God, Reason, and Suffering

This collection of texts examines philosophical discussions surrounding the existence and nature of God, primarily focusing on the viewpoints of C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell. It explores Lewis’s arguments, particularly regarding the problem of pain and the argument from reason, often positioning them in contrast to the skepticism of Hume and Russell. The material also addresses topics such as the design argument, the role of faith and reason in belief formation, and the essence of true religion according to these thinkers, highlighting both their disagreements and unexpected points of common ground.

C. S. Lewis’s Arguments for Christianity

Based on the sources provided, C. S. Lewis is presented as one of the most beloved Christian apologists of the twentieth century. The book excerpts provided place him in conversation with major critics of Christianity, David Hume and Bertrand Russell, to explore life’s challenging questions. The discussion centers on Lewis’s views on topics including the existence of God, suffering, morality, reason, joy, miracles, and faith. While differences exist, the source notes that surprising areas of agreement emerge between these thinkers.

Lewis’s journey to Christianity is described as a gradual and complex process. He was raised Christian but became an atheist in his early teens. By age seventeen, he believed in no religion, viewing Christianity as just “one mythology among many”. His return was influenced by figures like H. V. V. Dyson, J. R. R. Tolkien, George MacDonald, G. K. Chesterton, and Owen Barfield. His route involved a progression from materialism to idealism, then to Pantheism, Theism, and finally Christianity. This culminated in a moment in late September 1931 when he came to believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. About a month later, he described the story of Christ as a “true myth: a myth working on us in the same way as the others, but with this tremendous difference that it really happened”.

Much of Lewis’s work discussed in the source is presented as addressing philosophical challenges to Christian belief.

Response to the Problem of Pain:

• Lewis grappled with the problem of evil, devoting his first book of Christian apologetics, The Problem of Pain (published in 1940), to this issue. The source suggests this work was a direct response to Hume’s presentation of the problem in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
• Lewis confronts the problem in its simple form: “If God were good, He would wish to make His creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty He would be able to do what He wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore God either lacks goodness, or power, or both”.
• Lewis argues that understanding God’s omnipotence and goodness, and the true nature of human happiness, helps explain why God might permit suffering. He defines omnipotence not as the ability to do absolutely anything, but the ability to bring about any situation that is intrinsically possible.
• A key part of his attempt to solve the problem is a version of the free will defense. Lewis argues that a society of free souls where no soul can inflict pain on another is an intrinsic impossibility. If God creates a society of free agents, He thereby makes suffering possible.
• Lewis’s discussion of divine goodness focuses on God’s love for humanity. He argues that God’s desire is for humans to have “true happiness” (freely loving God and striving to become “Christlike”), not just “false happiness” (comfortable, pleasant earthly lives).
• Suffering, according to Lewis, can be one of the tools God uses to transform humans and nudge them toward genuine happiness, while leaving their freedom intact. Natural suffering can play a “remedial or corrective” role. This contrasts with a view of God’s goodness as merely concerned with making people feel good; it is a “real, terrible goodness that is concerned with making you become good”. Lewis describes God’s love as an “intolerable compliment”.
• Regarding the argument that suffering disproves God’s existence (If God were perfect, there’d be no suffering; there is suffering; therefore God isn’t perfect), Lewis would likely reject the premise that God’s moral perfection requires Him to desire a world devoid of suffering more than anything else. He holds there is at least one good more important than a pain-free world, which might require suffering.
• The source notes criticisms of Lewis’s solution, including its potential incompleteness in accounting for all human suffering, particularly the suffering of children that does not appear to serve a victim-improving or punitive function. Beversluis raised objections, such as the idea that if pain is God’s tool for nudging people towards Him, then the absence of pain in some (like psychopaths) might suggest God doesn’t love all humans or provide them the means to recognize their need for Him (the “problem of not enough pain”).
• Lewis distinguishes between a defense (showing the compatibility of evil and God) and a theodicy (providing an actual explanation for why God permits evil). While some remarks suggest he aimed only for a defense, the nature of his arguments and his distinct treatments of different kinds of suffering suggest he aimed for at least a partial theodicy, if not a complete one covering all suffering.

Positive Case for Christianity (Arguments for a Higher Power):

Lewis’s positive case involves arguments for a transcendent being, a Higher Power. He views this case as having two components: arguing for a Higher Power distinct from nature and arguing for the specific claims of Christianity, such as the Resurrection. Lewis looks to human nature rather than the physical universe for evidence of a Higher Power, suggesting that human nature cannot be explained by Nature alone. He identifies three features pointing to a Higher Power: human morality, the capacity to reason, and a desire he calls “Joy”. These form a cumulative-case argument, not intended as decisive proofs individually, but gaining force together.

1. The Moral Argument:

• Based on “Lewisian moral phenomena,” particularly what Lewis calls “the Law of Nature” (our sense of right and wrong and the fact that we break it).
• The argument is that these moral phenomena exist, and the best explanation for them is a Higher Power. This Power is inferred to be good and mindlike because it is “intensely interested… in fair play, unselfishness, courage, good faith, honesty and truthfulness”.
• Lewis explicitly rejects relying on the design argument from the physical universe, agreeing with Hume that it wouldn’t point to a good God.
• The source discusses Bertrand Russell’s objection: if God is good, He must conform to a moral law; if He created that law, He isn’t subject to it and thus cannot be good in the sense of obeying a law. Lewis rejects the idea that God is a “mere executor of a law somehow external and antecedent to His own being”.
• Lewis offers potential responses to how God can be good without obeying an external moral law, including the complex idea that “God is not merely good, but goodness; goodness is not merely divine, but God”.
• The source also explores Lewis’s attack on Dualism (the view of two equal good and bad powers) as a way to strengthen his moral argument. However, it suggests the argument against Dualism might fail if certain conceptions of divine goodness are true.

1. The Argument from Reason:

• Presented in Miracles, this argument aims to refute Naturalism (the doctrine that only Nature exists).
• Lewis argues that Naturalism cannot account for human reasoning. He distinguishes between causation (Cause and Effect) and the relationship between ground and consequent in reasoning (Ground and Consequence).
• A key premise is that one thought can both entail and cause another thought only if the first thought is known to entail the second. Lewis suggests Naturalism cannot adequately explain how thoughts can be both effects of natural processes and be about or derived from other thoughts in a logically grounded way.
• Doubt about the compatibility of naturalism and knowledge was a main intellectual component of Lewis’s move away from naturalism, credited partly to Owen Barfield.

1. The Argument from Desire:

• Based on an innate, natural human desire Lewis calls “Joy”.
• The argument is structured: all normal humans have a natural desire for something beyond the natural world (Joy); every innate, natural desire can be satisfied; therefore, Joy can be satisfied; if Joy can be satisfied, there is something beyond the natural world.
• Lewis notes that earthly experiences might awaken or point towards this desire, but nothing on earth can fully satisfy it.

Miracles and the Resurrection:

• Lewis addresses the plausibility of miracles, particularly the Resurrection of Christ, in his book Miracles, partly as a direct response to Hume’s essay “Of Miracles”.
• He poses philosophical questions: Are Christian miracles possible? How probable are they independently of historical evidence, and how probable are they when evidence is included?.
• Lewis rejects the idea that miracles are impossible because Naturalism is true, using his argument from reason against Naturalism.
• He criticizes Hume’s argument against miracles, suggesting it is circular because it assumes the near-perfect uniformity of nature, which can only be justified if we trust our sense of fitness, which in turn requires a supernatural source of rationality.
• Lewis introduces the concept of the “fitness” of the Incarnation, arguing it coheres with and explains other features of the universe. He identifies several features found in both nature and the Incarnation, such as the composite existence of humans, patterns of descent and re-ascent, selectiveness, and vicariousness (Christ suffering for humanity). He also suggests the Christian view explains aspects like finding dirty jokes funny (connected to the Fall of Man).
• Lewis argues that establishing the “fitness” of the Incarnation is a preliminary philosophical project to show that its probability is high enough that, when historical evidence is considered, belief in its occurrence is reasonable.

The Trilemma:

• One version of Lewis’s famous “Trilemma” appears in Mere Christianity: a man who said the things Jesus said would be either a lunatic, a liar (“the Devil of Hell”), or God. Lewis argues it’s obvious Christ was neither lunatic nor liar, leading to the conclusion that He was and is God.
• The source notes that Lewis places the Trilemma later in his apologetic works, suggesting he saw the need for a philosophical foundation (like the arguments for a Higher Power and the fitness of the Incarnation) before the Trilemma becomes convincing. Without such foundation, the Trilemma is likened to concluding Christ was an “alien robot” because he wasn’t a lunatic or liar.

Faith and Belief:

• Lewis distinguishes the initial assent to Christian propositions from the later adherence to them, which he discusses in “On Obstinacy in Belief”.
• He appears to suggest that Christians praise adherence to belief even when apparent evidence is against it. However, the source argues this isn’t a radical break from his view that belief should accord with evidence.
• Lewis is primarily thinking of suffering as the kind of apparent evidence against Christianity. He uses analogies of trusting a friend despite delay or trusting someone helping us through a dangerous situation despite appearances.
• Lewis’s view is that suffering without obvious explanation may seem like evidence against Christianity, but a fuller understanding (within the Christian framework) reveals it is not genuine evidence against Christianity. The vast difference between human and divine knowledge means we cannot fully assess the situation, and trusting God is the highest prudence. This approach, the source notes, is consistent with believing in accordance with all available evidence, as the apparent evidence isn’t seen as conclusive.

Other Views:

• Lewis’s understanding of God’s omnipotence is that it is the ability to bring about anything intrinsically possible. Using means to achieve goals (like God using suffering to transform humans) does not imply a lack of power if bringing about the end directly is intrinsically impossible (like freely given love).
• Lewis’s concept of “true religion” is described as the “thirst for an end higher than natural ends; the finite self’s desire for, and acquiescence in, and self-rejection in favour of, an object wholly good and wholly good for it”. The source notes striking similarity between this and Bertrand Russell’s definition, both seeing the struggle against the finite self as central.
• Lewis opposed religious compulsion. He suggested a separation between state-governed marriage and church-governed marriage. He argued against the government instilling Christianity through education, believing Christianity itself places limits on state power. He also opposed a Christian political party, fearing it would claim to represent the whole of Christendom and potentially lead to dangerous consequences like justifying treachery and murder.
• Lewis believed that sincere prayer, even to an imperfectly conceived true God or a false god, is accepted by the true God, and that Christ saves many who don’t think they know Him.

The source concludes by stating that Lewis’s proposed solution to the problem of pain is incomplete, his cumulative case for a Higher Power is not “terribly weighty,” and consequently, his foundation for the historical case for the Resurrection fails. However, it acknowledges that Lewis raises significant puzzles for both atheists and Christians.

David Hume’s Philosophical Contributions and Criticisms

Based on the sources provided, here is a discussion of David Hume:

David Hume (1711–1776) is presented as one of the three central intellectual figures in conversation in the book, alongside C. S. Lewis and Bertrand Russell. He is recognized as a giant in the Western philosophical tradition, particularly influential in the philosophy of religion. The editors of a book critically examining his religious views observe that the vast majority of philosophical attacks against the rationality of theism since his time have borne an “unmistakable Humean aroma”.

Hume is counted among Christianity’s most important critics. He, like Bertrand Russell, rejected the notion of a personal, loving God, admitting at best a distant, largely unknowable Deity that does not involve itself in human affairs. Unlike Lewis, who saw earthly life as a small part of overall existence, Hume and Russell viewed such lives as all we experience. Despite his criticisms of religion, the sources note that if the ability to face death without fear is a measure of a great philosopher, then Hume was one. His friend James Boswell was both fascinated and horrified by Hume’s calm acceptance of his impending death, especially as Hume did not believe in an afterlife. Hume himself wrote about facing his mortal illness with little pain and no abatement of his spirits, even suggesting he might choose to live this later period of his life over again.

A significant portion of the sources discusses Hume’s views on key philosophical topics:

• The Problem of Evil: Hume is central to the discussion of the challenge that suffering poses for belief in God. Lewis’s first book of Christian apologetics, The Problem of Pain, is described as a direct response to Hume’s presentation of the problem in Parts X and XI of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Although Lewis doesn’t mention Hume in The Problem of Pain, external evidence suggests Lewis, who studied philosophy at Oxford, likely read the Dialogues, a major work in the philosophy of religion. Internal evidence from the works themselves supports this connection. In the Dialogues, the problem of evil is raised by the characters Demea and Philo, and the sources suggest that the challenge presented there is never satisfactorily answered in Hume’s works, indicating that he considered it a serious problem for which he had no solution. Philo, playing the skeptic, uses the presence of suffering to criticize the idea of a powerful, wise, and good God, suggesting that such a God would have created a world without the sources of suffering we observe.
• Miracles: Hume’s views on miracles are a key topic, particularly his essay “Of Miracles” from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Although he discusses miracles in general, the historical context and his references to the dead being raised make it clear his central concern is the Resurrection of Christ. Hume’s main assault on miracles is found in this essay. He argues that testimony (of a certain kind) never provides a good reason to believe that a miracle has occurred. This has the implication that it would not be reasonable to believe in the Resurrection based on New Testament testimony. Hume’s central argument, according to the source, concludes that it is never reasonable to believe a miracle has occurred based on religious testimony alone. He bases this on experience and a “Probability Principle”: belief should be proportional to evidence, weighing opposing experiences. He defines a law of nature as a regularity for which there is abundant experience-based evidence and no counterevidence (excluding religious testimony). A miracle is a violation of such a law. Hume argues that our experience provides a “proof” that a miracle did not occur (excluding religious testimony). Furthermore, he argues that religious testimony is notoriously unreliable due to factors like the love of wonder and the spirit of religion. Applying his Probability Principle, Hume concludes that for any religious testimony for a miracle, the falsity of the testimony is more likely than the occurrence of the miracle. Thus, a wise person would believe the testimony is false rather than the miracle occurred. Lewis criticizes Hume’s argument, notably suggesting it is circular because it relies on the uniformity of nature, which itself requires justification.
• Morality: Hume seeks a naturalistic explanation for certain widely shared moral beliefs, agreeing with Lewis that such beliefs are common, but disagreeing with Lewis’s theistic explanation. Hume appeals to universal emotional dispositions within human nature, primarily “humanity” (benevolence or friendship for human kind), which is universal in distribution and object. He thinks moral judgments are rooted in emotions, and humanity explains why judgments against actions like tyrannical behavior are universal. Another important disposition is “the love of fame,” which he believes encourages virtuous behavior through concern for how others view us. These insights are considered plausible, but Lewis argues they merely push the question back: why are these emotional dispositions part of human nature?.
• Reason and its Limits: Understanding the nature and limits of human reason was a central goal for Hume, who saw himself as much a psychologist as a philosopher. He aimed to delineate what human reason could yield knowledge about and what lay beyond its reach, hoping to end “abstruse philosophy”. His investigation reveals gaps in what reason can do, famously exemplified by the problem of induction. Hume notes that inferences from experience (like assuming future bread will nourish based on past experience) suppose that the future will resemble the past, a supposition not established by philosophical argument. While he doesn’t deny that such inferences can be “justly inferred,” he argues they aren’t made by reason. Instead, he identifies “Custom or Habit” as the “great guide of human life” that enables these inferences and is essential for action and much speculation beyond immediate experience. Beliefs produced by custom, according to Hume, can have warrant and constitute knowledge even if not based on philosophical argument. He believes in what are called “properly basic beliefs”—beliefs with warrant not derived from other beliefs, which are often simply obvious. The belief that the future will resemble the past is one such properly basic belief.
• Evidentialism: Hume is not a straightforward evidentialist, but a “qualified evidentialist”. He believes some beliefs are properly basic and justified without external evidence. However, for beliefs that are not basic, he holds that one should always believe in accordance with the available evidence. The sources note that Lewis and Russell also hold this qualified evidentialist view.
• Argument from Design: Hume is significantly involved in discussions of the argument from design, largely through the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes defends a version of this argument, which is criticized by Philo and Demea. Philo questions the fundamental premise that the universe resembles man-made machines. The sources discuss the difficulty in pinpointing Hume’s own view, noting that the Dialogues is an attempt to work out the implications of three ideas he grappled with: skepticism about human reason concerning God, the apparent intelligent design of the universe, and the force of the problem of evil. Philo’s final “compromise position” in the Dialogues is presented as the best guess about Hume’s own views: human reason can only conclude that the cause of the universe is “something like a human mind,” but its nature is vague and beyond reason’s grasp. This position aligns with Hume’s acceptance of “Hume’s Conditional,” which states that if our knowledge of God is based solely on the observable physical universe, we cannot know that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
• True Religion vs. Popular Religion: Hume distinguishes between “true religion” (natural religion based on unaided reason) and “popular religion” (“religion as it has commonly been found in the world”). Humean true religion, derived from Philo’s compromise position, concludes only that the cause of the universe is vaguely mind-like. This yields emotional responses of astonishment, melancholy, and contempt for the limitations of reason. True religion has minimal implications for daily life, action, or politics and offers no certainties about an afterlife. In contrast, Hume views popular religion as “sick men’s dreams” or “playsome whimsies of monkeys in human shape,” often rooted in irrational emotions like terror (superstition) or elation (enthusiasm). He criticizes specific popular religious doctrines, such as Catholic transubstantiation and likely Christian doctrines like the Trinity and Incarnation, suggesting they conflict with reason or obvious truths. While skepticism might psychologically lead some to revealed religion, Hume suggests this move is irrational. Thus, Hume likely counts reformed Christianity among the corruptions of true religion.

Overall, the sources portray Hume as a profound skeptic regarding traditional religious claims based on reason or testimony, while also acknowledging his grappling with the apparent design in the universe and the challenge of evil. His philosophical project sought to understand the limits of human understanding, leading him to emphasize the role of natural instinct and custom where reason falls short.

Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy and Criticism of Religion

Based on the provided sources, here is a discussion of Bertrand Russell:

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) is presented as one of the three central intellectual figures in conversation in the book, alongside C. S. Lewis and David Hume. He is counted among Christianity’s most important critics, and like Hume, he is considered a giant in the Western philosophical tradition. While his reputation for greatness is more due to his contributions in logic and the philosophy of science, his views on religion are significant.

Like Hume, Russell rejected the notion of a personal, loving God, admitting at best a distant, largely unknowable Deity that does not involve itself in human affairs. He viewed earthly lives as all we get, in contrast to Lewis who saw them as a tiny fraction of overall existence.

If the ability to face death without fear is a measure of a great philosopher, then Russell was one, alongside Lewis and Hume. In the Postscript to his autobiography, Russell reflected on his long life and work. He noted both failures and victories, but his final remarks indicated an underlying optimism rooted in the pursuit of a vision, both personal (caring for what is noble, beautiful, gentle) and social (imagining a society where individuals grow freely and hate, greed, and envy die). He believed these things sustained him as death loomed. He described an ideal human existence as being like a river that grows wider, its banks recede, and its waters flow quietly before merging painlessly into the sea; a person who sees their life this way in old age will not suffer from the fear of death because the things they care for will continue.

Russell was by far the most politically active of the three thinkers. His activism was triggered by the outbreak of the first World War in 1914, which he said shattered the “Victorian optimism” of his youth. He wrote letters and articles, gave speeches, started a school, and won the Nobel Prize for Literature. He also spent time in prison, including six months in 1918 for writing an antiwar article.

A significant theme discussed is Russell’s perspective on belief formation and what constitutes “faith”:

• Russell thought faith was a vice, defining it as believing a proposition when there is no good reason for believing it. He contrasted this with the virtue of veracity, truthfulness, or intellectual integrity.
• He characterized veracity as the habit of deciding questions based on the evidence or leaving them undecided if the evidence is inconclusive.
• Russell showed particular scorn for advocating belief in propositions not because they are true or supported by evidence, but for other reasons, such as the good consequences of widespread acceptance.
• He maintained that knowledge is one of the essential ingredients in a good human life, and veracity is more likely to lead to knowledge than faith.
• He described a free thinker as someone free from tradition and their own passions when forming beliefs, bowing only to the evidence. Such a person avoids intellectual cowardice, which involves believing claims despite lack of evidence due to fear.
• Russell is described as a qualified evidentialist, believing that for beliefs that are not basic, one should always believe in accordance with the available evidence. Lewis is said to be in complete agreement with Russell on the importance of regulating beliefs according to evidence.
• Both Russell and Lewis saw human emotion as among the primary obstacles to proper belief formation. Russell thought that religion is primarily based on fear – terror of the unknown, fear of defeat, fear of death – which causes belief in harmful superstitions, including Christianity.
• Russell urged people not to be swayed by moods but to look closely at irrationality and not let it dominate, lest they remain vacillating creatures swayed by reason and infantile folly. Lewis expresses a similar idea about moods and faith.
• While they agreed on following the evidence, Russell and Lewis disagreed about where the evidence leads regarding Christianity.

Russell also critically examined arguments for the existence of God and religious claims:

• He was a critic of the moral argument, considering and rejecting one similar to Lewis’s. He argued that if the difference between right and wrong is due to God’s command, then for God Himself there is no difference. He claimed that a being (even God) can only be good by conforming actions to a moral law of which it is not the author (referred to as RC). This view implies God cannot be both good and the author of the moral law. Russell concluded from this that moral arguments like Lewis’s fail. Lewis, however, concluded that RC is false.
• Regarding the origin of conscience, Russell suggested that its deliverances vary widely from person to person and across ages and places. He used human sacrifice as an example. He argued this variation is evidence that conscience has an earthly origin, not divine. He saw conscience as stored-up discomfort from past disapproval or conditioning, particularly in early youth. He believed the feeling of ‘ought’ is an echo of what one was told by parents or nurses. He argued that the variation indicates conscience is entirely a product of education/conditioning, which can instill precepts that seem like the voice of God but are merely an illusion. The sources note that while Russell gives examples of variation, his argument requires establishing the absence of universal moral precepts, which his examples at best only support the presence of disagreement. He did not address alleged universal precepts presented by Lewis.
• Concerning the argument from design, Russell endorsed Hume’s conditional, which states that if our knowledge of God is based solely on the observable physical universe, we cannot know that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. He supported this by arguing that judging the Creator by the creation implies God is partly good and partly bad, liking things like poetry, music, and art, but also war and slaughter. He thought a perfect God could and would have created a better universe than the one we observe. Russell, like Hume and Lewis, saw the evil in the universe as a major stumbling block for arguments for the traditional God of Christianity.
• Russell sometimes endorsed the view that Darwin’s theory of evolution explains adaptation without needing design. He also seemed to support J. S. Mill’s argument that indications of Design are actually evidence against the Designer’s Omnipotence, as contrivance suggests limitation of power. The sources mention Lewis criticizing Mill’s underlying principle, which would mean Russell’s Mill-inspired argument fails.
• Russell presented another way to argue for Hume’s conditional: there are many equally probable hypotheses about the nature of the Designer that explain the observable universe, so there’s no reason to favor one implying a perfect God. He listed possibilities like a Deity doing its best under difficulties, doing its worst but unable to prevent good, having purely aesthetic purposes, or creating for drama and spectacle. He believed that in the absence of evidence, we shouldn’t favor hypotheses we find agreeable.
• On the argument from desire, Russell appeared to reject the notion that all our natural, innate desires can be satisfied, using the analogy that hunger doesn’t prove one will get food.

Russell’s views on true religion are also discussed:

• In his best-known writings, Russell gave the impression that religion in all its forms is an evil with almost no redeeming value. He regarded it as a “disease born of fear and as a source of untold misery to the human race”. He admitted only two useful contributions of religion to civilization: fixing the calendar and chronicling eclipses.
• He saw Christianity as rooted in irrational emotions rather than reason, considering it a “sick man’s dream from which Western civilization ought to awaken”. He believed rejecting its doctrines was the way to avoid the violence it sometimes engenders.
• However, in other writings, Russell maintained that elements of religion are worth preserving. He attempted to isolate the beneficial elements that could survive the decay of traditional beliefs, arguing that the essential good elements are not the dogmas (like belief in God or Christ’s divinity) but a certain outlook on the universe.
• He distinguished between the finite self (seeing the world centered around the “here and now” and oneself) and the infinite self (shining impartially, aiming at the good regardless of who possesses it). He defined the essence of religion as the conquest of the finite self by the infinite self. This conquest requires a moment of absolute self-surrender, which feels like a “death” to the finite self.
• This conquest yields a desire to make the world as good as possible, calm acceptance of unavoidable evils, and universal love for one’s fellow human beings. These elements are interconnected and can exist without dogma. Russell suggested that in a non-theistic religion, love of God is replaced by worship of the ideal good, but love for fellow humans should be preserved. This universal love is given indifferently, does not demand that the object be delightful or good, and breaks down the walls of self.
• His account of the essence of religion is noted as strikingly similar to Lewis’s. Both agreed on the importance of impartial love for all human beings. Russell sought to abandon dogma but preserve the essence, while Lewis saw acceptance of Christian dogma as key to preserving it.
• He endorsed a turn to mysticism as a way to preserve the benefits of monotheistic religions while avoiding conflicts over dogma.

Finally, the sources highlight some areas of agreement among Russell, Hume, and Lewis:

• All three reject the view that one can reason from the observable physical universe to the existence of a perfect God.
• All three recognized the potential for explosive violence in organized religion and were aware of Christianity’s failings in this regard.
• Most importantly, all three shared a common prescription for how humans ought to form their beliefs: Follow the evidence!.
• All three saw governmental interference as an obstacle to following this prescription. They believed intellectual honesty requires a political system that permits it, though the valuing of honesty must come from within individuals.
• The sources conclude that Lewis, Hume, and Russell shared a burning passion for the truth and reverence for evidence, which united them and makes them exemplars.

The Problem of Evil: Hume, Lewis, and Russell

The “problem of evil” is a central theme discussed in the sources, presented as a significant challenge for belief in a traditional, perfect God. It is a key point of conversation between C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell.

The problem is often posed as a question: If an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God exists, why does the world contain evil?. More aggressively, it is posed as a challenge: If such a God existed, the world wouldn’t contain the evils it does; therefore, no such God exists.

Hume’s Presentation of the Problem

David Hume grappled with the problem of evil, dedicating two sections (Parts X and XI) of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to it. The sources note that the problem of evil raised by Demea and Philo in the Dialogues is never satisfactorily answered, suggesting Hume considered it a serious challenge for which he had no complete answer. This discussion in the Dialogues sets the stage for Lewis’s work, The Problem of Pain.

Hume’s character, Philo, suggests that reflecting on human suffering will lead to doubt about the existence of a good God altogether. Philo describes human life as cursed and polluted, filled with perpetual war, necessity, hunger, fear, anxiety, terror, weakness, impotence, and distress, ending in agony and horror.

Philo argues that the suffering in the world provides a basis for a decisive objection to the design argument. Traditional monotheism posits an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God. Philo’s point is that the presence of suffering blocks the inference from the observable universe to a morally perfect Creator. He argues that a good God would desire human happiness. Therefore, from the presence of suffering, it appears reasonable to infer the nonexistence of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and good.

Philo presents a version of the problem of evil that can be formulated as a logical argument:

1. If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is morally perfect, then He wants there to be no suffering in the world.
3. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then He can bring it about that there is no suffering in the world.
4. So: If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, then there is no suffering in the world (from 2 and 3).
5. But there is suffering in the world.
6. Therefore, God does not exist (from 1, 4, and 5).

Philo cautiously suggests four factors producing suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient God could have avoided: (i) pain as a motive for action, (ii) the world governed by general laws of nature, (iii) nature being frugal in endowing creatures, and (iv) the “inaccurate workmanship” of the world. He believes a pain-free alternative exists for each, which a perfect God would have implemented.

The sources distinguish between the logical problem of evil (existence of evil is incompatible with God’s existence) and the evidential or probabilistic problem of evil (evil constitutes evidence against God’s existence). Philo’s argument, while seeming to be based on suffering counting as evidence against God’s existence, is presented as a logical version. However, Philo declines to endorse the proof with certainty due to his skepticism about human reason in this domain. This creates a “two-track” strategy, putting his opponent Cleanthes in a dilemma: either human reason is unreliable regarding God (abandon design argument) or suffering proves a perfect God does not exist (abandon theism).

C. S. Lewis’s Response to the Problem of Pain

C. S. Lewis devotes his first book of Christian apologetics, The Problem of Pain, to addressing this challenge, responding directly to Hume’s presentation in the Dialogues. Lewis notes the striking similarity between his past atheist reasoning and Philo’s description of the world, both pointing to suffering as evidence against a benevolent and omnipotent spirit. Lewis frames the problem of pain in its simplest form: If God were good and almighty, creatures would be perfectly happy, but they are not, so God lacks goodness, power, or both.

Lewis argues that the problem relies on popular but false understandings of divine omnipotence, divine goodness, and human happiness. His solution involves providing “true” conceptions of these ideas.

• Divine Omnipotence: Not the ability to do absolutely anything, but the ability to do anything that is intrinsically possible. Lewis argues that creating a society of free souls who cannot inflict pain on each other is intrinsically impossible, like creating a round square.
• Divine Goodness: Not the desire for humans to have merely comfortable, pleasant earthly lives (false happiness), but the desire for humans to attain genuine happiness, which involves freely loving God and striving to become “Christlike”.
• Human Happiness: Not comfortable earthly lives, but freely loving God and becoming “Christlike”.

Lewis offers a version of the free will defense to account for moral suffering (suffering resulting from free human actions). If God creates a society of free agents capable of choosing between right and wrong, they must be capable of inflicting pain on each other. Interfering constantly to prevent suffering would remove this freedom.

To account for natural suffering (suffering not caused by free human actions), Lewis suggests God uses pain for three purposes:

1. As a “megaphone” to shatter the illusion that earthly things are the source of true happiness and nudge humans towards God.
2. To allow humans to “be united with His suffering Son”.
3. To provide opportunities for freely willed virtuous action (e.g., courage, patience, love). (Though the sources don’t detail the third use as much as the others in the provided excerpts).

Lewis views pain not as good in itself (it is intrinsically evil) but as sometimes instrumentally good because it can lead to genuine happiness.

Addressing the logical argument (formulated above), Lewis would reject premise 2 if it means God desires a world devoid of suffering more than anything else. Lewis believes there are goods more important than a pain-free world, which may require suffering.

Challenges to Lewis’s Solution

While Lewis offers a defense and partial theodicy, his solution faces objections. One significant challenge is the problem of not enough pain, questioning why God, if using pain for transformation, doesn’t inflict suffering on comfortable sinners. Lewis might respond that God knows who will respond to pain and who are “incorrigibles” who would use it for further rebellion, and we cannot judge this.

A more critical issue is non-victim-improving natural child suffering – suffering experienced by a child, not from human action, that does not contribute to that child’s genuine happiness. The sources argue that Lewis’s explanations struggle to account for this kind of suffering on a large scale, such as in the 2004 Indonesian tsunami. Such suffering suggests Lewis’s theodicy is incomplete; his explanations might not cover all cases of evil. This leads to a revised problem: the problem of child suffering, which questions why a perfect God permits non-victim-improving natural child suffering.

The phenomenon of psychopathy is also mentioned as posing a similar problem for Lewis’s view. If God uses conscience to call people to Him, why are so many people (psychopaths) permitted to lack the emotional equipment needed for conscience development?. While perhaps not decisive, it is noted as a phenomenon that doesn’t fit well with Lewis’s overall view.

Russell’s View

Bertrand Russell also discussed the problem of evil. At least sometimes, his view was that the evil in our world decisively establishes the nonexistence of the traditional God of monotheism. He argued that judging the Creator by the creation suggests God is partly good and partly bad, or that a perfect God would have created a better universe.

Points of Agreement

Despite their significant disagreements, Lewis, Hume, and Russell all recognized the problem of evil (suffering) as a major stumbling block for arguments for the existence of a perfect God.

The Problem of Evil: Hume, Lewis, and Russell

The “problem of evil” is a central theme discussed in the sources, presented as a significant challenge for belief in a traditional, perfect God. It is a key point of conversation between C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell.

The problem is often posed as a question: If an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God exists, why does the world contain evil?. More aggressively, it is posed as a challenge: If such a God existed, the world wouldn’t contain the evils it does; therefore, no such God exists.

Hume’s Presentation of the Problem

David Hume grappled with the problem of evil, dedicating two sections (Parts X and XI) of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to it. The sources note that the problem of evil raised by Demea and Philo in the Dialogues is never satisfactorily answered, suggesting Hume considered it a serious challenge for which he had no complete answer. This discussion in the Dialogues sets the stage for Lewis’s work, The Problem of Pain.

Hume’s character, Philo, suggests that reflecting on human suffering will lead to doubt about the existence of a good God altogether. Philo describes human life as cursed and polluted, filled with perpetual war, necessity, hunger, fear, anxiety, terror, weakness, impotence, and distress, ending in agony and horror.

Philo argues that the suffering in the world provides a basis for a decisive objection to the design argument. Traditional monotheism posits an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God. Philo’s point is that the presence of suffering blocks the inference from the observable universe to a morally perfect Creator. He argues that a good God would desire human happiness. Therefore, from the presence of suffering, it appears reasonable to infer the nonexistence of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and good.

Philo presents a version of the problem of evil that can be formulated as a logical argument:

1. If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is morally perfect, then He wants there to be no suffering in the world.
3. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then He can bring it about that there is no suffering in the world.
4. So: If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, then there is no suffering in the world (from 2 and 3).
5. But there is suffering in the world.
6. Therefore, God does not exist (from 1, 4, and 5).

Philo cautiously suggests four factors producing suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient God could have avoided: (i) pain as a motive for action, (ii) the world governed by general laws of nature, (iii) nature being frugal in endowing creatures, and (iv) the “inaccurate workmanship” of the world. He believes a pain-free alternative exists for each, which a perfect God would have implemented.

The sources distinguish between the logical problem of evil (existence of evil is incompatible with God’s existence) and the evidential or probabilistic problem of evil (evil constitutes evidence against God’s existence). Philo’s argument, while seeming to be based on suffering counting as evidence against God’s existence, is presented as a logical version. However, Philo declines to endorse the proof with certainty due to his skepticism about human reason in this domain. This creates a “two-track” strategy, putting his opponent Cleanthes in a dilemma: either human reason is unreliable regarding God (abandon design argument) or suffering proves a perfect God does not exist (abandon theism).

C. S. Lewis’s Response to the Problem of Pain

C. S. Lewis devotes his first book of Christian apologetics, The Problem of Pain, to addressing this challenge, responding directly to Hume’s presentation in the Dialogues. Lewis notes the striking similarity between his past atheist reasoning and Philo’s description of the world, both pointing to suffering as evidence against a benevolent and omnipotent spirit. Lewis frames the problem of pain in its simplest form: If God were good and almighty, creatures would be perfectly happy, but they are not, so God lacks goodness, power, or both.

Lewis argues that the problem relies on popular but false understandings of divine omnipotence, divine goodness, and human happiness. His solution involves providing “true” conceptions of these ideas.

• Divine Omnipotence: Not the ability to do absolutely anything, but the ability to do anything that is intrinsically possible. Lewis argues that creating a society of free souls who cannot inflict pain on each other is intrinsically impossible, like creating a round square.
• Divine Goodness: Not the desire for humans to have merely comfortable, pleasant earthly lives (false happiness), but the desire for humans to attain genuine happiness, which involves freely loving God and striving to become “Christlike”.
• Human Happiness: Not comfortable earthly lives, but freely loving God and becoming “Christlike”.

Lewis offers a version of the free will defense to account for moral suffering (suffering resulting from free human actions). If God creates a society of free agents capable of choosing between right and wrong, they must be capable of inflicting pain on each other. Interfering constantly to prevent suffering would remove this freedom.

To account for natural suffering (suffering not caused by free human actions), Lewis suggests God uses pain for three purposes:

1. As a “megaphone” to shatter the illusion that earthly things are the source of true happiness and nudge humans towards God.
2. To allow humans to “be united with His suffering Son”.
3. To provide opportunities for freely willed virtuous action (e.g., courage, patience, love). (Though the sources don’t detail the third use as much as the others in the provided excerpts).

Lewis views pain not as good in itself (it is intrinsically evil) but as sometimes instrumentally good because it can lead to genuine happiness.

Addressing the logical argument (formulated above), Lewis would reject premise 2 if it means God desires a world devoid of suffering more than anything else. Lewis believes there are goods more important than a pain-free world, which may require suffering.

Challenges to Lewis’s Solution

While Lewis offers a defense and partial theodicy, his solution faces objections. One significant challenge is the problem of not enough pain, questioning why God, if using pain for transformation, doesn’t inflict suffering on comfortable sinners. Lewis might respond that God knows who will respond to pain and who are “incorrigibles” who would use it for further rebellion, and we cannot judge this.

A more critical issue is non-victim-improving natural child suffering – suffering experienced by a child, not from human action, that does not contribute to that child’s genuine happiness. The sources argue that Lewis’s explanations struggle to account for this kind of suffering on a large scale, such as in the 2004 Indonesian tsunami. Such suffering suggests Lewis’s theodicy is incomplete; his explanations might not cover all cases of evil. This leads to a revised problem: the problem of child suffering, which questions why a perfect God permits non-victim-improving natural child suffering.

The phenomenon of psychopathy is also mentioned as posing a similar problem for Lewis’s view. If God uses conscience to call people to Him, why are so many people (psychopaths) permitted to lack the emotional equipment needed for conscience development?. While perhaps not decisive, it is noted as a phenomenon that doesn’t fit well with Lewis’s overall view.

Russell’s View

Bertrand Russell also discussed the problem of evil. At least sometimes, his view was that the evil in our world decisively establishes the nonexistence of the traditional God of monotheism. He argued that judging the Creator by the creation suggests God is partly good and partly bad, or that a perfect God would have created a better universe.

Points of Agreement

Despite their significant disagreements, Lewis, Hume, and Russell all recognized the problem of evil (suffering) as a major stumbling block for arguments for the existence of a perfect God.

By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog

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