“Was Modi’s Attack merely publicity ploy? Why he accepted Humiliated Ceasefire?” by Afzaal Rehan, critically examines India’s 2025 airstrikes in Pakistan. The article argues that these strikes, specifically targeting alleged terrorist camps, were a publicity stunt by the Modi government and ultimately ineffective in combating terrorism. Rehan asserts that the targeted areas were deliberately left vulnerable, resulting in no significant damage to terrorist organizations or their infrastructure, and that any casualties were likely innocent civilians used to garner sympathy against India.
The article further suggests that terrorism in the region is a complex issue influenced by Pakistani establishment policies and American involvement, rather than being solely attributable to independent terrorist groups.
Assessing India’s Air Strikes against Pakistan
The article extensively discusses the effectiveness of the air strikes carried out by India, primarily by Prime Minister Modi, against alleged terrorist targets in Pakistan.
Here’s a summary of the article’s perspective on the effectiveness of these air strikes:
Publicity Ploy and Lack of Achievement:
The article contends that Modi’s air strikes, including those following “Pehalgam” and previously in Balakot, was merely a “made-up show” and a “publicity ploy” designed to please his own people. The strikes were described as “utterly baseless and a meaningless exercise”. Despite India’s claim of targeting specific terrorist locations rather than military bases, the article asserts that the outcome was “zero achievement” for India, beyond generating hatred.
No Damage to Terrorist Organizations:
The article explicitly states that “not even an iota of damage was done” to terrorist organizations or their organizational structure. Instead, these groups reportedly gained a form of “public sympathy”. The article questions what number of terrorists died or what even slightest damage was inflicted on their organizational structure.
Minimal Impact on Infrastructure:
While it is acknowledged that mosques or infrastructure might have been damaged, the article argues that this makes no difference; as such infrastructure can be easily rebuilt or repaired. It’s noted that terrorists did not invest their own money in building these structures, so their destruction does not represent a minimal significant financial loss to them.
Who Died?
The article challenges the idea that terrorists were killed in the strikes. Given that India had openly announced its intention to target terrorist hideouts, and even common writers like him knew about these potential attacks, the article questions why any “jihadi” would remain in such locations. Instead, the article suggests that the casualties were innocent women and children who were intentionally brought to those locations. This was allegedly part of a plan by “smarter terrorists” to gain international sympathy and portray the Modi government as ruthless, thereby fueling hatred against India and fostering sympathy for the charitable organizations of these centers.
Context of Terrorism’s Roots:
The article provides a broader context for terrorism in Pakistan, stating that Pakistan’s own “powerful establishment” has influenced the curbing of terrorist activities due to international pressure. It highlights that Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, somewhat slightly admitted that Pakistan engaged in terrorist activities for “western powers, especially America”. Former Army Chief General Bajwa is also quoted saying that the “terrorism seeds” were planted 40 years ago with American coordination is now being harvested, implying that Pakistan itself “nurtured this dangerous snake of terrorism”.
Alternative Approaches:
As a true humanitarian, author, suggests alternative ways to combat terrorism, such as capturing terrorists alive (like Ajmal Kasab) to gain international public opinion, improving relations with Pakistan’s “real powers” (the establishment), and avoiding deterioration of relations with America. The article also suggests addressing the Kashmir issue by providing a good life experience for Kashmiris and improving relations with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Terror Seed: A Forty-Year Harvest
According to the article, the origin of terrorism in Pakistan is attributed to actions taken approximately 40 years prior to the events discussed.
Specifically, former Army Chief General Bajwa stated that “40 years ago we planted the seeds of terrorism with American coordination” and is now “reaping its harvest”. The article further elaborates that Pakistan itself “nurtured this dangerous snake of terrorism”.
Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, also slightly admitted that Pakistan engaged in terrorist activities “for western powers, especially America,” indicating a history of cooperation or influence from external entities in these activities. The article implies that this “seedling” of terrorism, nurtured by Pakistan itself, is now being confronted by its own armed forces.
Modi’s Air Strikes: A Propaganda Ploy
The article extensively discusses political propaganda, particularly in the context of the air strikes carried out by India under Prime Minister Modi.
Here’s a breakdown of how the article characterizes political propaganda:
Purpose as a “Publicity Ploy”:
The article asserts that Modi’s air strikes, including those following “Pehalgam” and previously in Balakot, were primarily a “made-up show” and a “publicity ploy”. The aim was to “please his own people” and was deemed an “utterly baseless and a meaningless exercise”. The article consistently refers to this as “Modi’s propaganda”.
Fabricated Claims and False Narratives:
The propaganda involved spreading claims that India had successfully penetrated Pakistan and destroyed terrorist strongholds. The article states that Indian friends were led to believe, through “governmental propaganda or fake and fictional stories spread by the media,” that significant damage was inflicted on terrorism. Modi’s government explicitly stated that they targeted specific terrorist locations and not military or airbases.
Zero Achievement despite Propaganda:
Despite the claims of success, the article vehemently argues that the strikes resulted in “zero achievement” for India, achieving nothing beyond generating hatred. It emphasizes that “not even an iota of damage was done” to terrorist organizations or their structure.
Exploitation of Casualties:
The propaganda, according to the article, was also designed to manipulate public sentiment regarding casualties. The article suggests that innocent women and children were intentionally placed in targeted locations, becoming part of a “planning by smarter people”. This was allegedly to garner international sympathy, portray the Modi government as ruthless, and incite hatred against India, while simultaneously fostering sympathy for the charitable organizations associated with these centers.
Leaders Using Propaganda for Political Gains:
The article laments how political leaders resort to “hideous methods of propaganda” to “shine their politics”. The example of Modi’s actions is presented as a repeated pattern, noting that similar propaganda was used with the same enthusiasm regarding the Balakot strikes, which the article dismisses as a “drama”.
Media’s Role in Spreading Propaganda:
The article indicates that the media plays a significant role in disseminating these “fake and fictional stories”, contributing to the public’s misunderstanding of the actual outcomes of the strikes.
Contrast with Reality:
The author, identifying as a “true humanitarian,” feels it is their duty to reveal the “reality” or “truth” against these propagandistic narratives, asserting that the claims of successfully eliminating terrorist bases were “totally baseless and a futile exercise”.
Geopolitical Influences: US, Pakistan, India, and Terrorism
The article provide several insights into geopolitical influence, particularly concerning the United States’ role in the region and the impact of international pressure on India and Pakistan.
Here’s a breakdown of the geopolitical influences discussed:
US Influence on Terrorism’s Origin and Nurturing:
The articles explicitly state that the “seedling of terrorism” in Pakistan was planted “40 years ago… with American coordination”. Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, slightly admitted that Pakistan engaged in terrorist activities “for western powers, especially America,” indicating a significant external influence on Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism. The article states that Pakistan itself “nurtured this dangerous snake of terrorism”.
International Pressure on Pakistan:
The curbing of terrorist activities by Pakistan’s “powerful establishment” is attributed to “diplomacy and international pressure” and “global pressure”. This indicates that external forces played a role in compelling Pakistan to take action against these groups, suggesting that Pakistan’s policies are not solely internal but responsive to global demands.
America’s Role in Pakistan’s Internal Power Dynamics:
The article highlights the significant influence America has over Pakistan’s “real powers” – its establishment. It notes that the American President (Donald Trump) hosted Pakistan’s “real powerful General” for lunch and extended discussions, contrasting this with the perceived lack of recognition for Pakistan’s elected Prime Minister – even he did not know the name of Pakistani PM. This suggests that the US interacts more directly and significantly with Pakistan’s military establishment than with its civilian government, indicating a geopolitical strategy that prioritizes the “real powers” in the country.
Kashmir as an “American Tool”:
The article posits that the Kashmir issue is “in reality an American tool” used to “control matters”. It suggests that this “wound” (Kashmir) will fester when relations with America deteriorate, implying that the US leverages this issue as a means of influence or control in the region.
India’s Efforts to Gain International Opinion, Sympathy:
The article suggests that the alleged casualties of the air strikes—innocent women and children—were part of a “planning by smarter people” to “gain international sympathy” and portray the Modi government as ruthless, while simultaneously generating sympathy for the targeted “charitable organizations”. This indicates an awareness of the global audience and the importance of shaping international perception.
The article advises India to capture terrorists alive, like Ajmal Kasab, and then use “international public opinion” to its advantage, demonstrating an understanding of how global consensus can be leveraged in geopolitical conflicts.
Maintaining Relations with America:
India is advised that the current deterioration in its relations with America “should not have happened”, further underscoring the perceived importance of positive relations with the US for regional stability and influence.
Rethinking Counter-Terrorism: Diplomacy, Humanity, and Geopolitics
Based on the article, the discussion around counter-terrorism strategy primarily critiques the effectiveness of military air strikes and suggests alternative approaches, emphasizing diplomatic and social dimensions alongside international relations.
Here’s a discussion of counter-terrorism strategies as presented in the articles:
Critique of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
The article strongly argues that India’s air strikes, such as those following “Pehalgam” and in Balakot, were ineffective as a counter-terrorism strategy. These actions were described as a “made-up show” and a “publicity ploy” with “zero achievement” in combating terrorism.
It is asserted that “not even an iota of damage was done” to terrorist organizations or their structural integrity. Instead, these groups reportedly gained “public sympathy”.
The destruction of infrastructure like mosques was deemed meaningless; as such facilities can be easily rebuilt without significant financial loss to the terrorists, who did not invest their own money in them.
The article questions the claim of killing terrorists, suggesting that innocent women and children were the actual casualties, intentionally placed to garner international sympathy and fuel hatred against India, thereby benefiting the “charitable organizations” associated with these centers. This implies that military strikes on alleged terrorist hideouts can be counterproductive; leading to unintended civilian casualties and potentially increasing sympathy for the very groups they aim to eliminate.
Suggested Alternative Counter-Terrorism Strategies:
The author, identifying as a “true humanitarian,” proposes several alternative approaches for combating terrorism effectively:
Capture Terrorists Alive to Influence Global Opinion:
India is advised to “capture terrorists alive”, citing the example of Ajmal Kasab. This approach would allow India to leverage “international public opinion” in its favor. The idea is to present tangible evidence and gain global consensus, rather than relying on military actions with questionable outcomes.
Improve Relations with Pakistan’s “Real Powers”:
The article suggests that India should “try to improve its relations with Pakistan’s real powers,” referring to its powerful establishment, rather than its “nominal” elected government. This implies that engaging with the influential military and intelligence establishment in Pakistan is crucial for any meaningful progress against terrorism, as this establishment has historically influenced counter-terrorism efforts within Pakistan due to international pressure.
Maintain and Improve Relations with the United States:
A critical piece of advice is that the current deterioration in relations between India and America “should not have happened”. The article emphasizes America’s significant geopolitical influence, including its historical involvement in the “seedling of terrorism” in Pakistan and its role as a “tool” in controlling regional matters like the Kashmir issue.
Maintaining good relations with the US is thus presented as a vital component of regional stability and effective counter-terrorism efforts.
Address the Kashmir Issue with Humanitarian Focus:
Instead of military confrontation, the article suggests that India can gain “considerable control over this issue” by “providing a good life to Kashmiris through their encouragement” and by “improving relations with Pakistan”. This points to a strategy that addresses the root causes of disaffection and seeks a peaceful resolution, rather than relying solely on force.
In essence, the article advocates for a shift from aggressive military posturing to a more nuanced counter-terrorism strategy that prioritizes diplomacy, international relations, public opinion, and addressing humanitarian concerns, while being skeptical of the efficacy of conventional air strikes.
By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog
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