Gulf AI Centers: Drone Target Vulnerability

The provided text argues against building large Artificial Intelligence (AI) data centers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, despite a recent decision by the Trump administration to greenlight such projects. The authors, experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contend that these locations are highly vulnerable to drone attacks, a threat that has escalated since 2019 and was exemplified by attacks on Saudi oil facilities. They highlight that the vast size and exposed components of these future data centers make them easy targets, potentially causing global disruptions if damaged. The article emphasizes that physical security concerns have been largely overlooked and that building this critical infrastructure in the Gulf unnecessarily entangles the U.S. in a volatile region.

AI Data Centers: Gulf Risks and Vulnerabilities

The construction of massive artificial intelligence (AI) data centers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia represents one of the most significant technology investments of the decade. These facilities are projected to host some of the world’s largest and most powerful computing clusters, serving as critical infrastructure for training and deploying advanced AI models.

Here’s a detailed discussion of AI data centers based on the sources:

• Location and Funding
• The data centers are planned for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, specifically in the Gulf region.
• They are funded by Gulf sovereign wealth and built using U.S. technology.
• The Trump administration green-lit these deals, which supporters initially hailed as a triumph of commercial diplomacy.
• The optimistic narrative suggested these investments would open a trillion-dollar floodgate of Gulf capital for U.S. tech firms and more tightly integrate Abu Dhabi and Riyadh with the American AI stack.
• Significant Risks and Vulnerabilities The sources highlight several major risks associated with building these critical AI data centers in the Gulf:
• Vulnerability to Drone and Missile Attacks:
• The primary concern is the high vulnerability to attack from hostile actors, especially given the intensifying risk from cheap drones.
• These risks are not theoretical; in 2019, Iran used a barrage of drones and missiles to strike Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, significantly impacting crude output.
• Since then, the threat from drone warfare has become even more potent, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s use of drones to destroy strategic Russian aircraft. Drones are cheap and can carry payloads that cause extensive damage, benefiting non-state actors like Iran’s regional proxies.
• The planned data centers in the UAE will sprawl over 10 square miles, making them “sitting ducks”.
• Their most critical components, such as chillers that cool high-performance servers, are exposed, hard to armor without compromising function, and difficult to replace quickly.
• Even a single, small drone carrying a shaped charge or incendiary device could disable a cooling system, forcing a data center offline and potentially ruining long, expensive AI training runs. The global effects of such an incident could be extraordinary as AI becomes integrated into essential services.
• Cybersecurity and Geopolitical Concerns:
• The initial optimistic narrative “always glossed over cybersecurity risks” and the Gulf states’ robust relationships with China.
• A deeper and underappreciated risk is strategic entanglement, as this plan unnecessarily creates a new U.S. national interest in a region that successive U.S. presidents have sought to disengage from.
• While cementing U.S. security commitments is appealing to Gulf leaders, their interests may not align with those of the United States, which should not risk building the digital future on a “geopolitical fault line”.
• The sources describe this as a “major unforced error,” drawing a parallel to Washington spending tens of billions to onshore advanced semiconductor production from Taiwan, another geopolitical hotspot, only to approve offshoring AI data centers to a similar conflict-prone region.
• Proposed Defenses and Their Limitations
• Extensive site defenses are necessary, going beyond fences and cameras to include well-hardened perimeters, specialized nets, gun emplacements, drone-jamming capabilities, and sophisticated, multilayered air defenses.
• However, these systems are very costly and some high-end air defense systems are in high demand elsewhere, notably in Taiwan and Ukraine.
• Even with such hardening, data centers will remain vulnerable, as no missile defense system can shoot down every threat. Israel’s Iron Dome, one of the most sophisticated, has allowed missiles through.
• The threat of mass swarms created by cheap drones will make these defense systems even less effective. Ironically, the very AI enabled by these centers could accelerate the proliferation and design of even cheaper and more lethal drones.
• Lack of Adequate Risk Assessment
• Despite these obvious vulnerabilities, physical security has “barely registered in the public debate”.
• The “deals’ architects”—tech executives and venture capitalists—are knowledgeable about cybersecurity but poorly equipped to assess the physical threats posed by adversaries armed with drones and missiles.
• It is crucial for the administration to work with companies on rigorous threat assessments, building in redundancy, and ensuring robust air defense coverage, all while ensuring the U.S. does not bear the billions of dollars in cost.

In essence, building these critical AI data centers in the Gulf is like constructing a complex, high-tech factory for future innovation on an active volcano, right next to a known earthquake fault line. The potential for disruption from even seemingly small threats, like cheap drones, could have catastrophic global consequences for an increasingly AI-integrated world.

AI Data Centers: Drone Vulnerability in the Gulf

The construction of massive artificial intelligence (AI) data centers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, funded by Gulf sovereign wealth and built with U.S. technology, faces significant vulnerability to drone attacks. This concern is heightened by the intensifying risk posed by cheap drones.

Here’s a detailed discussion of drone attack vulnerability:

• Real-World Precedent and Growing Threat: The risks posed by drones are not theoretical.
• In 2019, Iran used a barrage of drones and missiles to strike Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, which knocked out roughly half of the kingdom’s crude output overnight.
• Since these 2019 attacks, the threat from drone warfare has become even more potent. Ukraine, for instance, has demonstrated drones’ capability to destroy strategic aircraft deep in enemy territory.
• Drones can carry payloads that can cause extensive damage, such as melting the armor of tanks. They are also cheap, making them advantageous for weaker non-state actors, including Iran’s regional proxies.
• Specific Vulnerabilities of AI Data Centers:
• The planned data centers in the UAE are set to sprawl over 10 square miles, which makes them “sitting ducks” for attacks.
• Their most critical components, such as chillers that cool high-performance servers, are exposed. These chillers are also “hard to armor without compromising function and difficult to replace quickly”.
• Even a single, small drone carrying a shaped charge or incendiary device could disable a cooling system, forcing a data center offline. This could potentially ruin “long, expensive AI training runs”.
• The “second- and third-order global effects” of a data center going offline could be “extraordinary,” especially as AI becomes increasingly integrated into essential services.
• Challenges in Defense: While extensive site defenses are necessary, they come with significant limitations.
• Defenses would need to go far beyond basic security measures like fences and cameras, requiring “well-hardened perimeters, specialized nets, gun emplacements, drone-jamming capabilities and sophisticated, multilayered air defenses”.
• These advanced defense systems are “very costly”. Furthermore, some high-end air defense systems are in “high demand elsewhere in the world,” particularly in Taiwan and Ukraine.
• Even with robust hardening, these data centers will remain vulnerable, as “no missile defense system can shoot down every threat”. For example, Israel’s Iron Dome, one of the most sophisticated systems globally, “has allowed several missiles through”.
• The “threat of mass swarms created by cheap drones is bound to make these systems even less effective”.
• Ironically, the very AI enabled by these data centers could “accelerate the proliferation and design of even cheaper and more lethal drones”.
• Lack of Adequate Risk Assessment and Strategic Implications:
• Despite these obvious vulnerabilities, the “physical security has barely registered in the public debate“.
• The “deals’ architects”—tech executives and venture capitalists—are knowledgeable about cybersecurity but “poorly equipped to assess the physical threats” posed by adversaries with drones and missiles.
• This underappreciated physical risk contributes to a deeper problem of “strategic entanglement,” creating a new U.S. national interest in a region that successive U.S. presidents have sought to disengage from.
• The sources describe this as a “major unforced error,” drawing a parallel to the U.S. trying to onshore advanced semiconductor production from Taiwan (another geopolitical hotspot) while simultaneously approving the offshoring of critical AI data centers to a similarly conflict-prone region.

Building these crucial AI data centers in a region highly susceptible to drone attacks is akin to founding a central bank for the digital economy on a seismic fault line known for frequent tremors, where the very technology you’re housing could inadvertently make future tremors more destructive.

Gulf AI Centers: Geopolitical Risks and Vulnerabilities

The Gulf region, specifically the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, is slated to host some of the world’s most powerful AI computing clusters through massive AI data centers funded by Gulf sovereign wealth and built with U.S. technology. While initially hailed as a triumph of commercial diplomacy that would open a “trillion-dollar floodgate of gulf capital for U.S. tech firms” and tie Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to the American AI stack, this optimistic narrative “always glossed over” significant underlying risks.

Here are the key risks associated with building AI data centers in the Gulf region:

• High Vulnerability to Physical Attacks, Especially by Drones:
• This is the primary and most pressing concern. The risk from “cheap drones is intensifying”.
• The vulnerability is not theoretical; in 2019, Iran used a “barrage of drones and missiles to strike Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities,” crippling a significant portion of their crude output. Since then, drone warfare has become even more potent, as seen in Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb” which destroyed strategic Russian aircraft deep in enemy territory. Drones are “cheap” and can carry payloads capable of extensive damage, making them advantageous for “weaker non-state actors,” such as Iran’s regional proxies.
• The planned data centers in the UAE will “sprawl over 10 square miles,” effectively making them “sitting ducks for attacks”. Their “most critical components,” such as chillers that cool high-performance servers, are exposed, difficult to armor without compromising function, and hard to replace quickly.
• Even a “single, small drone carrying a shaped charge or incendiary device could disable one of these cooling systems,” forcing a data center offline and potentially “ruining long, expensive AI training runs”. The “second- and third-order global effects” of such an outage could be “extraordinary,” especially as AI becomes “more integrated into essential services”.
• Limitations of Defenses Against Physical Threats:
• While “extensive site defenses” are necessary, including “well-hardened perimeters, specialized nets, gun emplacements, drone-jamming capabilities and sophisticated, multilayered air defenses,” these systems are “very costly”.
• Furthermore, high-end air defense systems are in “high demand elsewhere in the world,” particularly in Taiwan and Ukraine.
• Even with robust hardening, data centers “will remain vulnerable” because “no missile defense system can shoot down every threat”. For instance, Israel’s “Iron Dome,” despite its sophistication, “has allowed several missiles through”.
• The “threat of mass swarms created by cheap drones is bound to make these systems even less effective”. Ironically, the very AI that these centers will enable could also “accelerate the proliferation and design of even cheaper and more lethal drones”.
• Cybersecurity Risks and Relationships with China:
• The initial optimistic view about these deals “always glossed over cybersecurity risks”.
• It also overlooked the “robust relationships with China” that these Gulf states maintain.
• Strategic Entanglement and Geopolitical Instability:
• Beyond the physical and cyber threats, a “deeper risk” is “strategic entanglement”. The sheer scale of this plan would “unnecessarily create a new national interest” for the U.S. in a region that successive U.S. presidents have “sought to draw down from”.
• While Gulf leaders might welcome new ways to “cement U.S. security commitments,” their interests may not align with those of the United States, which “should not risk building the digital future on a geopolitical fault line”.
• Lack of Adequate Risk Assessment by “Architects”:
• Despite the “obvious vulnerabilities,” “physical security has barely registered in the public debate”.
• The “deals’ architects—tech executives and venture capitalists—understand cybersecurity, but they are poorly equipped to assess the physical threats posed by adversaries armed with drones and missiles”. This highlights a critical need for “rigorous threat assessments, building in redundancy and working to ensure robust air defense coverage”.

In essence, approving the construction of these critical AI data centers in the Gulf is viewed as a “major unforced error”. It’s akin to building the world’s most advanced digital brain in a glass house on a known battlefield, where the very technology you’re developing could enhance the projectiles aimed at it.

AI Data Centers: Gulf Region’s Drone Vulnerability

The physical security of the massive artificial intelligence (AI) data centers being constructed in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia presents significant vulnerabilities to attack from hostile actors, particularly from drones.

Here’s a detailed breakdown of these physical security concerns:

• Location in a High-Risk Region: The decision to build “some of the largest and most powerful computing clusters in the world” in the Gulf region, specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia, places them in “locations highly vulnerable to attack”. This is especially concerning as “the risk from cheap drones is intensifying”.
• Intensifying Drone Threat:
• Real-world Precedent: The risks are not merely theoretical. In 2019, Iran launched a “barrage of drones and missiles to strike Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities,” which resulted in knocking out “roughly half of the kingdom’s crude output overnight”.
• Evolving Capabilities: Since those 2019 attacks, the threat from drone warfare has become even more potent. Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb” provides an example, where drones were used to destroy “strategic aircraft deep in Russian territory”. Drones can carry “payloads that melt the armor of Russian tanks”.
• Asymmetric Advantage: Because they are “cheap,” drones often provide an advantage to “weaker non-state actors,” such as “Iran’s regional proxies”.
• Vulnerabilities of Data Center Infrastructure:
• Scale and Exposure: The planned data centers in the UAE will “sprawl over 10 square miles,” effectively making them “sitting ducks for attacks”.
• Critical Exposed Components: Their “most critical components—such as chillers that cool high-performance servers—[are] exposed, hard to armor without compromising function and and difficult to replace quickly”.
• Potential for Significant Damage: Even a “single, small drone carrying a shaped charge or incendiary device could disable one of these cooling systems,” which would force the entire data center offline and potentially “ruining long, expensive AI training runs”. A “barrage of drone strikes, especially if combined with ballistic missiles, as in 2019, could do extensive damage”. The “second- and third-order global effects of a center going down could be extraordinary, especially as AI becomes more integrated into essential services”.
• Challenges in Defense:
• Complex and Costly Defenses: Protecting these facilities would require “extensive site defenses” that go “far beyond installing fences or cameras”. These would include “well-hardened perimeters, specialized nets, gun emplacements, drone-jamming capabilities and sophisticated, multilayered air defenses”. Such systems are “very costly”.
• High Demand for Air Defense: High-end air defense systems are in “high demand elsewhere in the world,” particularly in “Taiwan and Ukraine,” which could complicate their acquisition or allocation to the Gulf region.
• Inherent Limitations: Even with robust hardening and advanced defense systems, “no missile defense system can shoot down every threat”. For example, “Israel’s Iron Dome, one of the most sophisticated in the world, has allowed several missiles through in the face of recent attacks”.
• Swarm Attacks: The “threat of mass swarms created by cheap drones is bound to make these systems even less effective”.
• AI Paradox: Ironically, the very “AI that these centers will enable could also accelerate the proliferation and design of even cheaper and more lethal drones,” potentially exacerbating the threat they face.
• Lack of Adequate Assessment: Despite these “obvious vulnerabilities, physical security has barely registered in the public debate”. The “deals’ architects—tech executives and venture capitalists—understand cybersecurity, but they are poorly equipped to assess the physical threats posed by adversaries armed with drones and missiles”. There is a critical need for the administration to “grapple much more seriously with physical risks through rigorous threat assessments, building in redundancy and working to ensure robust air defense coverage,” without the U.S. having to bear the “billions of dollars this will cost”.

In essence, constructing these vital AI data centers in the Gulf region is akin to building a state-of-the-art supercomputer in a known warzone, where the very technology you’re developing has the potential to make the incoming threats even more potent and difficult to defend against.

AI Data Centers and Strategic Entanglement in the Gulf

The construction of massive AI data centers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, while initially seen as a commercial diplomacy success, presents a “deeper risk” known as strategic entanglement.

Here’s a discussion of strategic entanglement in this context:

• Creation of a New U.S. National Interest: The “sheer scale” of the plan to host some of the world’s most powerful AI computing clusters in the Gulf would “unnecessarily create a new national interest” for the United States in the region. This is contrary to the approach of successive U.S. presidents who have “sought to draw down from” the region, indicating a desire to reduce U.S. commitments and presence there.
• Gulf Leaders’ Motivations: For Gulf leaders, entangling the U.S. deeper in the region is a key part of the plan’s appeal. They “naturally want new ways to cement U.S. security commitments,” effectively hoping that the presence of such critical infrastructure would obligate the U.S. to protect it, and by extension, their stability.
• Diverging Interests: However, the sources emphasize that the interests of Gulf leaders “are not those of the United States”. The U.S. should not “risk building the digital future on a geopolitical fault line,” given the region’s inherent instability and vulnerability to attacks, especially from drones.
• Contradiction in U.S. Policy: This move appears to contradict other strategic U.S. efforts. For instance, Washington is “spending tens of billions of dollars trying to onshore another core strategic technology, advanced semiconductor production, from a geopolitical hotspot, Taiwan”. To then approve the “offshoring of the data centers that will house so many of the resulting chips to another conflict-prone region” like the Gulf is described as a “major unforced error” that will be “difficult to reverse”.

In essence, strategic entanglement in this context means that by allowing crucial AI infrastructure to be built in a volatile region, the United States risks becoming inextricably tied to its security and stability. It’s like building the command center of a global digital network on a bridge in a known earthquake zone; while beneficial for the region, it creates an ongoing, involuntary security obligation and vulnerability for the builder.

By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog

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