinted that asylum in England might be possible while secretly waiting for explicit orders from the Admiralty. When the order came, it was uncompromising: Napoleon was to be taken to St. Helena. Napoleon rejected proposals to fight the blockade or escape in a whaleboat, and also a last-minute plea from his brother Joseph to return and lead the Army. He stated he would not be the cause of another cannon-shot in France.
The Allies rubberstamped the British action in the Convention of Paris on August 2nd. On August 4th, Maitland put to sea from Plymouth to transfer Napoleon to the HMS Northumberland for the journey to St. Helena.
Life on St. Helena was harsh. Napoleon’s residence at Longwood was in a decaying state, infested with rats and plagued by dysentery. Sir Hudson Lowe, the governor, and Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War, implemented draconian restrictions. Napoleon’s household was reduced, those remaining had to commit indefinitely, the annual expenditure was limited, correspondence was strictly controlled by the Governor, passes to visit Longwood required his permission, gifts mentioning imperial status were forbidden, unsupervised riding was curtailed, and Napoleon’s presence had to be checked twice daily. These instructions were described as breathing a spirit of “pure, vindictive spite”. The legality of his detention was later questioned in Parliament, and an Act of Indemnity was passed, effectively admitting there was no legal basis for holding him.
Despite Lowe’s precautions, news and bulletins reached Napoleon’s supporters in England, leading to a public outcry in 1817. Figures like Lord Holland in the House of Lords raised the issue, and articles in The Times insinuated the government was trying to hasten Napoleon’s death. This negative publicity led to Bathurst instructing Lowe to restore Napoleon’s allowance. Smuggled documents, like Napoleon’s Remontrance, were turned into effective propaganda pamphlets in England.
Napoleon found his captors, the British, to be a “ferocious race,” though he admired their soldiers and Parliament. He perceived a cultural barbarism, citing their practice of men drinking after women left the table and Henry VIII’s actions regarding Anne Boleyn. He continued to feel that France represented civilization against English barbarism. News from Europe was generally depressing, reinforcing a sense of pessimism. He learned of the executions of Ney and Murat and the humiliation of France under Allied occupation.
Escape plans were discussed, and serious attempts were devised in the United States, but Napoleon consistently refused to sanction them. He explained this decision by stating he would not survive six months in America before being assassinated by the comte d’Artois’s contract killers; he felt he was “better off in St Helena”. He avoided going outside after dark to avoid seeing the sentries Lowe posted around Longwood at night.
Napoleon’s health deteriorated seriously. A physician, Stokoe, diagnosed hepatitis, but this diagnosis had to be “doctored” due to political pressure, and Stokoe was court-martialed and dismissed for calling Napoleon “the Emperor”. Shortly before his death, Napoleon told Bertrand he hoped the English would not make him a prize exhibit by burying him in Westminster Abbey. He also stated he did not want the consolations of Catholicism, preferring to be “happy not to have religion” and free from “chimerical fears”.
On April 15th, he signed new codicils to his bequests and his last will and testament. Paragraph Five of the will stated: “My death is premature. I have been assassinated by the English oligarchy and their hired murderer. The English people will not be long in avenging me”. The circumstances of his death are described as “controversial and hotly disputed territory”. While the theory of death by cancer was advanced, sources also mention the theory of poisoning, with Montholon identified as a suspect.
The source uses a Jungian fable to place Napoleon’s experience in myth, noting his birth on one island (Corsica), exile to a second (Elba), and death on a third (St. Helena), with England representing a potential fourth island, his nemesis. His chaining to the rock of St. Helena is likened to Prometheus, who was also chained to a rock.
By Amjad Izhar
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