Rereading Russell

This compilation, “Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell’s Metaphysics and Epistemology,” is part of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. It brings together various scholarly essays examining aspects of Bertrand Russell’s philosophical work, particularly focusing on his later thought in metaphysics and epistemology. The essays explore topics such as Russell’s theory of knowledge, the concept of structure in matter, induction and projectability, and the significance of “On Denoting.” The volume also includes a bibliography and notes on contributors, providing a comprehensive resource for studying Russell’s ideas.

Russell’s Later Metaphysics and Science

This volume is part of the “MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE” series, specifically Volume XII, focusing on Bertrand Russell’s Metaphysics and Epistemology. The volume itself evolved from a conference held at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. The aim of the volume is to draw attention to Russell’s later metaphysics and epistemology, which is understood to include his ontology, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of science. While Russell’s early work in philosophy of science is well-understood, his later work, which is presented as a development of the earlier phases, has been less understood, with the exception of his pre-analytic phase.

Russell’s philosophy of science is notably addressed in his works such as The Analysis of Matter (1927) and Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948). During his middle analytic period (1919-27), Russell applied his analysis to physics and extended it to the philosophy of science. He hoped this work would be acceptable to empiricist perspectives and contemporary physics and psychology. In his late analytic period (1928-59), major problems in epistemology and philosophy of science were addressed in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth and Human Knowledge. One group of essays in the volume specifically deals with Russell’s philosophy of science and metaphysics, examining his analysis of instants in terms of events, his treatment of causality, and his lifelong commitment to science and its philosophy.

Kenneth Blackwell’s “Portrait of a Philosopher of Science” highlights Russell’s dedication to science. Blackwell notes that Russell’s “devotion to science was quasi-religious,” stemming from a deep need for certainty and potentially serving as a substitute for his lost adolescent religiosity. Russell’s later writings on science express this sentiment, stating that science, along with religion, art, and love, belongs with the pursuit of the beatific vision and the Promethean madness that drives great individuals. He suggests that the ultimate value of human life might be found in this pursuit, viewing it as religious rather than political or moral. Russell suggests that scientists are seekers after knowledge, driven by a desire to understand the object of their pursuit rather than seeking power or manipulation. He claims that scientists and poets engage in an “expansion of the ego,” moving towards a God-like perception of the universe, and suggests that Russell’s focus on science and its philosophy is metaphysically, even religiously, grounded, viewing the aim of scientific knowledge as a mystical union of the ego with the whole universe.

The concept of structure in The Analysis of Matter, a significant work in Russell’s philosophy of science, is explored. This book marks a step in Russell’s rejection of phenomenalism and the development of a form of Lockean Representationalism. The core claim of The Analysis of Matter is that knowledge of the external world is purely structural. This thesis is based on the idea that we are not “directly acquainted” with physical objects, and our knowledge of physical properties and relations is derived from structural knowledge. Whatever is inferred from perceptions is only structure that can be validly inferred, and this structure is what can be expressed by mathematical logic.

Within this framework, the distinction between structure and quality is crucial. External world events possess both structure and qualities, while perceived events are considered more fundamental than their qualities. Knowledge of external events allows us to know their structural properties but not their qualities. The philosophy of physics, according to this view, falls within the scope of this claim, implying that physical theories provide knowledge of structure alone. Russell’s perspective here is seen to have affinities with Ernst Mach’s Analysis of Sensations and Russell’s own 1914 external world program. Entities in this context are described as not experienceable, knowable, or even picturable, sometimes called “transcendent” entities. This transcendence, however, is presented as not obstructing our knowledge of content, as properties related to purely formal or structural properties are knowable, unlike intuitive qualities.

Newman’s objection regarding the triviality of structure is discussed in relation to Russell’s structural realism. Newman argued that if knowledge of the external world is limited to its structure, this knowledge becomes trivial. His point was that whether the world exhibits certain structural properties is a matter to be discovered, not merely stipulated. The difficulty with this view lies in the claim that only structure is known. This criticism suggests that despite Russell’s intentions, his structuralism might collapse into phenomenalism. If assertions about unperceived events are trivially true based on logic and empirical assumptions, and if statements about the external world are reducible to statements about perception, then phenomenalism is a guaranteed consequence if Russell’s view is accepted. This implies that phenomenalism is the single ontological assumption regarding the cardinality of the external world, and Russell’s structuralism is seen to guarantee its truth.

The sources highlight that Russell’s work in the philosophy of science is deeply intertwined with his metaphysics and epistemology, particularly concerning the nature of the external world, perception, and the role of structure in knowledge. His dedication to science is presented as a significant aspect of his philosophical pursuits.

Russell’s Evolving Concept of Sense-Data

Based on the sources provided and our conversation history, Bertrand Russell’s concept of sense-data is a central, though evolving, element of his epistemology.

In Russell’s early theories of knowledge, particularly in The Problems of Philosophy, sense-data are presented as the ultimate data of empirical knowledge. They are described as the completely certain, immediate, and precise data of experience upon which all other empirical knowledge is built. Russell argued that we are directly aware of sense-data without inference, and all other empirical truths are derived from this direct acquaintance by either deduction or induction. Sense-data are identified as the “things that are immediately known in sensation,” such as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, and roughnesses. He distinguished these from “sensation” itself, which is the experience of being immediately aware of sense-data. In this early view, sense-data were held to be absolutely certain, indubitable, infallible, immediate, precise, and self-evident. Russell suggested that when looking at a table, the brown colour is something quite certain.

However, Russell’s views on sense-data underwent a significant change, which he described as a “very important change” by 1921 in My Philosophical Development. In The Analysis of Mind (1921), Russell explicitly abandoned the term “sense-data”. His earlier view was that sensation was a fundamentally relational occurrence where a subject is “aware” of an object, using the concept of “acquaintance” to describe this relation. Later, he came to believe that the idea of a subject in this relation was a “mere echo”. While Russell abandoned the term, the extent to which he abandoned the underlying concept is a subject of debate among commentators. Some argue he did not entirely give up the concept in its original form, while others believe he virtually retained it.

In his later works, such as An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (IMT) and Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (HK), Russell’s epistemology continued to grapple with the foundational role of immediate experience. The concept of “data” in these later works appears to fulfill a role similar to that of sense-data, referring to propositions or statements that are known without inference. These data are considered to have some degree of independent credibility. Russell also introduces the concept of the “sensational core” of perceptual experiences in his later theory. This “sensational core” is the part of experience most causally dependent on the external stimulus and is seen as what remains after removing the inevitable inferences and unconscious influences that surround perception.

Russell’s later view in IMT and HK distinguishes between data and inference. Beliefs about things of which we are aware without inference, including those involved in “direct sensible knowledge” or “sensible fact,” do not require inference. Data in HK are sometimes described as “private” to the subject. Russell also distinguishes between “momentarily noticed” facts (data) and “remembered facts”. The idea of a “pure datum” is presented as an ideal to be approached asymptotically, suggesting the difficulty in isolating the immediate, non-inferential component of perception. These datum statements are supposed to be “purer” (less inferential and theory-laden) than those in ordinary language.

Despite the shift in terminology and the evolution of his views, the core idea of immediate, non-inferential knowledge derived from experience remained important in Russell’s epistemology. While in his early phase sense-data were seen as infallible, Savage questions this infallibility in the sources, suggesting that judgments based on sensation can be fallible. The process of deriving knowledge from sense-data or the “sensational core” often involves analysis, particularly in Principia Mathematica and later works, where complex entities are analyzed into their constituents.

In summary, Russell’s engagement with the concept of sense-data evolved significantly throughout his career. Starting as the bedrock of his early foundationalist epistemology, defined by their certainty and immediacy, the term was later abandoned, but the underlying idea of non-inferential data derived from immediate experience persisted in concepts like “data” and the “sensational core” in his later works. The question of the infallibility and accessibility of such “pure” data remained a complex issue in his philosophy of knowledge.

Bertrand Russell’s Evolving Theory of Knowledge

Bertrand Russell’s theory of knowledge is a central and evolving component of his philosophy, deeply intertwined with his metaphysics and logic. Traditionally, it began with a foundationalist approach to empirical knowledge, asserting that all such knowledge is built upon a base of immediately known, completely certain data.

In his early work, particularly The Problems of Philosophy, Russell posited sense-data as these fundamental data of empirical knowledge. Sense-data are described as the “things that are immediately known in sensation,” such as colors, sounds, smells, hardnesses, and roughnesses. He argued that we are directly aware of sense-data without inference, a relationship he termed “acquaintance”. This early view held sense-data to be absolutely certain, indubitable, infallible, immediate, precise, and self-evident. All other empirical truths were believed to be derived from this direct acquaintance through deduction or induction. He distinguished sense-data from the sensation itself, which is the experience of being aware of the sense-data.

However, Russell’s views on sense-data underwent a significant transformation, which he described as a “very important change” in My Philosophical Development. By 1921, in The Analysis of Mind, he explicitly abandoned the term “sense-data”. His earlier concept of sensation as a relational occurrence where a subject is “aware” of an object evolved as he came to believe the idea of a subject was a “mere echo”. While the term was abandoned, commentators debate the extent to which the underlying concept was retained. Some argue he held onto the concept in virtually its original form, while others believe he virtually abandoned it.

In later works like An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (IMT) and Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (HK), Russell continued to address the role of immediate experience, employing the concept of “data”. These data, often understood as propositions or statements, are those believed without inference and possess some degree of independent credibility. Russell introduced the notion of the “sensational core” of perceptual experiences, identifying it as the part of experience most directly caused by the external stimulus, remaining after the removal of inferences and unconscious influences. The idea of a “pure datum” is presented as an ideal to be asymptotically approached, highlighting the difficulty in isolating the immediate, non-inferential element of perception.

Another crucial aspect of Russell’s theory of knowledge is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. While we have direct acquaintance with sense-data and possibly universals, our knowledge of most physical objects and events is indirect, acquired through descriptions based on our acquaintance with sense-data. This process of deriving knowledge from immediate data often involves analysis. Russell’s philosophical method often involves analyzing complex entities or propositions into their simpler constituents. This analytical approach is evident in his logical atomism and is crucial for understanding how knowledge of the external world, particularly its structure, is derived from perceived data.

Russell also grappled with the problem of inductive inference, acknowledging the need for principles or postulates to justify non-demonstrative inference beyond immediate data. He attempted to formulate such postulates to bridge the gap between perceived data and knowledge of the unperceived world.

Furthermore, in his later work, Russell explored the role of indexicals (“I,” “this,” “here,” “now”) in connecting the private world of immediate experience to the public world of scientific knowledge. Indexicals were seen as crucial for linking subjective sensory awareness to objective spatial and temporal locations and, subsequently, to the world described by science.

Overall, Russell’s theory of knowledge evolved from a strict foundationalism based on the certainty of sense-data and acquaintance to a more nuanced view involving “data” and the “sensational core,” while retaining the importance of analysis and grappling with the inferential gap between immediate experience and knowledge of the external, scientific world. His epistemology is fundamentally shaped by his commitment to logical analysis and his deep respect for scientific inquiry.

Russell’s Logical Atomism: Simples, Facts, and Analysis

Bertrand Russell’s Logical Atomism is a significant aspect of his philosophy, particularly in his metaphysics and epistemology. It is closely linked to his work in logic, such as Principia Mathematica. Logical Atomism proposes that the world is ultimately composed of simple, ultimate entities (atoms) and that complex things and facts can be analyzed or reduced to these basic constituents and their relations. This metaphysical view is mirrored in a corresponding structure of language and knowledge, where complex propositions can be analyzed into atomic propositions.

Here are some key aspects of Russell’s Logical Atomism as discussed in the sources:

• Ultimate Constituents (Simples): According to Russell’s ontology in the period around 1910-11 and in his later views, the simples of the world are particulars (which can include concrete facts or events) and universals, which encompass properties (1-adic or monadic relations) and relations. All objects are particulars. Between 1914 and 1940, events were considered simples. After 1940, most simples were seen as simple qualities, though these could also be complexes.
• Facts: Russell came to believe that “every thing that there is in the world I call a fact”. Facts are composed of simples in relation. Complex facts, like propositions about complexes, are subject to analysis into their constituent parts and the propositions describing those parts.
• Analysis: A fundamental method in Logical Atomism is philosophical analysis, which involves breaking down complex entities, concepts, or propositions into their simpler constituents. This process is crucial for understanding the structure of reality and deriving knowledge. The principle of atomicity, formulated initially by Wittgenstein and later integrated by Russell, states that “every statement about complexes can be analyzed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complex”. While initially thought to be easily applicable, the practical application can be difficult, as particulars themselves may be complex and require further analysis.
• Atomic and Complex Propositions: Corresponding to the simple entities and facts are atomic propositions, which are the simplest meaningful statements. Complex propositions are built up from atomic propositions through logical connectives and generalizations. Russell’s analysis aims to reduce complex propositions to their underlying atomic components.
• Connection to Logic and Language: Logical Atomism is intrinsically linked to logic and the structure of language. Russell’s work in logic, particularly in Principia Mathematica, provided a framework for analyzing the structure of propositions and inferential relationships. The “atomistic hierarchy of sentences” reflects the way complex linguistic structures are built from simpler ones, mirroring the hierarchical structure of reality as conceived by Logical Atomism. Russell’s theory of types, developed to avoid paradoxes in logic, is closely related to the structure of propositions within this framework. The logical form of propositions is seen as reflecting the underlying structure of reality.
• Evolution of the Theory: Russell’s specific formulation of Logical Atomism and the related theory of types evolved. His earlier (1908) view treated propositions and propositional functions as “single entities,” while the PM theory (1910-13) reconstructed them as not being single entities, instead viewing them as constituents of facts. The principle of atomicity also saw a “weakened form,” allowing for the analysis of physical objects and complex facts.
• Role in Epistemology: Logical Atomism provides a foundation for empirical knowledge, positing that knowledge ultimately rests on immediate awareness (acquaintance) of simple facts or data. The process of gaining knowledge of the external world involves constructing knowledge of complex entities and relationships through logical inference and analysis, starting from this foundation of immediate experience, such as with sense-data (in his earlier period).
• Structural Realism and Challenges: In later works like The Analysis of Matter, Russell’s views connect to structural realism, which posits that objective, scientific theories describe the structural properties of the world, known indirectly by description. This approach, rooted in the idea of structure derived from basic constituents, faced challenges, such as Newman’s objection, which questioned whether knowing only the structure of objects was sufficient for knowing the objects themselves. This highlights a tension in deriving knowledge of the external world from immediate sensory data or structural descriptions alone.

In essence, Russell’s Logical Atomism, in its various iterations, sought to understand the fundamental nature of reality and knowledge through a process of logical analysis that revealed the simple constituents of complex entities and facts, mirroring this structure in the form of propositions.

By Amjad Izhar
Contact: amjad.izhar@gmail.com
https://amjadizhar.blog

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