Russell on Metaphysics

This compilation features Bertrand Russell’s significant metaphysical writings, offering insights into his development as a leading analytic philosopher of the 20th century. The selections address fundamental philosophical questions, including the nature of reality beyond appearances, the distinction between particulars and universals, the principle of individuation, and the philosophical problems surrounding causation and laws. Russell’s clear and analytical approach is highlighted, demonstrating his belief that even complex philosophical ideas can be made accessible, making this collection a valuable resource for those new to metaphysics or analytic philosophy. The book also explores the implications of logical analysis for understanding the world and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.

Russell’s Metaphysics Explored

Based on the provided sources, here is a discussion of metaphysics, drawing on Bertrand Russell’s views as presented in the selections:

What is Metaphysics? Metaphysics is described as one of the most abstract areas of philosophy. It aims to uncover the fundamental nature of reality beyond mere appearance. Unlike scientific inquiry, metaphysics studies the world by using philosophical methods of analysis, reason, and argument, rather than through empirical observation. Metaphysical questions cannot be settled by looking for observable evidence. As Russell characterized it, metaphysical entities are those things supposed to be part of the world’s ultimate constituents, but are not the kind of thing that is ever empirically given. Metaphysics is not inherently more puzzling or mystifying than other branches of philosophy, such as moral philosophy or epistemology, which also deal with abstract questions non-empirically.

While a physicist and a metaphysician might consider the same subject, such as material substance, they do so in very different ways. What a scientist says is usually of little use in a metaphysical debate. For example, a physicist might say material substances are made of electrons, but the metaphysician would then ask if an electron is a bundle of qualities or has an underlying substratum. Decisions between rival metaphysical theories are made through argument and analysis.

Russell as a Metaphysician Bertrand Russell made a major and lasting contribution to metaphysics, which has been hugely influential and helped establish analytic philosophy. Although he is often depicted as an empiricist who largely rejected metaphysics, this book aims to counter that misconception, arguing that Russell was indeed a metaphysician and perhaps that his most important insights were metaphysical. He was one of the main figures to react against British idealism, which was heavily influenced by Hegelian metaphysics.

The volume Russell on Metaphysics collects a comprehensive selection of his writings on the subject, following the development of his thought. It starts with papers from his pre-analytic period, includes his realist accounts, discussions of universals, causation and laws of nature, and later thoughts on diverse questions like vagueness.

Key Metaphysical Topics in Russell’s Work (as presented in the sources) The sources highlight several key areas of metaphysics that Russell addressed:

• Idealism: The volume begins with papers from Russell’s early idealist period. Russell later developed a critique of idealism, arguing that the psychological viewpoint (like the idea that knowledge of one’s own mind is more certain than that of the external world) mistakenly failed to recognize that psychological statements also transcend the immediate given, just as physical statements do.
• Ontology: This is a significant area covered in the book. An ontology is essentially an inventory of what exists, listing categories of things like propositions, properties, and relations.
• Universals and Particulars: Russell extensively discussed the problem of universals. He considered the question of whether there is a fundamental division between universals and particulars, leaning towards the view that the dualism is ultimate. He defined particulars as entities that can only be subjects of predicates or terms of relations (logical substances) and exist in the narrow sense of the word. Universals, like properties or relations, can appear as predicates or relations and subsist rather than exist in the same sense as particulars. The question of whether predication is an ultimate relation is tied to the existence of particulars.
• Existence and Being: The sources distinguish different senses of “existence” and “being”. Being belongs to every conceivable term or object of thought, including numbers, relations, and propositions; if something can be counted, it has being. The meaning of existence used in philosophy and daily life is predicated of individuals like Socrates, but this is distinct from the sense used in mathematics or symbolic logic. Russell held that mathematics and metaphysics, being a priori, are existence-free in the philosophical sense.
• Facts: Russell discusses different kinds of facts, including particular facts (“This is white”), general facts (“All men are mortal”), positive facts (“Socrates was alive”), and negative facts (“Socrates is not alive”). The distinction between positive and negative facts is considered difficult but important. He suggests taking negative facts as ultimate, finding alternative explanations (like those involving incompatibility or molecular facts) less successful at avoiding paradox. Facts themselves are neither true nor false; truth and falsehood belong to statements, propositions, or judgments.
• Logical Fictions/Constructions: Russell applied the concept of logical fictions, arguing that certain entities are not ultimate constituents of the world but can be constructed out of empirically given things. Numbers, for example, are logical fictions (classes of classes). Physical objects like atoms are also viewed as logical fictions or constructions, replaceable by logical fictions composed of empirically given things, such as series of classes of particulars. This approach allows physics to be interpreted in terms of empirical data, without requiring belief in non-empirical metaphysical entities that physics talks about.
• Causation and Laws of Nature: Russell addressed causation and laws of nature. Modern physics, unlike older physics, views causation and laws of science as concerned with what usually happens approximately (statistical probabilities), rather than what always happens exactly.
• Philosophy of Mind (Neutral Monism): Russell’s work includes thoughts on the metaphysical question in the philosophy of mind, developing a form of neutral monism. This theory maintains that the distinction between mental and physical is a matter of arrangement or context of the same underlying material. Mental and physical events might be compresent (overlap in space-time), although whether this entails identity and establishes monism is debated. According to neutral monism, simple entities are members of both physical and mental series. A person is considered a series of experiences, without necessarily denying a metaphysical ego, but such an ego is unknowable and irrelevant to science. While physics might predict the structural properties of events in the head, it cannot necessarily predict their intrinsic qualitative nature (e.g., the subjective experience of seeing). However, actions like speaking or writing are bodily movements subject to physical laws, suggesting that the socially important part of thought might have a one-to-one relation to physical events.
• Free Will: Russell discussed the free-will problem from an idealist standpoint. He noted that both the “plain man” who believes in free will and the “up to date” scientist who rejects it often abuse metaphysics, yet metaphysics is necessary to settle their difficulties. He argued that terms like freedom and determination have narrower (fatalism vs. caprice) and broader senses; in their narrower senses, both are false, while in broader senses, both are true, with the reconciliation belonging to “metaphysical subtleties”.
• Space and Time: Russell considered debates about space and time, specifically whether they are plenal (adjectival) or punctual (relational). This distinction is tied to the choice between monism and monadism. If space is relations between non-spatial monads, time must be too; if time is a plenum (adjective), space must be too.
• Matter: Russell explored different conceptions of matter, contrasting kinematic and dynamical definitions. Matter might be defined by extension or force, and its nature is tied to questions about space and motion. The concept of punctual space/time allows gaps, unlike plenal space/time. Homogeneity of space or a plenum makes motion meaningless.

Methodology and the Role of Language Russell emphasized the importance of philosophical grammar, believing that much traditional metaphysics is filled with mistakes due to bad grammar and failure to make distinctions in philosophical grammar. Studying the principles of symbolism can help avoid fallacious inferences from symbols to things, as language has properties not shared by things in general. With caution, the properties of language may help understand the world’s structure. He argued that complete metaphysical agnosticism is incompatible with maintaining linguistic propositions, as language itself is an empirical phenomenon. The metaphysical problem of universals, for instance, presents itself in terms of finding meaning for predicate words.

The Purpose and Value of Metaphysics Russell argued that metaphysics should be pursued out of intellectual curiosity and guided by it alone, rather than seeking religious satisfaction. He criticized the idea that metaphysics could provide comfort or consolation, as the reality constructed by metaphysics often bears no relation to the world of experience and cannot offer hope or solace for present ills. While philosophy might provide aesthetic satisfaction or a certain mood, this is distinct from religious comfort which requires belief. The desire for comfort has led to fallacious reasoning in metaphysics. He believed that once metaphysical problems, like the problem of universals, are approached technically, their lack of bearing on religious belief or social consequences becomes evident. Philosophy can achieve solid results by temporarily forgetting such preoccupations and acquiring patience and devotion to detail, similar to experimental science.

Russell on the Problem of Universals

Based on the provided sources and our conversation history, here is a discussion of universals as presented through the lens of Bertrand Russell’s writings:

The Problem of Universals: Definition and Historical Context

The problem of universals is a central topic in metaphysics with a history stretching back at least to Plato. It concerns the status of what are called “universals”. Aristotle was perhaps the first to give the problem a form approaching logical correctness. His definition of a “universal” is “that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects”. An “individual” is that which is not thus predicated.

Linguistically, this relates to the distinction between subject and predicate. In “Socrates is human,” “Socrates” is the subject, and “human” is the predicate. The predicate “human” can attach to many other subjects besides Socrates. Even if only one man existed, the statement “this is human” could still be significant, though false, if “this” referred to something else like a cat or dog. Thus, a universal does not need to be truly predicable of many things, only significantly predicable. This distinction is clear in any language with subject-predicate syntax.

The metaphysical problem, distinct from the linguistic one, asks what is meant by words that are predicates. What does “human” mean? It’s not something with a definite position in space and time, as it’s present in every man, not just Socrates. You cannot point to it, it is not born, and it does not die. It has a name but no physical location. This leads to the question of its nature – what kind of thing is it? Aristotle considered a universal a “such,” not a “this” – a kind, not an individual thing, and not a substance, as the substance of each thing is peculiar to it, whereas a universal is common.

Historically, realists held that universals exist and predicates mean universals similarly to how proper names mean persons or things. Nominalists, conversely, held that universals are linguistic creations, with nothing outside language corresponding to a predicate’s meaning. Medieval philosophers like Aquinas and Occam, while generally nominalists regarding human knowledge, conceded God must have had universals (like “human being”) in mind before creation. Berkeley and Hume were prominent modern nominalists in the British Isles, denying not only universals in the world but also abstract ideas in the mind, arguing that general words function by our ignoring particular features of specific instances.

Russell’s Views on Universals

Russell made significant contributions to the discussion of universals. His initial position in The Problems of Philosophy (1912) was described as a Platonic answer, suggesting particulars participate in a common nature or essence. He argued for the existence of universals, stating they are “anything which may be shared by many particulars”. Russell contended that universals do not exist in space and time; unlike particulars, they are “nowhere and nowhen”. They also do not have a mental existence but exist independently of our thoughts about them. Instead of existing, universals have being or subsistence. The world of being (universals) is superior to the fleeting world of particulars, though the latter is more important to our lives.

However, he also made the claim that we are acquainted with universals in sense-data. This seems to contradict the idea of universals being supra-sensible and located nowhere. He suggested that knowledge of universals is gained through a process of abstraction from particular instances, taking what is common and rejecting what is particular. This process, however, is problematic, as it seems to require prior knowledge of the universal to guide the abstraction.

Russell later revisited the problem, expressing confidence that modern logic could provide a definitive solution. He believed the solution would be technical and have no bearing on religious philosophy, empiricist philosophy, or social consequences, criticizing past philosophers (like Plato and Leibniz) for linking the problem to such broader issues. He saw connecting the problem to technical details as a way to remove bias and irrelevant preoccupations.

Argument for the Existence of Universals (Argument from Resemblance)

One of Russell’s notable arguments for the existence of universals, particularly relations, is the argument from resemblance. Nominalists attempting to avoid universals must at least concede that white particulars resemble each other. But the resemblance between two white things must be the same resemblance as that between two red things. While objects may resemble each other in different ways (color, shape), the relation of resemblance itself seems to be a single entity involved in each case. Therefore, Russell argued, at least the relation of resemblance must be a universal.

He argues against explaining away similarity by saying that similar stimuli produce similar reactions (e.g., seeing two red discs prompts saying “red” each time). Are we saying the same thing about the discs and the utterances when we call them similar, or just similar things? If the latter, it leads to a vicious endless regress: the similarity of the wholes AB and CD (where A and B are similar, C and D are similar) is explained by their similarity, which would require explaining the similarity of these similarities by their similarity, and so on. This regress suggests that similarity must be a true universal. He concludes, with hesitation, that universals exist, or at least general words are not the whole story. Similarity, at minimum, must be admitted, making elaborate efforts to exclude other universals hardly worthwhile.

Russell clarifies that the argument proves the necessity of the word “similar,” but this word is necessary because there are pairs of similar things, and the similarity of two things is a non-linguistic fact.

Universals vs. Particulars

A fundamental division in metaphysics is between universals and particulars. Russell believed this dualism is ultimate. He sought criteria for distinguishing them.

• Spatial Location: One criterion Russell used is that a particular can only be in one place at a time, whereas a universal can have instances in different places simultaneously. Whiteness, if it exists, exists wherever there are white things. A particular patch of white, however, cannot be in two places at once. The logical possibility of exactly similar things co-existing in different places, combined with the impossibility of things in different places at the same time being numerically identical, necessitates admitting particulars (instances of universals) exist in places, not the universals themselves. The fact that certain spatial relations (like being outside each other) imply diversity of their terms, and that things can be indistinguishable in qualities but numerically diverse due to these relations, forces the admission of particulars distinct from universals or collections of universals.
• Logical Role: Particulars are entities that can only be subjects of predicates or terms of relations. They are analogous to traditional logical substances. Universals, on the other hand, can appear as predicates or relations.
• Existence vs. Subsistence: Particulars exist in the narrow sense of the word; they can be fleeting and need not be causally independent. Universals, however, do not exist in the same sense but rather subsist. They do not exist in time.
• Predication: The distinction between particulars and universals is tied to the question of whether predication is an ultimate, simple, asymmetrical relation. If there are particulars, predication is ultimate: “This is white” expresses a relation between a particular and whiteness. If particulars are rejected, predication is not ultimate; “This is white” might mean whiteness is a quality in this place. Russell, believing particulars exist, views predication as an ultimate relation involving a fundamental logical difference between its terms.

Particulars as Bundles of Qualities (Later View)

In a later discussion, prompted by revisiting the problem of universals, Russell ventured the view that a “thing” is nothing more than a bundle of qualities. These qualities would traditionally be called universals. This view implies that two different things cannot be exactly alike in all their qualities (including relational qualities), as they would then be one thing. Diversity is conferred by spatio-temporal position, which Russell explains not just by saying they occupy different parts of space, but by suggesting position is defined by certain qualities (like “more-or-less-right-or-leftness” and “more-or-less-up-or-downness” in visual perception).

On this view, the simplest meanings belong to words denoting qualities (universals), like “redness” or “sweetness”. Particulars, like Socrates or a rose, become “bundles of qualities”. A statement like “this rose is red” is analyzed not as a subject-predicate statement about a particular (“this rose”), but as asserting that certain spatial qualities, the qualities defining “rose,” and redness all coexist or are compresent in a region. Compresence is the relation between qualities that partially or completely overlap in space-time. A “place” can be defined as a bundle of compresent qualities.

This later view suggests that what are commonly called particulars are bundles of qualities (universals) that include enough spatio-temporal qualities to ensure they occupy a continuous region. Their logical and syntactical status does not differ fundamentally from qualities like redness. This shifts the problem of universals; instead of asking about qualities like “red,” we ask about properties of qualities, such as “colour”.

The Role of Language and Ontology

Russell emphasized the importance of philosophical grammar and syntax in understanding metaphysical problems. He believed mistakes in traditional metaphysics often arose from “bad grammar”. While caution is needed, the properties of language can help understand the world’s structure. For example, the existence of universals can be inferred from language. Russell argued that complete metaphysical agnosticism is incompatible with maintaining linguistic propositions, as language itself is an empirical phenomenon.

He connected the linguistic distinction of subject and predicate to the ontological distinction of things and concepts (his earlier terms for particulars and universals). Words are divided into substantives, adjectives, and verbs. Substantives can denote things (particulars), while adjectives and verbs denote concepts (universals/relations). Concepts are terms usable as both predicates (“Socrates is human”) and subjects (“humanity belongs to Socrates”), whereas things (particulars) can only be subjects.

In his later view, the distinction between proper names (denoting particulars) and predicates (denoting universals) is reformulated. Proper names denote spatio-temporally continuous series of occurrences (like Socrates or France), while predicates denote something in discontinuous portions (like whiteness). However, even things denoted by proper names, like “Tom,” are recognized by qualities (universals) like red hair or blue eyes. The name “Tom” applies primarily to whatever has these qualities, suggesting “Tom” denotes primarily a bundle of universals. Primary vocabulary consists of words denoting universals, learned through association with similar occurrences. Words for particulars, if possible, are learned later and involve analysis.

Russell also considered the ontological status of relations. While acknowledging their necessity in language (“A is above B”), he questioned if they denote an actual ingredient of the fact. He explored whether a relation could be a quality of the whole composed of its terms, but this approach faced difficulties with asymmetric relations and led back to needing universals (like “vertical order” or “similarity-in-a-certain-respect”). He concluded that relations like temporal order exist independently of language.

While the need for relation-words is clear, whether the word “similarity” (as a substantive) is needed in isolation, or only “similar” (as an adjective/verb), was debated. This is linked to the idea of relation-words being syncategorematic – meaningful only in context with terms. However, Russell ultimately argues that the fact that “similar” is necessary because there are pairs of similar things implies a non-linguistic fact about the world, just as “yellow” implies the yellowness of things.

In summary, Russell grappled with the problem of universals throughout his career, moving from an early Platonic realism to a sophisticated analysis involving logic, language, and ontology. He consistently argued for the ultimate reality of universals (or at least similarity) and maintained the fundamental distinction between universals and particulars, though his understanding of particulars evolved towards viewing them as constructed from universals (qualities) in spatiotemporal relations. He emphasized that the problem is a technical one about the structure of reality, reflected in language, and should be pursued without regard for potential religious or social consequences.

Russell on Causality: From Rejection to Reintegration

Based on the provided sources, a discussion of causality in the context of Bertrand Russell’s writings reveals a complex and evolving perspective, marked initially by a strong rejection of traditional notions and later by a reintegration of the concept into the foundations of science.

Russell’s Early Deflationism and Rejection of Traditional Causality

In earlier papers, such as “On the Notion of Cause” (Paper 14, 1913), Russell argues that the word “cause” is “so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable”. He believes the “law of causality” is a “relic of a bygone age” that survives only because it is erroneously thought to do no harm. Russell notes that in advanced sciences like gravitational astronomy, the word “cause” never occurs. Instead, science utilizes formulae, such as equations like F = ma, in which nothing can be identified purely as cause or effect. These formulae, Russell contends, “eliminate” causality altogether, rather than merely being a more accurate way of talking about it.

Russell critically examines traditional philosophical understandings of cause, including definitions from Baldwin’s Dictionary. He finds definitions linking causality to “necessary connection” or “taking place in consequence of another process” to be problematic. The notion of necessity is often tied to the idea of something being “true under all circumstances,” which Russell argues applies to propositional functions, not simple propositions. Interpreting causality in this light might lead to a definition stating that whenever an event e1 occurs at time t1, an event e2 follows after a specific interval. However, he raises “insuperable difficulties” with the traditional idea of cause and effect being contiguous in time, arguing that the time-series is compact, meaning there are no contiguous instants. Any finite time interval between cause and effect allows for other intervening circumstances, suggesting the supposed cause is not, by itself, adequate to ensure the effect.

Russell also challenges common maxims associated with causality:

• Cause and effect must resemble each other: Science shows them to be “very widely dissimilar”. This maxim is operative, for instance, in the thought that mind could not have grown up in a purely material universe.
• Cause is analogous to volition: This view, suggesting an “intelligible nexus” between cause and effect, is rejected because modern physics leaves no room for such a connection between two events. The nexus desired seems to mean something “familiar to imagination”.
• The cause compels the effect: Russell argues that “compulsion” is a complex notion involving “thwarted desire” and is inapplicable where desire is not present. In the absence of volition, it is “misleading to regard the cause as compelling the effect”. He also refutes the vaguer form that the cause “determines” the effect in a way the effect does not determine the cause, showing that any supposed lack of symmetry is “illusory” when considering pluralities of causes or effects.
• A cause cannot operate when it has ceased to exist: Russell calls this a “common maxim” and “still more common unexpressed prejudice”. It is based on the mistaken supposition that causes “operate” at all, a notion derived from assimilating causes to volitions. If causes and effects are separated by a finite time interval, as they must be if they exist, then effects necessarily occur after their causes have ceased to exist.
• A cause cannot operate except where it is: This maxim underlies prejudice against “action at a distance” and relies on the assumption that causes “operate” in an obscure analogy to volitions.

In place of the traditional notion, Russell suggests that science deals with uniformities of sequence, where the earlier event can be called the cause and the later the effect if observed frequently. However, this sequence is only probable, not necessary. Furthermore, not every event needs a cause in this sense, and any sufficiently frequent sequence (like night causing day) could be called causal. He contrasts this with the idea of “invariable succession,” which Mill linked to the Law of Causation, noting that such universal causal laws, as Mill conceived them, are not found in advanced science. Scientific laws consist not in “sameness of causes and effects” but in “sameness of relations” or, more accurately, “sameness of differential equations”.

Causality, Determinism, and Laws of Nature

Russell’s views on causality are closely intertwined with the debate on determinism and laws of nature. He views laws as descriptions of uniformity. In his earlier paper “The Free-Will Problem from an Idealist Standpoint” (Paper 3, 1895), influenced by idealism and Kant, he proposed a “reconciliationist” or “compatibilist” solution to the free will problem, arguing that free will is compatible with determinism. This position relies on an understanding of laws of nature as descriptions of what happens, not entities that compel or control events. A law is “nothing but a compendious description” of events. This understanding aligns with a Humean metaphysics in which there are no necessary connections between events; laws are simply discerned patterns of regularities.

Russell defines a “deterministic system” as one where, given certain data about the system at specified times, it is possible to infer events at any other time. Whether our volitions belong to such a system is a “mere question of fact,” and empirical evidence suggests uniformities in volitions, though it might not be overwhelming. The “subjective sense of freedom” does not refute determinism, as it is based on the mistaken idea that causes compel their effects. Even if volitions are “mechanically determined” (part of a system with purely material determinants), this does not imply the supremacy of matter over mind, as the same system might be susceptible to both material and mental determinants. The notion of necessity often associated with determinism is a “confused notion”. Russell concludes that the problem of free will versus determinism is “mainly illusory,” arising from erroneous notions about causality.

Connecting Causality to Physics and Ontology

Physics, in Russell’s view, replaces the notion of “force” with “laws of correlation”. These correlations allow events to be grouped, and this is “all that is true in the old notion of causality”. These correlations or laws of correlation are what lead to the definition of permanent “things”. Instead of persistent substances, things (like tables, chairs, electrons, or even light-rays) are seen as “series of more or less similar phenomena, connected, not by substantial identity, but by certain causal connections”. They are “strings of events or of sets of events” connected by discoverable laws. Physics aims to discover the “causal skeleton of the world”.

Later Shift: Causality as a Scientific Postulate

In a “marked contrast” to his earlier view, Russell’s later work (e.g., Paper 17, 1948) presents a rehabilitation of causality. He now states that the power of science rests in the discovery of causal laws and that science “assumes causality in some sense”. Causality becomes a “fundamental postulate of science” that allows inference about one region of space-time from another.

In this later view, a “causal law” is defined as a general principle allowing inference from data about certain space-time regions to something about other regions. This inference may be only probable, but the principle must allow probability “considerably more than a half”. This definition is wide, allowing inferences backwards or forwards in time, involving complex data, and permitting probabilistic laws. This revised view allows for “crude generalisations from which common sense starts,” like “bread nourishes,” which permit exceptions.

This belief in causality, allowing inference from sensations/perceptions (events in us) to external physical objects, is fundamental to our knowledge of the physical world. The justification of this belief belongs to epistemology, but science methodologically assumes it. The validity of scientific method depends on assumptions that can be roughly stated as the postulate that there are general laws of certain kinds. Russell calls this the “faith” of science: there are formulae (causal laws) connecting events, exhibiting spatio-temporal continuity, and predictions based on these formulae are confirmed. Possible postulates for scientific method include the law of causality, uniformity of nature, reign of law, and belief in natural kinds.

Despite this later acceptance, Russell still distinguishes this scientific concept from the traditional philosophical notion of cause as an “invariable antecedent” where the sequence is felt to be “necessary”. However, he admits “reasons… for admitting laws of the form ‘A causes B’,” provided there are “suitable safeguards and limitations”. This is particularly relevant for defining the identity of physical objects over time via the concept of a “causal line” – a series of events where knowledge of some allows inference about others independently of the environment. When two events are part of one causal line, the earlier can be said to “cause” the later. Physics using differential equations can be seen as stating “what is tending to happen,” resolving the conception of “cause” into that of “law”.

In summary, Russell’s perspective on causality shifts from an outright rejection of the traditional notion as a misleading relic to a later acceptance of causal laws as fundamental postulates necessary for scientific inference and the construction of our understanding of the physical world, redefined through concepts like functional relations, differential equations, correlations, and causal lines. He consistently argues against the traditional idea of cause as an agent exerting force or compulsion.

Russell on Language, Metaphysics, and Philosophy

Based on the provided sources and our previous discussion on Causation, Bertrand Russell viewed the study of language as crucial for philosophical inquiry, particularly in metaphysics and logic. However, his perspective comes with significant caveats and develops over time.

Here’s a discussion of Russell’s views on language as presented in the sources:

1. Language as a Guide, Not a Master, to Metaphysics:

• Russell initially advocated for an ontology “guided by the logic of language”. He believed the study of grammar is “capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed”. Grammar can serve as “prima facie evidence” of philosophical differences and is a “source of discovery”. He suggested grammar “brings us much nearer to a correct logic than the current opinions of philosophers” and should be taken as a “guide”.
• He explicitly applied this method, using grammatical distinctions (like substantive and adjective) as a guide to ontological distinctions (like substance and attribute, things and concepts). He believed “every word occurring in a sentence must have some meaning”.
• However, even in this earlier phase, he expressed reservations about language dictating ontology.
• Later, this caution solidified, with the explicit statement that “to allow grammar to dictate our metaphysics is now generally recognized to be dangerous”. This shift in emphasis, though not necessarily a complete inconsistency, marks a distinction in his approach.

1. The Fallacy of Verbalism:

• A central theme in Russell’s view is the danger of inferring properties of the world from properties of language. He calls this the “fallacy of verbalism”.
• He argues that “almost all thinking that purports to be philosophical or logical consists in attributing to the world the properties of language”. Since language exists, it has properties, but many properties of language are “not shared by things in general,” and when these “intrude into our metaphysic it becomes altogether misleading”.
• He specifically identifies the traditional notions of “existence” and “reality” as arising “entirely through mistakes as to symbolism”. Clearing up the “muddle about symbolism” reveals that much said about existence is simply a mistake.
• The influence of symbolism on philosophy is often unconscious, and studying its principles can provide negative results by helping avoid fallacious inferences from symbols to things.

1. Language as Representation and the Nature of Vagueness:

• Russell views language as a system of symbolism, a type of representation. Every word is a symbol. A symbol “means” something else.
• He argues emphatically that vagueness and precision are characteristics of representation, not of the things represented. “Things are what they are, and there is an end of it”.
• He explicitly states that “only representations are vague” and there are “no vague objects or vague properties of objects”.
• Vagueness in language is inevitable. It arises because concepts are derived from vague sensory evidence and because meaning is a “one-many relation” rather than a one-one relation (as it would be in an accurate language).
• He uses examples like “red” and “bald” to illustrate this linguistic vagueness, arguing it invalidates classical logic rules like the law of excluded middle when applied to vague words.

1. Language, Ontology, and the Problem of Universals:

• Russell analyzes the relationship between different types of words and the entities they signify. Propositions, in his view, contain the entities indicated by words, not the words themselves.
• He distinguishes terms indicated by proper names (“things” or “particulars”) from terms indicated by other words (“concepts,” including those for adjectives and verbs/relations).
• The linguistic distinction of subject and predicate is seen as suggesting the metaphysical problem of universals.
• Children learning language via ostensive definition rely on repetition and recognition of qualities (which Russell considers universals). This suggests our primary vocabulary consists entirely of words denoting universals. Knowledge of these qualities, denoted by universal words, is “the easiest and most primitive knowledge that we possess”.
• He challenges nominalism (the view that universals are just words) by arguing that words themselves are classes of instances, and if universals are denied in the world, they must logically be denied in language too, which is untenable.
• He argues that the very need for relation-words, particularly for relations like similarity, suggests the existence of universals in the non-linguistic world. Words like “before” and “above” “mean” something that occurs in perception. Similarity itself is a “non-linguistic fact” that makes the word “similar” necessary.
• While some uses of relation-words (as substantives, e.g., “similarity”) might be argued to be syncategorematic (meaningful only in context), Russell believes that the need for relation-words points to something objective: “things are related”.
• He notes that the word “precedes,” although it means a relation, “is not a relation,” which he sees as a source of philosophical muddle about relations.
• Ultimately, he concludes that “complete metaphysical agnosticism is not compatible with the maintenance of linguistic propositions” and that studying syntax can lead to knowledge about the structure of the world.

1. Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy:

• Russell strongly attacked the “ordinary language” philosophy movement.
• He saw this movement as claiming that all possible philosophical knowledge could be discovered through the analysis of ordinary, non-philosophical language alone.
• This contrasted with his own more cautious view that language analysis, particularly of philosophical grammar or a logical language, could help in understanding the world’s structure, but not that ordinary language was sufficient for all philosophical discovery.

In sum, Russell saw language as a crucial tool for philosophical analysis, capable of guiding our understanding of the world’s structure and revealing fundamental ontological categories like universals. However, he issued strong warnings against being misled by linguistic structures, emphasizing that properties of language should not be automatically attributed to the world. His analysis of vagueness is a prime example of distinguishing between linguistic properties and non-linguistic reality.

Russell’s Philosophy: Logic, Language, and Reality

Drawing on the sources and our conversation history, Logic holds a foundational and multifaceted role in Bertrand Russell’s philosophy.

The Centrality of Logic and Critique of Tradition:

Russell viewed logic as indispensable for philosophical inquiry, going so far as to suggest that what he calls “symbolical logic” is simply “logic” itself, implying nothing else truly warrants the name. He argued forcefully that the traditional logic, particularly the subject-predicate logic inherited largely from Aristotle and still prevalent in the work of idealists like Bradley, was fundamentally inadequate. This old logic, based on erroneous beliefs, led philosophers to counterintuitive positions and fallacies. Traditional elementary logic is seen as an “almost fatal barrier to clear thinking” unless a “new technique” is acquired. Russell’s “new logic”, or “mathematical logic”, provided the tools to diagnose these fallacies and move philosophical analysis forward.

Logic, Ontology, and Metaphysics:

Logic is deeply intertwined with ontology – the study of what exists. Russell’s philosophy advocates for an ontology “guided by the logic of language”. While cautioning against letting grammar dictate metaphysics (a view more solidified in his later work), he initially saw grammar as a crucial “guide” and “prima facie evidence” for philosophical distinctions, bringing one “much nearer to a correct logic”. The new logic itself has a “metaphysical basis,” assuming the existence of entities such as real and mind-independent propositions, objective truth and falsehood, relations with independence from their terms, and a plurality of objects. Russell came to believe that “complete metaphysical agnosticism is not compatible with the maintenance of linguistic propositions”. By studying language, particularly its syntax in a “logical language,” one can gain considerable knowledge about “the structure of the world”. However, the danger of attributing properties of language to the world (the “fallacy of verbalism”) is also a key concern, emphasizing that while language can guide, it should not be allowed to dictate metaphysics.

Logical Analysis and Atomism:

A core application of Russell’s logic is in philosophical analysis, particularly the approach known as “logical atomism”. Logic enables the analysis of complex things or propositions down to “ultimate simples” or “logical atoms”. These atoms are the unanalysable residues at the end of the analytical process; they are “purely logical” and need not be physical. Russell distinguishes between terms and the relations that relate them in a complex. Logic helps to determine the “smallest empirical apparatus” or “smallest apparatus” (not necessarily wholly empirical) out of which propositions can be built, using a minimum of “simple undefined things” and “undemonstrated premisses”. This process, guided by Occam’s Razor, diminishes the risk of error by reducing the required assumptions. Through logical analysis, entities previously considered fundamental metaphysical substances (like atoms in physics or persistent desks) can be revealed as “logical fictions” or constructions built from empirical data.

Logic and Language Structure:

The structure of language provides insights for logic and ontology. Distinctions in philosophical grammar, such as those between proper names, adjectives, and verbs, correspond to distinctions between different types of entities: particulars (indicated by proper names) and concepts (indicated by adjectives and verbs). Propositions themselves contain the entities indicated by words, not the words as symbols. Verbs, in a logical sense, are concepts capable of occurring in a proposition without being a term, and every proposition must contain one verb. Russell suggests that every verb, logically speaking, may be regarded as asserting a relation. The capacity for combining terms into a complex is the defining characteristic of verbs. The linguistic distinction of subject and predicate is linked to the metaphysical problem of universals and the relation of predication.

Logic and Propositions/Facts:

Logic primarily concerns propositions, which are the “typical vehicle on the duality of truth and falsehood”. Atomic sentences, devoid of logical words like “not,” “or,” “and,” “if,” “all,” “some,” are the building blocks for molecular propositions. Atomic propositions correspond to facts, which exist “whatever we may choose to think about them”. Facts are what make propositions true or false. Russell grapples with the question of whether there are “negative facts” (e.g., the fact that “Socrates is not alive”) corresponding to negative propositions. He ultimately inclines towards accepting negative facts, finding alternative explanations like reducing negation to incompatibility between propositions problematic, partly because propositions themselves are not “real” in the same sense facts are when making an inventory of the world.

Logic and Existence:

Russell emphasizes a crucial distinction regarding the word “existence,” particularly between its philosophical/common sense (predicated of individuals, like “God exists” or “Socrates existed”) and its use in “symbolic logic”. In symbolic logic, existence is a technical term meaning a class “has at least one member”. Entities considered in mathematics or symbolic logic (like numbers or principles of the syllogism) do not exist in the philosophical sense, but they are “real” to symbolic logic and mathematics. This logical sense of existence clarifies the “existential import of propositions,” showing that certain types of propositions (A and E) do not imply the existence (in the logical sense) of their subjects, while others (I and O) do.

Logic, Vagueness, and Precision:

Russell argues that “all language is vague” because meaning is a “one-many relation”. Vagueness and precision are properties of representation (language, symbols), not of the things represented; there are “no vague objects or vague properties of objects”. Logical words, while seeming precise, ultimately rely on the notions of “true” and “false,” which are themselves vague when applied to propositions containing vague non-logical words. Thus, even logical propositions, as we frame them, have a degree of vagueness. However, logical words apply essentially to symbols, and we can “imagine what a precise symbolism would be,” allowing us to conceive a precise meaning for logical terms. This ability to conceive precision, even if not attainable in practice, leads Russell to state that “logic takes us nearer to heaven than most other studies”.

Logic and the Advancement of Science:

Russell sees a close relationship between logic and the sciences. A “logic of the sciences” involves understanding the fundamental ideas and potential contradictions within scientific systems. Mathematical logic provides the technical apparatus needed for analyzing scientific propositions and constructing theories with minimum assumptions. Russell suggests that problems soluble by logical methods often move from the realm of philosophy (what we don’t know) to that of science (what we more or less know). This application of mathematical logic can make philosophical inquiry more “dry, precise, methodical,” diminishing its speculative freedom but increasing its certainty.

By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog

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